THREE ODES
OF PINDAR

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A LITERARY STUDY OF PYTHIAN 11, PYTHIAN 3, AND OLYMPIAN 7

BY

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To Ed Barton

PREFACE

The first three chapters of this monograph are expanded versions of separate papers that were read before the annual convention of the American Philological Association in 1966, 1965, and 1967, respectively. Accordingly, my primary aim here is to advance the understanding of the three poems as individual works of the literary art. The results of the three separate studies are in many respects dissimilar, but they make some strongly interrelated suggestions about the problem of critical method and about Pindar's poetic technique. It seemed desirable, therefore, to bring the essays together for publication and to summarize, in a conclusion, what I regard those interrelated suggestions to be. Since critical method and Pindaric technique thus become corollary topics, the present work also continues the study begun in my "Pindaric Criticism," in which I sought to clarify the results and the course of Pindaric scholarship from Boeckh's day to our own. In the following pages, therefore, the frequent attention paid to Pindaric scholars and scholarship is intended not as an impertinent attempt to catalogue the successes and failures of others but merely as a practical continuation of that former study. Some readers may need to consult "Pindaric Criticism" for an explanation both of the controversies in the field and of the attitudes assumed toward them here.

Pindaric studies have suffered from a frequent supposition that the sundry poems must have in common some important characteristic, such as compositional method, imagery, theme, or purpose. I have, therefore, chosen the three poems more for their apparent disparity than for anything they may have in common. Their common features are, in fact, almost limited to their authorship, their encomiastic nature, and their major status in Pindaric scholarship (I pass over their literary integrity, which emerges only after the study). Even the recipients of the three poems are remarkably dissimilar. Hieron and Diagoras lived just within the western and eastern reaches, respectively, of Greek civilization, whereas Thrasydaios was of Pindar's own home city of Thebes. Thrasydaios was a mere youth when his poem was written; Hieron must have been advanced in age, and apparently died a natural death not many

years after the composition of *Pythian 3*. Diagoras was a father in thriving manhood, near the end of his active athletic career, for two of his five children, Damagetos and Akousilaos, won Olympic victories in adult events a scant twelve and sixteen years, respectively, after Diagoras' success in 464. All evidence, internal and external, suggests that Thrasydaios and his family did not have considerable political importance; Hieron was a powerful, renowned monarch, whose western wars influenced the security of Greece itself. Again Diagoras occupies a middle position between the other two, since he and his family were definitely of political significance in Rhodes but cannot, in political power, be compared to the Sicilian despot. Similarly, Diagoras probably falls between the other two with respect to financial wealth, although concrete information on this point is lacking. As for the poems themselves, scholars do not even classify *Pythian* 3 as an epinician; *Olympian* 7 probably conforms to the genre as well as any poem in the epinician corpus. *Pythian* 11 is clearly an epinician, but most critics have thought its generic nature contaminated by a personal apology. *Pythian* 3 consists of a long mythical section followed by a shorter encomiastic portion. The other two poems display a standard epinician structure, in which a central portion devoted to myth is preceded and followed by praise of the victor. Other differences and similarities may be noted later; these should be sufficient to indicate that no obvious uniformity in the three poems has determined their choice.

My book is brief, but the debts incurred in writing it are great, and many are long-standing. My great debt to Pindaric scholars, past and present, is apparent on nearly every page. To some I feel so personally and generally indebted that, although I have known none of them personally, I must acknowledge their help here; the following come first to mind: Dissen, Mezger, Fraccaroli, Gildersleeve (a veritable sage), Schadewaldt, Illig, Fraenkel, Bundy, and Burton. For generous financial support at various stages of the manuscript, I wish to thank the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation and the University of California. I owe much to my former teacher, now colleague, Professor Keith Aldrich, who first introduced me to Pindar. My greatest debt is to Professor Roger Hornsby of the University of Iowa, whose patience and prodding, when my research was in a beginning state, gave me a view of literature that emboldened me to undertake this study. I wish also to acknowledge the help and encouragement of Professor Roy A. Swanson and my

colleague, Professor Alva Walter Bennett; special thanks go to Miss Nancy Winter, who helped me prepare the manuscript, and to my wife, who endured much in order that this work could be completed.

Finally, I express my sincere gratitude to a group of learned Dutchmen, whose extraordinary thoroughness and competence are refreshing indeed: to the editors of *Mnemosyne*, for their interest in my study, to Professor S. L. Radt, for a number of corrections and helpful suggestions, and to Mr. T. A. Edridge and his staff at Brill's, with whom it is a true pleasure to work.

Santa Barbara D. C. Y.
May, 1968

CHAPTER ONE

PYTHIAN II

Most Pindaric critics have assumed that *The Epinician Odes* contain numerous topical allusions which serve Pindar's personal aims more than they suit the encomiastic and literary purposes of the poems in which they occur. From this common assumption result two others; namely, that many Pindaric odes lack essential poetic unity [1] and that Pindar frequently uses the epinician to attack his competitors, to defend himself against sundry critics, and to publish his personal and political censures and loyalties.[2] Although many scholars still credulously accept these notions, Bundy's unusually significant work has placed them in doubt.[3] His essays suggest that at least some of the many judgments about Pindaric irrelevance and quarrelsomeness are woefully misconceived.[4] *Pythian* II and its

[1] Any personal reference unrelated to the rest of the poem makes perfect unity impossible. Many scholars allot so much importance to the supposed personal references that they even deny a general, imperfect unity in the odes. The problem of unity in Pindar has repeatedly been examined under false theories of poetic unity. For a detailed study of this subject see my "Pindaric Criticism," *passim* (cf. pp. 63 f. *infra* with notes thereto).

[2] In almost every poem some scholar has found Pindar throwing veiled insults at his supposed rivals or defending himself against one or more of the following charges: maligning local heroes, betraying the Theban government in favor of Sicilian tyrannies, being disloyal to Sicilian tyrannies, Medizing or not Medizing, "never glorifying Thebes" (Farnell II, 223), favoring oligarchy or not favoring it, being lenient toward Athenianism, etc.

[3] In "Pindaric Criticism" I wrote, "[Bundy's] work is probably the most important of this century" (p. 622), but I also expressed serious reservations about the ultimate potential of Bundy's method. These reservations remain unchanged, but the numerous misconceptions which are still perpetuated demonstrate beyond doubt that the study of the genre must become the *sine qua non* of the Pindarist (as Schadewaldt's essay suggested long ago). I regard Bundy's general thesis, despite his misplaced emphasis and a few misinterpretations, as convincingly proved by his evidence; the inadequacy of his approach, as a comprehensive critical method, is equally apparent, but should not obscure his great contribution.

[4] If we should discover a large number of passages in which we have erroneously seen strictly personal references to Pindar's own private circumstances, the effect upon Pindaric scholarship would be great. Not only would many standard interpretations become doubtful but also the datings based upon them.

scholarship offer much that is germane to this problem, for critics have read it against the background of Pindar's assumed proclivity for irrelevance, personal *apologia*, and narrow political comment. And they have grossly misread it, I fear.

The poem labors under the reputation of being one of the most obscure and difficult of Pindar's odes.[1] It runs the gamut of supposed difficulties. The scholiasts apparently give us a choice of two precise, but widely separated dates.[2] We are confronted with the question of Pindaric influence on Aeschylus or vice versa, depending upon which date we accept.[3] From ancient times to the present, virtually everyone has branded the myth with total and even unforgivable irrelevance. Scholars generally agree that the most famous passage in the poem, *vv.* 50b-54, reveals Pindar's political convictions and his private predicaments, but they dispute its meaning. Finally, there is in the conclusion a monstrous textual crux.[4]

My primary intention here is to clarify the meaning of *Pythian* II as a literary work of art by resolving the major difficulties usually attributed to it. The poem itself, despite its reputation, is rather

[1] Most critics (e.g., Méautis, p. 263) still take refuge in Wilamowitz' remark, "Pyth. II zumal ist eins der dunkelsten seiner Lieder" (*Pindaros*, p. 259). Norwood has conveniently collected (p. 119) many statements of the unusual difficulty of Py. II as a buffer for his own interpretation, which even he regarded as unusually far-fetched (p. 126).

[2] Drachmann II, 254. Γέγραπται ἡ ᾠδὴ Θρασυδαίῳ παιδὶ νικήσαντι κη′ Πυθιάδα, καὶ λγ′ δίαυλον ἢ στάδιον ἄνδρας (inscr. a; cf. inscr. b). Von der Muehll's careful study (*Mus. Helv.* 15 [1958], 141-156) proves the dating in 474 almost certain, and he gives plausible solutions to the usual problems in respect to the event which Thrasydaios won, his father's name, and the distribution of victories in his family. Since the interpretation presented here does not depend upon the date, I accept Von der Muehll's dating without further discussion.

[3] Since 474 is probably the date (note 2 *supra*), we must consider Pindar's myth influenced, as seems probable anyway, by Stesichorus but not Aeschylus. Until we learn more about Stesichorus' *Oresteia*, it is pointless to speculate whether or not Aeschylus' monumental trilogy is influenced by the short myth in Py. II. The many parallels collected by Duering, while interesting, are not sufficiently close or unusual to prove borrowing of any kind or to exclude a common source; surely they will not prove any choice of priority, such as Duering forces from them (Aeschylus).

[4] *Vv.* 54-57; this complex crux is undoubtedly beyond repair. However, Turyn's text (after Schroeder et al.) seems obviously wrong; it violates the context, fails to explain the corruption, and is seriously inconsistent with the τε (*v.* 55b). In *v.* 55, Hóman's interrogative should be abandoned and the MSS εἰ restored; neither ἅτᾳ (the subscript of which, according to other editors, lacks the MSS support accorded it by Turyn) nor τᾶν is at all likely as the first word. Thus Snell's text, which admits the lacunae and gives the required sense, is the best.

easy, and an exhaustive line-by-line analysis is unnecessary. Yet the proper reading of *Pythian* 11 implies, incidentally, that our attempts to understand Pindar's poetry have, in at least this case, suffered greatly from our attempt to reconstruct Pindar's biography. The following remarks, therefore, will serve in part as an explanation of the obvious literary, rather than biographical, emphasis of subsequent chapters.

The poem, composed in honor of Thrasydaios of Thebes, opens by invoking the daughters of Cadmus and summoning them, along with Alkmene, to the temple of Ismenian Apollo (*vv.* 1-8). There they will help Apollo make celebration both for Thebes and for the Pythian games (*vv.* 9-12). The occasion of the religious and civic celebration is partly, at least,[1] Thrasydaios' athletic victory, which continues an illustrious family tradition (*vv.* 13 f.). At this point (*v.* 15) Pindar introduces the myth by means of a far from subtle transitional device which has been aptly called "geographical subterfuge." [2] Thrasydaios was victorious in the Pythian games, in the land of Pylades, who was the *xenos* of Orestes. With no more ado than that, Orestes' name becomes the antecedent, as the almost inevitable relative pronoun (τόν, *v.* 17) [3] begins the myth, which has nothing to do with Pylades and Delphi, very little with Orestes. The wilfulness of the transition is remarkable. Pindar sometimes uses a geographical connection to make transition to or from a myth,[4] but perhaps nowhere else is the real relationship of the place to the events or heroes in the myth so remote as here, where the myth formally depends upon the mere fact that the victory occurred in the land of a man who was *xenos* to one of the characters in the myth. Although the artificial nature of this transition has been

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[1] We have no way of knowing whether the epinician celebration became such a ceremony or was merely attached to one (see, e.g., van Groningen, *Composition*, p. 360), but Py. 11 is one of the very few epinicians which are apparently performed in a religious shrine during a ceremony of civil significance. We now know that the inscription at the head of Ol. 3, εἰς θεοξένια, is an erroneous and late interpolation (Fraenkel, *Hermes* 89 [1961], 396); for well-founded scepticism about the connection between Py. 5 and the Carneia festival see Burton, pp. 135 f.

[2] Méautis, p. 264.

[3] See p. 32, note 4 *infra.*

[4] Ol. 9, 45, Py. 4, 4, Ne. 9, 9 ff., Ol. 7, 77-80, Ne. 5, 37-42, etc. Py. 10, 30 f. alone seems comparable to Py. 11, 15 ff., and there the reflection of Hyperborea in Thessaly is rather patent; Thebes does not reflect Sparta, nor does Thrasydaios' house reflect that of Agamemnon (despite the inventions of early critics as found in Dissen[2] II, 360 f., and Mezger, pp. 289-294).

adduced as proof of the irrelevance of the myth, I suggest that it may be the mark not of a wilful irrelevance, but of a poet adamantly using whatever he deems most relevant to his poem. The troubles of the house of Agamemnon have been chosen to form the myth for this particular poem, and, to that end, Pindar is willing to resort to almost anything, even geographical subterfuge.

The myth itself is a customary Pindaric *Ringkomposition* or ring-form,[1] dealing with the same events as those occurring in the first two plays of Aeschylus' *Oresteia*, the murders of Agamemnon and Cassandra, the union of Clytaemestra and Aegisthus, and their eventual murder at the hands of Orestes. Orestes' rôle in the events forms the outer terms of the ring. From the first mention of his exile in the land of Pylades, Pindar works back in time, through the first set of murders, to questions regarding Clytaemestra's motives for killing her husband (*vv.* 17-25). These questions lead to gnomic reflections on the maligning nature of townspeople's talk and on the direct proportion of ὄλβος to φθόνος: the loftiness of one's position in life (ὄλβος) attracts jealousy (φθόνος) in an equal amount. Activity at a low level passes unnoticed.[2] These gnomic reflections (*vv.* 25-30) make up the central, pivoting point of the myth, which now progresses forward in time, through the earlier murders again, and culminates with Orestes' killing of Aegisthus and Clytaemestra (*vv.* 31-37), the crucial event which Pindar has not yet mentioned. The very nature of the concluding sentence is probably terminal.[3]

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[1] See, in general, Illig, *passim* and, for Py. 11, also Burton, pp. 64 f.; see also p. 103, note 3 *infra*.

[2] The exegesis of this sentence has been much disputed. χαμηλὰ πνέων, the opposite of μέγα or μεγάλα πνέων (e.g., Euripides *Ba.* 640, *Andr.* 189), does not mean, in itself, "humilia spirans i.e. humili loco vivens" (as commonly explained in Rumpel s.v. πνέω) but "humilia spirans," i.e., "ad humilia aspirans" or 'proceeding without ambition or ostentation' (see Fennell *ad loc.* and cf. *LSJ* s.v. φρονέω 2.b and, despite overemphasis on the physiological, P. N. Lockhart, "φρονεῖν in Homer," *Class. Phil.* 61 [1966], 100). βρέμει neither means ζῇ (which notion is rather absurd) nor refers to the jealous mutterings of townspeople (which notion is contrary to the context); it means, as usual, 'makes a noise.' I suggest that the point of the sentence is as follows: whereas intense public interest attends the sayings, personal lives, and even the thoughts of the lofty, the most blatant activity or talk (βρέμει) of the humble and unpretentious arouses little notice (cf. Schroeder, *Pythien*, *ad loc.*).

[3] For a résumé of victims as terminal to a myth see Ol. 2, 89 ff.; 13, 84 ff., Py. 10, 46 ff., Is. 5, 42-47, etc. See, in general, Burton, p. 9, and cf. the formulaic crucial acts mentioned in Ol. 1, 88, Py. 5, 63 ff., etc. Cf. also such clausal epithets as frag. 46, 76 (= Paean 6, 104 Snell[3]) and Py. 1, 54.

In order to resume the program [1] where he had left it (*v.* 15), specific praise of Thrasydaios' victory, Pindar now elaborates a conventional transitional motif, assessing the relevance of his current subject to his current song (*vv.* 38 ff.).[2] He poses a rhetorical question, asking if he has taken a wrong turn or been blown off course. Since the motif seems a straightforward excuse for the discontinuance of a subject whose further treatment would be irrelevant, it does not necessarily prove the irrelevance of the myth,[3] but it clearly suggests the poet's consciousness of relevance. It serves as a rhetorical means of passing from one relevant subject to another, and that, after all, is what Pindar implies in *vv.* 41 ff. Thus the myth, which has appeared wholly out of place because it contains no discernible connection with the victor's city, family, or apparent circumstances, reveals in both its introduction and termination that Pindar uses it with design, almost cunning, and with apparent full knowledge of its consequences for his poem. We ought, therefore, to seek the relevance of the myth in causes other than the usual familial and geographical relationships before we term it a literary "freak." [4]

Having completed the transition back to the program, the poet briefly praises the victories of Thrasydaios and his family and describes their resulting glory (*vv.* 43-50b). Thereupon occurs the famous passage about τὰ μέσα and tyrannies (50b-54), which will receive detailed consideration shortly; I quote it here that its context be fully apparent.

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[1] The term 'program' is commonly, although somewhat loosely, used to denote those portions of an epinician where the praise of the victor is more direct, i.e., mention of his victory, his family, his city, etc., than in other portions, such as the myth.

[2] Bacch. 10, 51 f., Py. 10, 4, Ne. 3, 25 f. (see Bundy II, 44). For the explicit termination and transition cf. Py. 10, 51 ff., Bacch. 5, 176 ff., and Ne. 4, 69 ff. The Bacchylidean examples disprove Lefkowitz' remarks (pp. 204, 209; for her terminology, p. 199) that such statements are found only in the epinician poems of Pindar and thus vitiate her thesis that these are statements personal to Pindar and not part of a traditional repertory. For the proper understanding of this much misconstrued passage in Py. 11 see Schroeder, *Pythien*, pp. 104 f., Schadewaldt, pp. 284 f., and Burton, pp.68 f.

[3] As is commonly assumed: schol. *ad loc.*, Wilamowitz, *Pindaros*, p. 261, n. 2 (see Schadewaldt, p. 284, n. 5), Perrotta, p. 129, van Groningen, *Composition*, p. 361, Farnell *ad loc.*, et al.

[4] As Farnell, after castigating it for several pages, eventually terms it (I, 149).

θεόθεν ἐραίμαν καλῶν,
δυνατὰ μαιόμενος ἐν ἁλικίᾳ.
τῶν γὰρ ἀνὰ πόλιν εὑρίσκων τὰ μέσα μακροτάτῳ
ὄλβῳ τεθαλότα, μέμφομ' αἶσαν τυραννίδων·
ξυναῖσι δ' ἀμφ' ἀρεταῖς τέταμαι·

The remainder of the antistrophe (*vv.* 54-58) is marred by the textual crux, but clearly contains a beatification of the man who escapes jealousy and ὕβρις, and dies leaving to his descendants the best of all possessions, a good name. The subsequent epode (*vv.* 59-64) cites, as eminent examples of such successful lives, Iolaos, Heracles' attendant, and the Dioscuri, Castor and Polydeuces.

Such then, in outline, are the matters which confront every critic as he reads and examines the ode. I want first to examine the results obtained under the usual critical outlook, the assumption of irrelevant topical allusion in the poetry of a man supposedly so overcome by his personal anxieties that he cannot forbear discussing them while composing in another man's interest. A single interpretation of *Pythian* II, the so-called Wilamowitz interpretation,[1] receives common acceptance, and both it and its variants depend wholly upon the assumption of an irrelevant personal allusion in the famous deprecation of tyrannies in *v.* 53. Wilamowitz, terming the passage an obviously personal statement unrelated to the epinician at hand, concluded that Pindar, upon return from his Sicilian visit of 476, found himself confronted by jealous Theban accusers, who charged him with betraying Thebes and having become a foreign "Agent" loyal to the Sicilian tyrants, Hieron and Theron. Wilamowitz maintains that Pindar thus takes the opportunity offered by *Pythian* II in 474 to vindicate himself against these charges, to let his Theban countrymen know his political stand, and to disclaim publicly

[1] Wilamowitz (*Pindaros*, p. 263) is regarded as the founder of this interpretation, but it depends, to a large extent, upon Rauchenstein ("Ueber die Tendenz und Zeit der II. pythischen Ode," *Philologus* 2 [1847], 193-211), who first posited the connection between the myth and the unpleasantries of Hieron's court and even emended the scholia (which, in the erroneous 19th century computations, placed the ode in 478) to date the poem after the Sicilian visit. Pindar could thus proclaim to his countrymen, upon his return to Thebes (462 B.C., after the long odyssey from Sicily around the Mediterranean which Schmidt had assigned him), his distaste for the tyrannies which he had experienced and seen fall. Wilamowitz moved the date up to 474, added the part about Pindar's enemies and about his defense against charges of political disloyalty, and made it popular.

allegiance to the Sicilian tyrannies (μέμφομ' αἶσαν τυραννίδων, *v.* 53). This view, accepted and elaborated by virtually all who accept the dating in 474,[1] has received a popular variation designed to accommodate 454. Bowra, unable to discover a tyranny to which Pindar could be reputed loyal in 454, unwilling to give up the notion that Pindar here defends himself against charges of political disloyalty, has incongruously substituted Athens for the Sicilian despots as the specific tyranny rejected in *v.* 53.[2]

Both Wilamowitz and Bowra, of course, attribute essential disunity to the poem, but the complete disunity which their interpretation implies is probably best illustrated by their attempts to relate it to the myth. Here the ramifications show the bizarre nature of the basic interpretation: Wilamowitz finds Pindar likening himself to Clytaemestra, as they both must experience calumny at the hands of jealous townspeople. Regarding the analogy between Pindar and Clytaemestra as gross,[3] Bowra claims that Clytaemestra's death in the myth is a Pindaric prophecy of the fall of Athens.[4] I shall not examine such interpretations in further detail, for their very nature defies direct refutation and invites further

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[1] Norwood, p. 123, Dornseiff, *Pindar*, pp. 112, 115, Duchemin, p. 252, n. 1, van Groningen, pp. 364 f., Gundert, pp. 83-86 (Gundert regards the deprecation of tyrannies in Py. 11 as the only place where Pindar speaks his private, rather than poetic, views), Puech II, 156, Méautis, p. 263, Burton, pp. 61, 72 f., 76, Nierhaus, pp. 71 f., et al.; but see p. 12, n. 2 *infra*.

[2] This interpretation was first put forth in his "Pythian 11" (1936) and most recently elaborated in his *Pindar* (pp. 154 ff., 405), where, rather less obscurely than before, he joins to Athens, as the object of Pindar's disclaimer of allegiance, the Theban government set up by Athens after the battle of Oenophyta. Bowra's dating and view of the poem have found acceptance among Finley (pp. 160, 165) and his followers (e.g., *Harv. Stud. in Class. Phil.* 66 [1962], 272).

[3] As do others of whom the most curious is Duchemin. While apparently accepting the rest of Wilamowitz' interpretation, she decides that Pindar compares himself to Cassandra rather than to Clytaemestra: Pindar's enemies were so violent in their attacks upon him that he apparently feared assassination, and gave warning by the Cassandra myth that "on peut bien assassiner l'interprète des dieux, mais que ceux-ci le vengeront tôt ou tard" (*Pindare, poète et prophète* [N.B. the title], p. 252, n. 1).

[4] Bowra, p. 154 (are we then to regard Agamemnon as a defeated Thebes?). In his *Time-Life Book: Classical Greece* (1965) Bowra states (p. 104) that "This anti-Athenian point of view is expressed in the work of Pindar .... He criticized the Athenian spirit for destroying the sense of inner peace .... He saw the city as an example of that self-pride which breeds its own ruin. Athens, *he said*, was like Bellerophon who tried to scale the sky ...." (italics added; for Bowra's common interpretation of Py. 11 and Is. 7 see his *Pindar*, p. 294).

invention and historical conjecture.[1] I want merely to point out that we are thus left with an obscure, unsuccessful, bastard epinician of little or no literary value.[2]

Opposition to Wilamowitz' interpretation, with the exception of Bowra's variation, has been amazingly slight and inconspicuous, and it has offered no positive alternative. Recently, however, three exceptionally able and judicious Pindaric scholars, in brief passing remarks, have approached some alternatives to the received interpretation. They have even, indeed, implied serious errors in it—only to reject, immediately, their own insights without even so much as serious consideration. Von der Muehll questions (rightly, as we shall see) Wilamowitz' view on the grounds that it misconstrues Pindar's use of the first person in *vv.* 50b-54. He then states that he cannot determine whether Pindar's choice of the myth is significant, "d.h. ob der Mythos etwa als Beispiel des Rechts, das Apollon vertritt, oder als Beleg der αἶσα τυράννων dasteht" (p. 145). The

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[1] The interpretations of *Pythian* II made before the change in the reckoning of Pythiads provide a sobering reminder of the subjective and ephemeral nature of these topical interpretations, for only the names and events changed with the date; the basic assumptions are the same. If we were suddenly forced to date the poem in 490, whole new sets of governments and tyrannies would be concocted to fit the same assumptions. The nineteenth century interpretations abounded with talk of the battle of Plataea, Medizing, and the subsequent political upheavals in Thebes. The tyrannies censured in *v.* 53 were those of the Medizing Theban "τύραννοι," Attaginus and Tegenidas, or the notorious Spartan "τύραννος," persecutor of Medizers, Pausanias, or the Spartans in general, or Mardonius. Pindar, or more frequently Thrasydaios, was found accused of questionable political loyalties (and the latter, of course, had to contend with all the family troubles of nineteenth century scholarship: murdered relatives, relatives who had been calumniously accused of adultery with an aristocratic lady [Clytaemestra], etc.). But in those days Athens was not Clytaemestra (who sometimes had her rôle as Sparta usurped by Orestes or Agamemnon), but Aegisthus (Cassandra, of course, was not Pindar [p. 7, n. 3 *supra*], but Thebes). See, in general, Mezger's bibliographical summary (pp. 288-295), a frightening but instructive essay, and see my remarks ("Pindaric Criticism," p. 592) on L. Schmidt's book (where my statement "was not to abate until" was, I fear, premature).

[2] The concluding remarks of scholars are, if not disappointed (see Bundy II, 35), disappointing: see such remarks as those of van Groningen, *Composition*, pp. 365 f. (the phrase "serviteur des Muses" [p. 366] really means not "servant of the Muses" but 'servant of common gossip and personal pride'), Farnell I, 148 f., Finley, p. 164. I am not implying, of course, that no one has understood, appreciated, and admired any of the poem; Finley, Burton, and Méautis, for example, make perceptive observations, but these are all in despite and usually contradiction of their basic interpretations, and therefore not emphasized (cf. p. 20, n. 1 *infra*). Lattimore (p. 156) well sums up the general confusion and disappointment.

latter suggestion is especially interesting, for Gildersleeve, long ago, and Wolde, more recently, had already implied it in their unfortunately meager and unnoticed introductions to the poem (yet Gildersleeve and Wolde also misconstrued the first person in *vv.* 50b-54 and thus failed to comprehend much of the poem). Nevertheless, by the next sentence, Von der Muehll has abandoned his suggestions, and joins the scholiast in despair of finding any relevance in the myth.

Similarly van Groningen, discussing Pindar's myth, gives us first his own impression: "Si l'on voulait tirer de ce récit, qui condense en quelques vers une abondance d'horreurs, une conclusion adéquate, ce serait probablement celle-ci: le sort des rois est beaucoup moins enviable qu'il ne paraît." But van Groningen immediately discounts his own critical impression in his next sentence ("Mais ce n'est pas ce que Pindare formule en premier lieu"), and then forsakes it for explicit, full, and admiring approval of Wilamowitz' comprehensive interpretation of the poem (*Composition*, pp. 359 f., 364 ff.). In much the same manner Burton, assessing *v.* 53, makes a momentary concession to his own critical acumen: "While μέμφομ' αἶσαν τυραννίδων (*v.* 53) may perhaps be a distant echo of Archilochus' μεγάλης οὐκ ἐρέω τυραννίδος (Fr. 22 Diehl)"; but he abandons that idea, fails to pursue the parallelism or its implications, and completes his sentence thus: "the remark must be related closely to its context in the poem and to what is known of Pindar's circumstances at the time." The Archilochus passage forgotten, Burton proceeds to elaborate an only slightly modified version of Wilamowitz' interpretation, which he explicitly claims to be following (pp. 71, 61, n. 2).

Yet the critical impressions of such scholars as Von der Muehll, van Groningen, and Burton are seldom wholly unfounded, and their unexamined and hastily abandoned suggestions, if pursued, conflict seriously with the accepted views of the poem. I shall agree with Burton that much can be gained from viewing a poem in the light of its circumstances, but I suggest that the critics of *Pythian* II have, in the main, been looking for the wrong kind of circumstances. Such things as the battle of Oenophyta, Hieron, and Pindar's presumed jealous townsmen do not make up the total possible background of the poem. There are some other considerations, and they prove, I think, more conspicuously pertinent than the former. Burton mentions one, from Archilochus (22 Diehl^3):

Οὔ μοι τὰ Γύγεω τοῦ πολυχρύσου μέλει
οὐδ' εἷλέ πώ με ζῆλος οὐδ' ἀγαίομαι
θεῶν ἔργα, μεγάλης δ' οὐκ ἐρέω τυραννίδος·
ἀπόπροθεν γάρ ἐστιν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐμῶν.

In assessing these lines should we blindly follow the assumption of specific personal, topical, and political allusions, apply it to Archilochus, and conclude, with Bonnard,[1] that this soldier-poet (and, some think, slave-son bastard) had been asked to become *tyrannos* of Thasos (which offer he hereby publicly declines)? Let us not, this time. I prefer to analyze the fragment and move on. Archilochus here presents a list of three things which he does not covet, extreme wealth, superhuman abilities,[2] and a tyranny. Then he summarily rejects them (or at least the last); unfortunately, the fragment, which seems to be a priamel,[3] ends before we are told what, if anything, Archilochus does, in fact, desire.

Anacreon 8 (*PMG* 361) proves remarkably similar to Archilochus' fragment:

ἐγὼ δ' οὔτ' ἂν Ἀμαλθίης
βουλοίμην κέρας οὔτ' ἔτεα

[1] This amazing interpretation (Bonnard, p. 9, with a reference to Lasserre's frag. 35 [P. Oxy. 2310, fr. 1, col. 1]) suggests that the Delphic oracle had requested that Archilochus become *tyrannos* of Thasos.

[2] The meaning of οὐδ' ἀγαίομαι θεῶν ἔργα ("I do not envy the deeds of gods") has apparently been unclear (e.g., it bothers Lattimore so much that, to avoid it, he apparently invents an active participle of θεάομαι [?: *Greek Lyrics*, p. 2]). The common view of the phrase regards it as an expression of satisfaction with the divine order (Bonnard), varied to "Was die Götter einem Menschen schenken, neidet man ihm nicht" (Fraenkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie*², p. 154), to a failure to begrudge others their supernatural powers, which are god-given gifts (suggested by Gyges' magic ring: Cataudella, pp. 251 f.). There may be some validity in these interpretations, especially in the last, but the main point of the phrase is 'I do not covet (i.e., desire to perform) the acts of gods (i.e., superhuman feats),' as is corroborated by the theme of superhuman longevity in Anacreon 8 and Simonides 71 (*infra*; cf. Maximus Tyrius XX, 2: οὐ πλοῦτον τέθηπεν, οὐ βασίλεια ἐκπλήττεται, οὐ φεύγει θάνατον [Schmid, *Priamel*, p. 157]) and other superhuman feats in Euripides *Med.* 543, Theocritus *Id.* 8, 54, etc.

[3] "The priamel is a focusing or selecting device in which one or more terms serve as foil for the point of particular interest" (Bundy I, 5). See, in general W. Kröhling, *Die Priamel als Stilmittel in der griechisch-römischen Dichtung* (Griefswald, 1935): for Pindar, see p. 33, n. 4 *infra*; for the particular form pertinent here, see Schmid, *Priamel*, pp. IX f. *et passim* (of prime relevance for Py. 11: cf. the topics listed in Schmid's Register [part C] with the remaining remarks of this chapter), Bundy II, n. 117 (on Bundy's interpretation of Py. 11, 53 see p. 14, n. 3 *infra*).

πεντήκοντά τε κἀκατὸν
Ταρτησσοῦ βασιλεῦσαι.

Anacreon, like Archilochus, rejects first a desire for extreme wealth. He then ingeniously combines the second and third items of Archilochus' list, the desire for superhuman qualities and that for a monarchy or τυραννίς, by disclaiming a wish to emulate a man (Arganthonius) who proverbially not only possessed a monarchy but also retained it for the humanly impossible span of 150 years. Like Archilochus 22, Anacreon 8 is probably part of a priamel the remainder of which is now unrecorded.

A fragment of Simonides (71 [*PMG* 584]), however, plausibly suggests the kind of desire which the earlier poets might have chosen in the missing verses, decisively clarifies the general nature of the sentiment which they express, and substantiates the connection which I have posited between Archilochus' θεῶν ἔργα and Anacreon's "150 years":

τίς γὰρ ἁδονᾶς ἄτερ θνα-
τῶν βίος ποθεινὸς ἢ ποί-
α τυραννίς;
τᾶσδ' ἄτερ οὐδὲ θεῶν ζηλωτὸς αἰών.

The sentiment is cast in a slightly different form, a deprecation of any life void of pleasure, but the second and third items in Archilochus' list are clearly evident; the potential envy of the gods' superhuman deeds (οὐδ' ἀγαίομαι θεῶν ἔργα) becomes a potential envy of their generally superhuman life and, especially, longevity (οὐδὲ θεῶν ζηλωτὸς αἰών); the potential desire for a τυραννίς remains the same.

These three fragments and many passages in later poets testify to the existence of a definite poetic *topos* wherein various traditionally desirable goals of life are assessed and considered inferior to another.[1] Obviously, the lives of the extremely wealthy, of the gods, and of the *tyrannos* or monarch were customarily regarded enviable and desirable;[2] Archilochus and Anacreon disavow such desires, and Simonides, in order to magnify pleasure, maintains that even

[1] The *topos* is, of course, manifold and assumes several developments; eventually, the whole host of priamels like Horace *C.* I, 1 are a part of the same *topos*, but I shall disregard such diffuse matters and concentrate only on those which are of immediate and illuminating relevance to Py. 11, 53.

[2] The literary *topos* involves the negative appraisal of these supposedly blessed lives; there occurs, however, at least one late instance where the positive wish is expressed first (*Anth. Pal.* XI, 3, 1 f.):

such commonly coveted lives are worthless without it. We shall probably never be sure of the precise nature of the missing conclusions of the Archilochus and Anacreon fragments, but their poetry would generally and strongly tend to confirm what Simonides 71 suggests, that the two authors hold up the lives of wealth and power as splendid foil for the choice of a common life of pleasure.[1] Moreover, although these examples of the *topos* reveal some variety in their presentation, they, along with many others in which much variety is displayed, have a common element: the desire to have a τυραννίς is pointedly disclaimed.

Pythian II, 50b-54 reveals palpable and crucial affinities to this *topos*, and, in fact, proves an example of it when viewed without prejudice and in the light of post-Pindaric versions. The preconception that Pindar speaks in these lines as a private citizen rather than as a poet, that the views expressed pertain to Pindar rather than to the victor, that the (ἐγώ) is narrow and personal rather than impersonal, choral, or poetic, is directly contrary to the evidence both of this poem and of others. *Pythian* II, 50b-54 appears a patent instance of the common and well-known Pindaric use of ἐγώ whereby general commendations, often applicable to everyone but usually specifically applicable to the victor, are cast in statements made in the first person singular.[2] Moreover, the use of the first person singular in *Py.* II, 50b-54 would conform to a tradition of the *topos*

Ἤθελον ἂν πλουτεῖν ὡς πλούσιος ἦν ποτε Κροῖσος,
καὶ βασιλεὺς εἶναι τῆς μεγάλης Ἀσιῆς.

Yet the speaker relates in the subsequent verses that whenever he sees the coffin-maker he is reminded of death, turns to drinking wine, and trades Asia for the simple, convivial life (μύρα καὶ στεφάνους).

[1] Any reconstruction of the missing next lines is an obvious indulgence of fancy, but even before I had discovered Theocritus 8, 56 (erotic motif) or been led to *Anth. Pal.* XI, 3 (drinking motif [p. 11, n. 2 *supra*]) by Cataudella, p. 252, my colleague A. W. Bennett had suggested that Archilochus' next line was something like "All I want is a girl in my arms and wine in my cup," and surely that is more likely than 'I thank you, nevertheless, Apollo and Thasians, for the great honor which you have offered me' (p. 10, n. 1 *supra*) or "aber wenn ich den Soundso in dem Prunk und der Macht seines übel erworbenen Reichtums an mir vorübergehn sehe, dann allerdings bekomme ich Lust, ihm meine Axt an den Kopf zu werfen" (Fraenkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie*², p. 154; cf. his *Wege und Formen*, p. 57, where less violence is displayed).

[2] See Von der Muehll, pp. 144 f.; significantly, thus Py. II, 50b-54 was regarded in the early 19th century (to Von der Muehll's note 12 add Thiersch's lucid note *ad loc.*); Von der Muehll is apparently the only critic to oppose, with explicit and scholarly arguments, the Wilamowitz-Bowra view of the

already observable in Archilochus and Anacreon. The general sentiment expressed by the *topos* may well also be personal to the poet, as it was, no doubt, to Archilochus and Anacreon. But until adapted to a specific dramatic purpose by the tragedians,[1] the *topos* remains concerned with general concepts and bears no discernible direct application to actual people, events, or opportunities.[2] Another common but wholly groundless prejudice regards Pindar's passage as concerned with specific kinds of government, such as aristocracy and tyranny, rather than with the position of an individual within a body politic irrespective of its formal organization. Yet αἶσα (*v.* 53), which must be totally ignored in the usual interpretation, suggests an individual lot rather than a generic classification. Moreover, a fragment of Phocylides (12 Diehl³) demonstrates that τὰ μέσα (*Py.* 11, 52) must be a reference to an individual's prominence within a state, not a tortured way of saying "(Theban) aristocracy," as is often assumed:[3]

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passage (although Farnell II, 222 f. and Wolde, pp. 311 f. deny a topical reference to the passage, they also misconstrue the first person: cf. Gildersleeve, pp. 358 f., Schroeder *ad loc.*). For documentation of this use of the first person see p. 58, note 5 *infra*. These are not so much "if I were you" statements (Lefkowitz, n. 107, Dornseiff, p. 84) as encomiastic remarks made in a spirit of admiration, approbation, and emulation of the victor (thus in tragedy they often indicate disapprobation or a lack of desire to emulate someone, e.g., Aeschylus *Pr.* 894-897). For further recognition of this use of ἐγώ in Py. 11, 50b-54 cf. Mezger *ad loc.* and Finley, p. 166. Van Groningen illustrates their usual inconsistency by claiming that this use of ἐγώ is suddenly discontinued (after just one sentence) to become an ἐγώ intensely personal and private to Pindar and wholly irrelevant to Thrasydaios' epinician (*Composition*, pp. 361 f.).

[1] Tragic characters of royal blood, either when accused of seeking a monarchy or when offered such an opportunity, mouth the generalized *topos* as having specific application to their personal situations: besides Euripides *Hipp.* 1013-20 and *Ion* 621-32 (which are discussed *infra*) see Sophocles *O.T.* 584-600 (where the *topos* is cleverly modified to take advantage of Creon's actual political power). N.B. the common vocabulary in *Hipp.* 1013 f. and *O.T.* 589 and 592.

[2] See Fraenkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie*², p. 169, n. 50. Even if a few might find it credible that Archilochus refused an actual directive to become monarch of Thasos, surely no one will believe that Anacreon refused a similar, but even better, offer from the Tartessians or that he actually came upon the Horn of Plenty only to let it lie.

[3] See, e.g., Burton, p. 72. A number of scholars recognize that τὰ μέσα deals with the status of an individual within any society, quote pertinent parallels, and yet inconsistently proceed to discuss both τὰ μέσα and αἶσαν τυραννίδων as being terms for Theban aristocracy and specific tyrannies respectively (Burton, pp. 72 ff.; Bowra, pp. 155 f., Schroeder, *Pythien*, p. 106, Norwood, p. 122).

πολλὰ μέσοισιν ἄριστα· μέσος θέλω ἐν πόλει εἶναι.

The similarity to *Py.* II, 52 f. is so obvious as to require no further comment.

When these prejudices are set aside, the manifold affinities of *Py.* II, 50b-58 to the *topos* discussed above emerge. There seems to be a minor but unmistakable depreciation of wealth in *v.* 58, where the χάρις of a good name is termed the best of "possessions" (κτεάνων).[1] Archilochus' lack of desire to perform superhuman feats (θεῶν ἔργα) finds a parallel in δυνατὰ μαιόμενος (*Py.* II, 51).[2] But, as is usual in this *topos*, Pindar's emphasis is on the deprecation of the tyrant's life (μέμφομ' αἶσαν τυρρανίδων), which, as will soon become apparent, cannot mean 'I regard tyranny a bad form of government': like Archilochus' μεγάλης οὐκ ἐρέω τυραννίδος, Pindar's phrase means 'I do not care to possess a tyranny.'[3]

In sum, then, the famous passage in *Pythian* II is not a personal defense against charges of specific attitudes toward specific tyrannies

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[1] This notion itself is traditional: cf. Theognis 409 f., οὐδένα θησαυρὸν παισὶν καταθήσει ἀμείνω/αἰδοῦς, ἥτ' ἀγαθοῖσ' ἀνδράσι, Κύρν', ἕπεται (for αἰδώς referring to respected, favorable reputation see Farnell *ad* Ol. 13, 110 and p. 93, note 4 *infra*). This parallel makes the monetary reference of Pindar's κτεάνων rather clear. The deprecation of a tyranny in this *topos* sometimes pales the deprecation of wealth even when the latter is clearly present (see *contra* note 3 *infra*); for a similarly unemphasized deprecation of wealth in conjunction with the abjuration of desire of tyranny cf. Euripides *Hipp.* 1010-13 for which see W. S. Barrett, *Euripides Hippolytus*, pp. 351 f. (Barrett's confusion about the relationship between the two motifs and about the purpose of Hippolytus' denial of a desire for wealth [*ad* 1012] results from his failure to recognize that Hippolytus is using a traditional *topos*).

[2] Cataudella, p. 252, relates θεόθεν ἐραίμαν καλῶν rather than δυνατὰ μαιόμενος to Archilochus' οὐδ' ἀγαίομαι θεῶν ἔργα, but I think that his interpretation of Archilochus' phrase (after Fraccaroli) wrongly emphasizes a desire to have exceptional powers only if the gods will it; in neither Archilochus nor Pindar is there suggestion of any desire for such exceptional powers. If the received interpretation of ἐν ἀλικίᾳ is correct ('as befits whatever may be my age'), a relationship between it and the notion of longevity in Anacreon 8 and Simonides 71 perhaps is suggested; another interpretation, however, of ἐν ἀλικίᾳ has perhaps equal validity (see p. 19, note 1 *infra*).

[3] Apparently Bundy alone, in his short reference to our passage (II, 86 with n. 117), has recognized that μέμφομαι here declares a personal choice (he glosses with "οὐκ ἔραμαι" and quotes many pertinent parallels) rather than a generic condemnation, but he seems to view the entire passage as merely a derogation of wealth (αἶσαν τυραννίδων glossed by "πλουτεῖν") as part of a theme of liberality (εὐεργεσία) and disregards the political aspect of the passage. The latter proves of far greater importance for the poem, which does not seem to present, to any considerable degree, Thrasydaios' εὐεργεσία as monetary; see also p. 61, note 1 *infra*.

and oligarchies of Fifth Century Greece; it is a general statement, in no way personal to Pindar, cast in a traditional poetic *topos* and intended to reflect and thus to praise the victor's way of life. Yet the pre-Pindaric examples of the *topos* which I have adduced above have, unfortunately, all been fragmentary, and the full nature of the *topos* has not yet become apparent. The post-Pindaric examples, however, which give an elaborate view of the whole *topos*, firmly corroborate the suggestion that the disputed passage in *Pythian* II is, indeed, such a specimen. They also felicitously and to an amazing degree clarify the meaning of *Pythian* II, in both its totality and its individual phrases.

Of several pertinent post-Pindaric versions, I shall discuss only the two which most illuminate *Pythian* II.[1] The first is Euripides *Ion*, 621-632, which, like *Py.* II, 52 f., rejects tyranny and commends the Mean:[2]

τυραννίδος δὲ τῆς μάτην αἰνουμένης
τὸ μὲν πρόσωπον ἡδύ, τἀν δόμοισι δὲ
λυπηρά· τίς γὰρ μακάριος, τίς εὐτυχής,
ὅστις δεδοικὼς καὶ παραβλέπων βίον

[1] Others of lesser but positive relevance are Theocritus *Id.* 8 (not 7, as erroneously printed often in Schmid, *Priamel*), 53-56 (where πρόσθε θέειν ἀνέμων probably represents supernatural ability [p. 10, n. 2 *supra*] but more specifically, athletic prowess [p. 18, n. 2 *infra*]), *Anth. Pal.* XI, 3 (p. 11, n. 2 *supra*), Sophocles *O.T.* 584-600 (p. 13, n. 1 *supra*), Gregorius Nazianzenus, *ad animam suam*, 89 ff. (Cataudella, pp. 251 f.); cf. Solon, 23, 5 f. (Diehl[3]) and see, in general, many of the texts at the end of Schmid, *Priamel*. In Theoc. *Id.* 8, 53 Pelops' kingship is ingeniously combined with the geographical extent of his sway (γᾶν Πέλοπος), as Pelops is the paradigm of the concept 'king' (Tyrtaeus 9 [Diehl[3]]: cf. Ol. 1 *passim*) and in the *topos* the extent of possession of land is a variant for kingship as an illustration of power or for wealth (cf. *Anth. Pal.* IX, 110, Ne. 8, 37 ff. and see Schmid's Register *s.v. Landbesitz*); the reasoning is given in Phocylides 7 to which cf. Anacreon 8 (*supra*).

I heard a pertinent contemporary rendering of precisely the same *topos* in Sept. 1966, when it was used by a Mississippi radio evangelist (J. Charles Jessup, who, incidentally, appears to compose orally in formulae, usually in distinct metrical and breathing units, and occasionally breaks into actual song) as follows (to the best of my ear and memory):

"I don' wanta have all the money in the world [breath]
I don' wanta be the President of the United States [breath]
I just wanta live a good Christian, to please my God."

For the nature of the choice here cf. Theognis 653 f.

[2] I must credit Fraccaroli, p. 507, for leading me to this important passage, as he curiously appends mention of it as an afterthought to his interpretation of Py. II, which, being based on the usual notions (the tyrant is Pausanias), is wholly discordant with his mention of the *Ion*.

αἰῶνα τείνει; δημότης ἂν εὐτυχὴς
ζῆν ἂν θέλοιμι μᾶλλον ἢ τύραννος ὤν,
ᾧ τοὺς πονηροὺς ἡδονὴ φίλους ἔχειν,
ἐσθλοὺς δὲ μισεῖ κατθανεῖν φοβούμενος.
εἴποις ἂν ὡς ὁ χρυσὸς ἐκνικᾷ τάδε,
πλουτεῖν τε τερπνόν; οὐ φιλῶ ψόφους κλύειν
ἐν χερσὶ σῴζων ὄλβον οὐδ' ἔχειν πόνους·
εἴη γ' ἐμοὶ <μὲν> μέτρια μὴ λυπουμένῳ.

Verse 621 shows clearly what Pindar means by μέμφομαι in *Py.* II, 53, for a τυραννίς is usually αἰνουμένη, but, in the opinion of those who use the *topos* which deprecates it, μάτην αἰνουμένη. *Pythian* II, 53, therefore, does the opposite, linguistically, of according a tyranny its usual praise (αἰνέω) and "finds fault" (μέμφομαι) with it. Similarly, *Ion* 625 f. ought to solve the problem of ξυναῖσι ἀρεταῖς (*Py.* II, 54),[1] as δημότης recalls ξυναῖσι and shows that those who reject the extreme political position, monarch, may present, as a corollary, their conformity and devotion to the public good, through mere common citizenship. μέτρια (*Ion* 632) parallels τὰ μέσα (*Py.* II, 52).

Yet *Ion* 621-632 does far more than clarify a few Pindaric phrases, for it and the speech whence it is drawn suggest a clear and persuasive solution to the problem which has, more than any other, plagued the critics of *Pythian* II, namely, the apparent irrelevance of the myth. The *topos* of the deprecation of a desire for a tyranny involves, in its full form as given in the *Ion*, the supremacy of the moderate life over the powerful and rich, but dangerous and vituperated, life of a τύραννος, and *Pythian* II conforms perfectly. Ion explains his rejection of the tyrant's life by reference to such things as the deceit, improper coalitions, jealousy, calumny, palace coups, and constant threat of death inherent in it,[2] and Pindar could not

[1] The problem (see, e.g., Farnell *ad loc.*) hardly deserves the attention it receives; ξυναῖσι means merely 'public,' but surely the emphasis is on the public good (cf. Bundy II, 86) rather than on a differentiation between those ἀρεταί available to a *tyrannos* and those accessible to all (e.g., Schroeder, *Pythien*, p. 108). τᾶν in the texts of Bowra et al., which, because of the interposing sentence, can hardly be correct anyway, ought to be removed in order not to beg this question.

[2] *Ion* 585-647; note especially *vv.* 595 ff., the emphasis upon the hate and slander experienced by those high in politics, and the contrast between οὐχ ἡσυχάζων (*Ion* 601) and ἡσυχᾷ νεμόμενος (Py. II, 55b). Lucian *cont. (Charon)*, xviii provides another but remarkably similar list: ἦν γοῦν τοὺς βασιλέας ἴδῃ τις αὐτῶν, οἵπερ εὐδαιμονέστατοι εἶναι δοκοῦσιν, ἔξω τοῦ ἀβεβαίου καὶ ὡς φῄς

have chosen a better paradigm of this kind of life than the horrors of the house of Agamemnon. We may now understand why Pindar took such pains to use this myth, despite its being formally somewhat inconvenient. Far from being irrelevant, the myth perfectly and vividly describes with concrete examples the anxious, λυπηρός life which offers brilliant and frightening foil for the moderate, pleasurable life attributed to Thrasydaios and commended in *vv.* 50b-58. The relevance of the myth, then, I suggest, is precisely what has caused such consternation: there is nothing in the myth which pertains to Thrasydaios or to his kind. That is the point.

It seems certain, therefore, that a study of this *topos*, in which desire for a tyranny is denied, gives persuasive solutions to the two problems of *Pythian* 11 which are commonly assigned the greatest importance, the precise nature and significance of *vv.* 50b-54 and the relevance of the myth. Verses 50b-54 contain a traditional beatification, in the generalized first person, of the simple, secure, citizen's life, to which the portion in life (αἶσα) alloted to those who seem *beati*, τύραννοι or monarchs, is deemed far inferior. The myth gives cogent arguments for the judgments contained in *vv.* 50b-54. Yet the mere solution of these two problems does not give a satisfactory reading of the ode, for the real problem of this poem, as in every poem, is its general meaning, and that has been little more than a side issue, at best, in the criticism of *Pythian* 11. If we are to understand *Pythian* 11, we must understand why the *topos* is applied to Thrasydaios, how the treatment of the *topos* relates to the poem as a whole, and why, indeed, the *topos* assumes such importance that it apparently even dictates the choice of the myth. Pindar's poem is clear enough, I think, and were it not for the unfortunate textual crux, would probably be even clearer than it is. The meaning of the poem can be apprehended by observation of the development and interaction of ideas within it. Yet again a persuasive suggestion may be found in another treatment of the *topos*, and to act upon that suggestion will enable me to abbreviate my argument.

Unlike the host of Pindaric critics, Euripides' Hippolytus could never have regarded *Pythian* 11 as being at all obscure, and he gives us a crucial hint about our poem. In a typical deprecation of the

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ἀμφιβόλου τῆς τύχης, πλείω τῶν ἡδέων τὰ ἀνιαρὰ εὑρήσει προσόντα αὐτοῖς, φόβους καὶ ταραχὰς καὶ μίση καὶ ἐπιβουλὰς καὶ ὀργὰς καὶ κολακείας· τούτοις γὰρ ἅπαντες σύνεισιν.

tyrant's life which, in view of all of the above,[1] is an obvious *locus communis*, Hippolytus remarks (*vv.* 1013-1020):

ἀλλ' ὡς τυραννεῖν ἡδύ; τοῖσι σώφροσιν
ἥκιστά γ', εἰ μὴ τὰς φρένας διέφθορεν
θνητῶν ὅσοισιν ἁνδάνει μοναρχία.
ἐγὼ δ' ἀγῶνας μὲν κρατεῖν Ἑλληνικοὺς
πρῶτος θέλοιμ' ἄν, ἐν πόλει δὲ δεύτερος
σὺν τοῖς ἀρίστοις εὐτυχεῖν ἀεὶ φίλοις.
πράσσειν τε γὰρ πάρεστι, κίνδυνός τ' ἀπὼν
κρείσσω δίδωσι τῆς τυραννίδος χάριν.

This passage not only substantiates the connection posited above between the *topos* and the myth in *Pythian* II, but it also introduces an extremely relevant point: "I would like to be first in the winning of the games of the Greeks, but in the city to have a secondary place, faring well in the comradeship of the good." Surely that idea lies behind Pindar's use of the *topos* and determines much of the poem. There are, after all, some possibilities for admired greatness which lie outside the scope of wealth and political power and, consequently, do not entail the dangerous, hated, unhappy, and disastrous life described in Pindar's myth. Foremost among these possibilities, in the view propounded in *Hippolytus*, *Pythian* II, and perhaps elsewhere,[2] is athletic victory. This aspect of Pindar's theme explains his use, in an epinician, of the traditional *topos* elaborated above, and the corollaries of the kind of life selected by those who use this *topos* are carefully and fully developed in Pindar's poem and do much to reveal its consummate literary unity. Hippolytus, Ion, *Pythian* II, and others, while deploring the vituperation, insincere

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[1] Hippolytus unobtrusively abjures a desire for wealth in the preceding lines (see p. 14, n. 1 *supra* and cf. *Ion* 629 f. [*supra*]). See also p. 13, n. 1 *supra* and p. 19, n. 1 *infra*.

[2] Hippolytus' remark even has the appearance of a proverb, as there is no suggestion (despite his frequent training of horses) that Hippolytus' entering of the games is at all pertinent to the drama, and, taken literally, his desire to win in the games seems strangely out of place. The whole point, however, is that the life of the athlete is a ready alternative to the undesirable tyranny, as athletic excellence was one of the members traditional (first in Tyrtaeus 9 [Diehl[3]], 2) to the general *topos;* it precedes, in fact, political power and unexampled financial wealth (all of Lydia's grain in a private storehouse) in the list of the first three kinds of lives rejected by Horace (*C.* I, 1); see, in general, Schmid's discussions (Register, part C, *s.v. Sportliches Können*) and especially Xenophanes 2, where the choice of political over athletic activity runs directly counter to Py. II.

friendships, general deceit, and constant anxiety of the tyrant's life, commend the common citizen's loyalties of true friendship,[1] civic devotion, and reverence for the gods.

It seems apparent, then, that a study of *Pythian* II in the context of its literary precursors and successors results in far greater understanding of the poem than an attempt to place it in its historical context. Yet if the poem is read as literature and without bias, the internal development of its ideas is perfectly clear, and an understanding of the poem need not depend so directly and exclusively on the adducing of *topoi* and traditional parallels as it has in the foregoing pages. Thrasydaios' reverence for the gods and his devotion to the common, civic good are clearly indicated in the proem of the poem, wherein his excellence in the games becomes an occasion for a civil, religious ceremony. The summoning of the heroines and goddesses to the public temple gains its importance not as an illustration of Pindar's serene outlook toward women [2] but as testimony of Thrasydaios' devotion to the city's divinities and heroic past and of the religious significance of his victory, which fosters civic pride. The proem thus involves a recognition of a clear and present instance of a kind of life (namely, that which is elaborated after the myth).

The values of such a life are first illustrated by presenting the disadvantages of its opposite, and the only common ground of Orestes and Thrasydaios, which is literal and geographic, enables transition to the illustrative foil. Since the paradigmatic purpose of the myth is to illustrate the hatreds and woes which beset the lives

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[1] *Hipp.* 1018; cf. *Ion* 633-47. The theme of friendship remains implicit in Py. 11 (however, with ξυναῖσι ἀρεταῖς, *v.* 54 cf. ἀστοῖς ἁδών, Ne. 8, 38 in context) until it is presented by the exempla of Iolaos and of the Dioscuri (p. 22 *infra*), unless ἐν ἁλικίᾳ (*v.* 51) means, as seems altogether possible, 'among my comrades' (Burton, pp. 70 f.).

[2] I cannot understand why scholars (e.g., Norwood, p. 125 with n. 25) busy themselves with Wilamowitz' question, "Warum kommen nur die Heroinen, nicht die Heroen?" (*Pindaros*, p. 260) nor why Py. 11 is supposed to have some especial feminine interest and significance (Finley, pp. 160-164, Méautis, p. 264, et al.). Apart from the invocation (where Apollo is present, too) Py. 11 "concerns women" only in the myth. For what it is worth, we might note that other poems, even apart from Ol. 6 and Py. 9, such as Ol. 2 and Is. 7, might be regarded as showing much interest in women; also, for what it is worth, we might note Pindar's interest in centaurs: in portions of Py. 2 and Py. 3, it is rather intense, in Py. 9 and Py. 4, moderate, in Ne. 4, Is. 8, and Ne. 3, slight, and in many poems, such as Ol. 1, Pindar seems not to have been interested in centaurs at all.

of the politically high and mighty, the myth focuses upon the problems of the central figure in the events of Agamemnon's house, Clytaemestra, who, as both killer and killed, is exemplary of the life not to be emulated. Clytaemestra was not admired by her countrymen; she was, rather, hated, and the musing about her motives in *vv.* 22-25 illustrates the inimical public curiosity to which even the private lives and thoughts of the great are subjected. Exposure to curiosity gives way to other but related unpleasantnesses, a κακαλόγος citizenry and general, unwelcome jealousy. If all these matters are not enough to prove the life of supposed ὄλβος undesirable,[1] Agamemnon's house has plenty more to offer, as its members and their associates meet violent death at each other's hands for the remainder of the myth. Since the illustrative point of the myth is not, as in the *Oresteia*, the problem of justice but rather the difficulties of the high and mighty life, further narrative of Orestes' story would be irrelevant, and on those grounds Pindar excuses himself for terminating the myth before it is, in fact, resolved.

Always of prime relevance, however, for the epinician is praise of the victor and of his feat, to which topic Pindar now returns. Thrasydaios, like Orestes, came home from Delphi, but the differences in their returns provide positive illustration of the differences between the two ways of life examined in the poem.[2] Orestes returned from Delphi to a fatherless house to kill his mother and thus to repeat, for a third time, a family tradition of familial murders. Thrasydaios returns in festive glory bringing, as we are notified both before and after the myth, the third in his family's sequence of estimable athletic victories. That is the tradition which Thrasydaios perpetuates and the one which Hippolytus, unable to escape his royal blood and its horrible concomitants, more in poetic whimsy than in actual possibility, desires to emulate. And that is the tradition which Pindar now fuses to another, that of the simple life, thereby greatly enhancing both. The theme of the simple life,

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[1] See van Groningen's remarks quoted in the text *supra*. Yet van Groningen then proceeds to claim that the real purpose of the myth is to illustrate the slander faced by Pindar, and he thus perverts the myth, whose literary point could not escape him, to make it conform to Wilamowitz' theory (*Composition*, pp. 360, 362, 365 f.; cf. Finley, pp. 164 f., where he thinks that the unsuccessful point of the myth is to contrast Clytaemestra with the heroines in *vv.* 1 ff. as illustrations of bad and good women).

[2] Mezger, p. 300.

with its ramifications, is developed by a conventional device whereby actions and aspirations given in the first person convey a general recommendation which often has specific application, as it apparently has here, to the manner in which the victor conducts his life. The life described in *vv.* 50b f. is one of satisfaction which accepts the human station and feasible aspirations. The life of only moderate political aspirations is then beatified, and its opposite, the often highly regarded tyranny, is spurned, surely on the grounds set forth earlier in the myth. Verse 54 then commends the life of public good, an illustration of which has appeared in the religious and public dedication of Thrasydaios' epinician at the start of the poem. The textual problems of the succeeding lines are perhaps insurmountable, but the passage obviously recounts the fruits of the life recommended in the preceding verses. Jealousy is held at bay, if a man obtains the summit (ἄκρον ἑλών is definitely, although not exclusively, a description of athletic victory) [1] but conducts himself peaceably (the noun, ἡσυχία, is the opposite of στάσις, the tool of the prospective tyrant and the constant fear of the successful one) [2] and avoids ὕβρις; he may then bequeath to his children the finest of κτέανα, a famous but good (not infamous, like that of the tyrant) name.

The life traditional to Thrasydaios' family serves implicitly as the model of such a life throughout the argument, but, as often, Pindar draws his explicit examples and proofs from the fixed world of past heroes,[3] namely, Iolaos and the Dioscuri, Castor and Polydeuces. Critics, wholly steeped in reconstructed and conjectured politics by the end of the poem, have regarded the presence of these heroes in the conclusion of the poem as a "Spartan colouring" [4] and discuss existent or prospective military alliances between Thebes and Sparta in accounting for the passage. To attach such significance to the appearance of these heroes' names here is to disregard the context and even Pindar's words, both of which clearly indicate that the heroes are cited as illustrative of the kind of individual life which the poem praises. The fact that their respective countries later became involved in the same wars, often as allies, has little point

[1] See Fennell *ad loc.* (Rumpel: "summum assecutus, sc. victoriam ludicram"); cf. also the phrase ἀέθλων κορυφά (Ne. 9, 9; 10, 32). On the text used here see p. 2, n. 4 *supra*.

[2] See Burton, pp. 175 f. and p. 16, n. 2 *supra*.

[3] Cf. Py. 3, 112 ff. (p. 62 *infra*).

[4] Bowra's term (*Class. Quart.* 30 [1936], 134 *et passim*).

either for the stories of these heroes or for the use of such stories. There are, however, some significant parallels in the major traditions about Iolaos and about the Dioscuri, and these parallels give a cogent explanation for their joint presence here.[1] All three heroes acquired their fame, to a large extent, through their athletic successes (traditionally, each had won an event in the first Olympic games), attributes, and associations.[2] Moreover, as Antilochus illustrates devotion to a father *par excellence*, Iolaos, the faithful squire of Heracles, and the mutually devoted Dioscuri were the models of genuine devotion to worthy comrades and friends.[3] Surely the traditions of athletic prowess and of loyal friendship, coupled to the absence of stories with a palace setting,[4] are foremost in making these heroes the paradigms of the life recommended in the poem and thereby commended in the victor. And while the memories of all the heroes of the house of Agamemnon have been tainted by the awful events described in Pindar's myth, Iolaos and the Dioscuri, having left the best of legacies,[5] enjoy good repute, and even as this poem was composed, still regularly presided, as archetypal athletic heroes, over the games which were celebrated in their honor in their respective cities.[6]

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[1] Cf. Is. 1, 16-29, wherein Castor and Iolaos are linked because of their athletic ability, and their prowess and successes in the games are elaborately described.

[2] Olympic victories: Pausanias V, 8, 3-4. For their athletic victories in general see note 1 *supra*, schol. *ad* Is. 1, 22 f., their attributes in art and their epithets (*RE* s.v. Dioskuren 1108, 1092 f., s.v. Iolaos, 1844).

[3] Norwood, p. 249, n. 15; for Iolaos see, e.g., Euripides *Heracl.* 1-54; for the Dioscuri see *RE* s.v., 1093.

[4] The Dioscuri are briefly listed in the succession of Laconian kings in Pausanias III, 1, 5, but they are rulers in none of their myths, and the tradition that they once held the government is surely minor and probably local.

[5] The emphasis here is not so much on the children as on what one leaves behind in this world upon death (see p. 14, n. 1 *supra* and cf. Ne. 8, 36 f.). However, Wilamowitz' surprising remark (where he despairs of discovering Pindar's motive for mentioning the heroes here: *Pindaros*, p. 262, n. 3), "Kinder haben sie alle nicht hinterlassen," etc., is palpably wrong (for Iolaos see Hesiod *frag.* 142 Rzach^2; for the Dioscuri, Pausanias II, 22, 5) and might mislead. It is equally surprising that Py. 11, 57 should cause Wilamowitz to take Schroeder's unfortunate discussion (*Pythien*, p. 107) so seriously and thus to argue about the birth dates of Pindar's children (p. 263)—until one remembers how he viewed the rest of the poem.

[6] The Theban games were named after Iolaos (see, e.g., schol. *ad* Is. 4, 69 f.) as were the gymnasium and stadium (Pausanias IX, 23, 1); at the Argive games, statues of the Dioscuri, whom Pindar calls ταμίαι Σπάρτας ἀγώνων (Ne. 10, 52), stood near the start of the *dromos* (Pausanias III, 14, 7). For further details see the pertinent articles in *RE*.

The poem is, then, a consummate and lucid literary unit, an epinician in fact as well as in name,[1] which deals with traditional *topoi* and a specific victor. Yet through an original use of these materials and a coherent internal development, the occasional poem becomes something catholic, and provides a sustained, cogently argued literary study of different kinds of human lives and values and of the propriety and potential fruits of human aspirations.[2] The poem is not a discordant Pindaric defense against his personal critics strangely and badly welded onto Thrasydaios' epinician; neither, however, is it mere rhetorically adulatory praise of an athlete. It is, in fact, an admirable, permanent work of art. The epinician has too long suffered under the unjust stigma of being an inferior, even unfortunate, genre. We wish we had the hymns. Yet if Pindar himself found the epinician so distasteful and restrictive to his talents, it seems strange that he should have written four books of poems in it, more than in any other genre.

The epinician genre, as used by Pindar, has extremely great literary potential. Most modern critics agree that poetry must deal with concrete subjects. The fact that an epinician is an occasional poem founded upon a specific victory of a historical individual is beneficial, not detrimental, to its poetry. The epinician program provides concrete εὐμηχανία, something to tell about, tangible and present material for the illustration of ideas. Yet the epinician also makes frequent use of myths. Even in Homer the telling of a myth usually has an obvious purpose: specific examples from the mythical past illustrate ideas of general application, and thus clarify real human situations.[3] Furthermore, the epinician both inherits from

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[1] We may, therefore, despite van Groningen's objection (*Composition*, p. 366), call it an ἐγκώμιον, and are not obliged to give it "le nom de profession de foi, d'apologie, ou de protestation."

[2] I am not implying that the poem expresses a Pindaric tenet that the simple life is superior to that of the monarch; we all know that, both before and after the composition of Py. 11, Pindar wrote such phrases as τὸ δ' ἔσχατον κορυφοῦται βασιλεῦσι (Ol. 1, 113 f.); neither, however, am I implying that Pindar was irresolute or fickle, talking out of one side of his mouth to a Hieron, out of the other side to a Thrasydaios (as, e.g., Norwood, p. 250, n. 20, p. 18; cf. Bowra, p. 404, Theiler, p. 273, Duering, pp. 122 f. et al.). He also wrote ἀναπνέομεν δ' οὐχ ἅπαντες ἐπὶ ἴσα (Ne. 7, 5); if we were to discover that the originator of the proverb "Out of sight, out of mind" also created "Absence makes the heart grow fonder," would we think any less either of him or of his proverbs?

[3] See, e.g., M. M. Willcock's excellent "Mythological paradeigma in the *Iliad*" (*Class. Quart.* 14, [1965], 141-154).

earlier poetry and acquires by itself[1] many common motifs and themes. Because of the conventional nature of these themes, their appearance, even in abbreviation, will immediately summon before an audience literate in Greek poetry the manifold ideas habitually associated with them. Unusually concise expression is thus able to convey an unusual amount of intelligible import.

The epinician may develop, therefore, in its rather restricted temporal or spatial scope, a complex general thesis based upon concrete examples from both the observable world of the present (the victory) and from the incontrovertible world of the past (the heroes). The resulting poem may itself be timeless and an important, compact literary and poetic masterpiece; or it may be time-bound or an abject failure, depending upon the originality, genius, and craftsmanship of its author and upon the nature of the problem to which he addresses himself. But the genre itself, partly due to its concreteness, is perfectly suited, probably far more so than most, for the creation of cogent and aesthetic statements about humans and their world; in fact, its compact nature coupled to the gravity of its usual theme, human life, perhaps proves a unique advantage, challenge, and attraction for such a poet as Pindar, and the epinician little deserves the contempt that it sometimes receives.

Pythian II is, I think, worthy of considerable esteem and wide reading. Of several distinguishing qualities, it is outstanding for its lucid, perfect thematic and artistic unity resulting from the interrelation of all its passages; for its memorable and vivid account of kingly popularity, anxiety, and death in Agamemnon's house; and for the facility with which it combines the mythical tradition, the traditional *topos* of the common life, and the traditional values of a victory to make an original statement about a glorious but untroubled life against the foil of calamitous fame and power. The poem, however, probably does not rank among Pindar's greatest masterpieces, for, despite its literary perfection, it is not so complex in theme, so original and bold in poetic execution, nor so ambitious in undertaking as, for example, the Hieronic odes.

The preceding pages have been concerned, to a large extent, with non-Pindaric poetry, comparatively little with *Pythian* II; but that unfortunate situation was inevitable. Despite the relative simplicity

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[1] E.g., the *consolatio* (Py. 3, 80b-end [see page 50. note 2 *infra*]; cf. Bacch. 5, 50-59, Py. 10, 21 f.) is inherited; the victory catalogue and probably many of the motifs explicated by Bundy are peculiarly epinician.

of the poem, the misconceptions about it are manifold, apparently universal, and deeply embedded in the minds of Pindaric critics. An elaborate illustration of the true nature and contextual function of *vv.* 50b-54 was required to contravene such prejudices and to recover the passage as an integral part of the poem. In succeeding chapters, however, I shall deal with poems more complex and ambitious than *Pythian* II, and, wherever possible, I shall relegate to the notes discussions of parallel themes, phrases, and *topoi*. I want to concentrate, through line-by-line literary analysis, on the meaning of some truly remarkable poems. Consequently, I shall depart somewhat from the critical method used above, but the study of *Pythian* II has laid some groundwork for the subsequent studies.

If the above reading of *Pythian* II seems, as I am convinced that it is, preferable, both in result and in conformity to the evidence, to the usual view of the poem, it makes several important, interrelated suggestions about the critical reading of Pindar. First, the assumption of irrelevant personal allusions proves unsound, even ludicrously unthinkable, in *Pythian* II, and therefore requires unprejudiced scrutiny wherever it customarily presents itself; there may be far fewer such allusions than is commonly supposed.[1] Second, as Bundy has maintained, a knowledge of the genre and, often of even more importance, of the general traditions and *topoi* of Greek poetry becomes a critical necessity without which the

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[1] I am not, of course, claiming that the analysis of Py. II given above proves that there are no irrelevant personal allusions in other odes; nor am I denying that Pindar's private circumstances affected what he wrote: we seem to have clear instances in such poems as Ol. 10 and Is. 1. Nor am I questioning here the received interpretation of Ne. 7, which rests on sounder ground than the usual view of Py. II. Perhaps Py. 2 does indeed have a "central core of anger, disgust, and contempt" and indicate that Pindar "was insufferably affronted," that he "is in torment and quite unable to control his resentment" and "compares [Bacchylides] with a monkey;" perhaps "the flood of [Pindar's] injuries bursts forth in almost inconsequent fury and defiance, and even when he has begun to pull himself up, he lapses back into threats and abuse" (Bowra, pp. 135 f.). Yet most personal allusions in Pindar are immediately apparent, and they usually have reference to the circumstances of the victor; the problem is to determine the frequency and nature of allusions that are comparatively obscure. Many supposed personal allusions may not be topical allusions at all. When we have learned more about Pindar's technique and his use of tradition and convention, Ne. 7 may appear as a striking illustration of the exception rather than of the rule. The general problem is complex and difficult, and it needs much serious, comprehensive study; the above analysis of Py. II is intended as merely one contribution to that larger study.

critic may flounder and err in embarrassing ways. Third, although perhaps everything in *Pythian* II, from the myth to individual phrases, bears a tangible relationship to something traditional, the ode itself is highly original. It avails itself of various traditions to suit, through emphasis or modification, its own poetic aims. Finally, and probably most importantly, as the assumed irrelevancies prove false, the unity of the poem becomes apparent: a literary unity resulting from the careful development and consistency of manifold themes and ideas which interrelate so as to form a coherent whole. Pindar thus makes an aesthetically attractive, novel statement through the traditional means. The study of *Pythian* II implies, in short, that Pindaric criticism should have less to do with personalities and politics, more to do with poetics. Such is the approach intended in the following chapters.

CHAPTER TWO

PYTHIAN 3

The Third Pythian has fared better in the hands of Pindaric scholars than most of the odes,[1] perhaps because it contains relatively few of the peculiarly epinician conventional motifs which, if not misunderstood, are usually deplored.[2] The same preconceptions, however, and misconceptions which habitually attend the interpretation of Pindar have left their mark on this poem, too, and in this

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[1] Several useful studies of the poem exist, and much of my interpretation, I am sure, results from the suggestions of others, especially Burton, pp. 78-90, Illig, pp. 47-54, and, his brevity not withstanding, Gildersleeve, pp. 268 f. Mezger, pp. 70-73, and Lefkowitz, pp. 219-223, have anticipated me on several points which I find crucial to my argument and, therefore, have elaborated. Many other discussions of the poem, such as those by Fraccaroli, Coppola, Schadewaldt, Méautis, and Finley, are helpful, and, for Pindaric criticism, they reveal a remarkable unanimity about the meaning of the poem as literature.

[2] See Bundy *passim*. The Pythian victory vaguely referred to in *vv.* 73b f. is undatable and seems remote; consequently, much of the traditional controversy about the poem concerns its date and occasion. Most scholars believe that the ode is not an epinician for a specific victory, but a *consolatio* written for the ailing king. Despite frequent attempts to uncover the cause of the poem, the only presumably historical fact relating to it remains Hieron's illness which is attested by the scholia *ad* Py. 1, 46 (Dr. p. 17, cf. p. 19), one of which cites Aristotle as an authority. If Pindar wrote the ode as an advertisement to procure the patronage of Hieron and the invitation to Sicily, which would date the ode before 476 (Farnell, cf. Gaspar and Turyn), or if the poem was written to decline an invitation for a second trip to Sicily and should be dated about 474-3 (Wilamowitz, Bowra, cf. Burton, *et al.*), these matters cannot be determined. The term Αἰτναῖος (*v.* 69) makes the later date more probable, but the ancient discussions about the term are not conclusive. The lack of any mention of the Olympian victory of 476, the argument given for the earlier date, is not only an "argument from silence" (Burton) but also seems refuted by Py. 1, in which I can find no reference to the Olympian victory (nor are there references to Hieron's earlier Pythian victories in Ol. 1). By some dubious but not impossible reasoning, Duchemin concludes that the poem was written during Pindar's visit to Sicily of 476 (p. 143, note 1). Arguments that the ode is a consolation for a failure to win in the Pythia of 474 (Wilamowitz, p. 283, cf. his "Hieron und Pindaros," p. 1298) or that it was written as an anniversary piece for the two earlier Pythian victories (Schroeder, *Pythien*, p. 24) are mere conjectures. Fortunately, despite the so far insoluble problem of date and occasion, the poem is quite intelligible as it stands, and we hardly need such information.

chapter I shall undertake to show that what Gildersleeve called the "drift" of the poem is even far clearer than has been realized and that what Bundy has called the "grotesqueries" of criticism are more unwarranted in this poem than even his important work has shown them: *Pythian* 3 must surely be one of the most lucid, perfectly controlled, carefully wrought works of Western literature.

One of the popular prejudices most damaging to an understanding of the poem involves the first sentence, and I shall begin there.

1 Ἤθελον Χείρωνά κε Φιλυρίδαν,
εἰ χρεὼν τοῦθ' ἁμετέρας ἀπὸ γλώσσας κοινὸν εὔξασθαι ἔπος,
ζώειν τὸν ἀποιχόμενον, ...

Commentators and translators have failed to recognize the import of these verses, because they have not construed the two clauses as a contrary-to-fact conditional sentence but rather as a simple wish followed by an anacoluthic interjection.[1] Such an interpretation arises primarily from a bias resulting from its own self-perpetuating tradition, but partly from syntactical difficulties which demand further investigation, since from them results the incongruous notion of an apodosis and a protasis occurring in a sentence with little or no relationship to each other.

First, ἤθελόν κε, despite the contiguous protasis, has been equated with the Attic ἐβουλόμην ἄν, which occurs independently.[2] Moreover,

[1] With only five exceptions, the 30 odd translations or interpretations of the sentence which I have seen may be classified as follows, most translations falling under the first category: 1) complete anacoluthon, indicated by parentheses or dashes; 2) complete omission of the protasis; 3) a clear statement or indication that the critic regards the first clause as a simple wish conditioned by nothing; 4) mild anacoluthon, a modal in the apodosis but a present indicative in the protasis (but the modals are usually merely potential, not unreal, and I doubt that even when the latter occurs the critic intends it as such; for the possibility of such a translation see p. 29, n. 2 *infra*). Hartung avoided both confusion and the text with present indicatives in both clauses; for Gildersleeve see p. 30, n. 1 *infra*.

Turner's "I could wish, if it were permitted" and Sandys' "If [I] might, I would pray" are superior to most, but Turner's translation is little known and passes unclarified; Sandys unfortunately clarifies his translation in other ways and by omitting the protasis in his introduction. Only Lefkowitz, who also realizes its implications, renders the sentence as an unambiguous unreal condition: "I would wish that Cheiron now dead were living, if it were proper to utter from my tongue this prayer ...." (p. 219). Since hers is the obvious interpretation, her lack of argument and failure to mention the traditional view are perhaps understandable, but nevertheless remarkable.

[2] Despite their being frequently listed jointly in grammars, to consider ἐβουλόμην ἄν and βουλοίμην ἄν as interchangeable expressions (Schwyzer-

since the copula of the protasis εἰ χρεών does not occur in the Greek, scholars have unhesitatingly supplied an ἐστί, probably confident that ἦν would have been written had it been intended. Neither view, however, has a firm basis. The evidence shows that we should not, in any case, expect any copula with χρεών,[1] nor is it impossible for a copula other than ἐστί to be omitted in such a conditional sentence.[2] There is no more cause for assuming two different elliptical constructions in the first sentence of *Pythian* 3 than in Sophocles, *Philoctetes* 661 (εἴ μοι θέμις, θέλοιμ' ἄν), which seems never to have been denied its conditional form.[3] To recognize, therefore, an unreal

Debrunner II, 347 *et al.*) essentially equivalent to βούλομαι is linguistically insensitive: for the difference between ἤθελον (ἐβουλόμην) ἄν and related expressions see Jebb *ad Aias* 1400. ἐβουλόμην (ἤθελον) ἄν may be the apodosis of an unreal condition (Smyth § 2327). Having granted that there is no formal implication of unreality in a simple potential indicative with ἄν, we still must observe that so it is used (cf. Schwyzer-Debrunner, II, 309, 347 f., Goodwin, §§ 245-8) except, perhaps, in the rarest of cases. In Py. 3, 1 ff., furthermore, we no longer are dealing with a merely potential expression, for the circumstances which condition the indicative have been formally expressed in a protasis (Goodwin, §§ 246-8); see further notes 2 and 3 *infra*.

1 In early poetry and in tragedy, the absence of a form of εἰμί with χρεών is constant and even amazingly so: see Guiraud, pp. 150, 148, 270, 44 (cf. 113), 226 f., *et passim*. (Guiraud gives the usual interpretation of Py. 3, 1, translating ἤθελόν κε as *je voudrais* and the protasis as anacoluthic). Cf. *LSJ s.v.* χρεών. See also note 2 *infra*.

2 Schwyzer-Debrunner, p. 623, Guiraud, pp. 281-327. The fact that a present unreal condition is involved eliminates the chances of a determining word, such as the πάρος of many of the examples, but the mere form, ἤθελόν κε, serves the same purpose. Similarly, in Demosthenes 19, 90 ἄν προσῆν lets us know that εἰ μὴ διὰ τούτους is the protasis of an unreal condition even though no verbal phrase, such as ἑτέρως ἐγένετο or οὕτως εἶχεν, occurs to designate tense in the protasis (so Goodwin [§ 245 end] translates "If it had not been for these men," and we could as well translate "If it were not for these men," but certainly not "If it is not for these men").

Again (p. 28, n. 2 *supra*) there is no formal implication of unreality in the protasis or apodosis of an unreal condition, "but, in the combination, the unreality of the protasis is always, and that of the apodosis generally, implied" (Smyth, § 2308).

However, since no verb form can actually be assumed with χρεών (note 1 *supra*), there is a possibility of interpreting our sentence, in form only, as a simple present condition with an unreal indicative as apodosis (Smyth, § 2300 b), in which case a few translations referred to "3)" in p. 28, n. 1 *supra* could be acceptable. The result, however, remains the same, since contextually, though not formally, such protases are implied to be unreal, the very fact which determines the unreal apodosis. Py. 3 will show the protasis contextually unreal, and ἤθελόν κε remains not a simple expression of wish, but an unreal indicative.

3 For obvious reasons (although Ellendt, *Lexicon Sophocleum*, *s.v.* θέμις, records the fact that Brunck actually denied the conditional nature of Soph.

condition in the Pindaric sentence is not only syntactically permissible, but even mandatory.[1] A verbatim translation might be "I would want Cheiron to be alive, if it were proper ...." [2]

The next point involves the interpretation of κοινόν (*v.* 2), which most scholars render "on the lips of all," i.e., the wish expresses a current public sentiment. The prayer which Pindar describes in these verses could hardly be *vulgaris* in that sense.[3] κοινόν here, as the scholiast suggests, apparently bears the sense of 'commonplace,' 'ordinary,' 'everyday,' [4] and Pindar accentuates such a meaning by

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O.C. 644, εἴ μοι θέμις γ' ἦν, and interpreted it to be a wish [*utinam*] rather than the protasis of an unreal condition with the elliptical apodosis dutifully supplied by Jebb *ad loc.*). Cf. also Soph. *Tr.* 809 (εἰ θέμις δ', ἐπεύχομαι) which, with *Ph.* 661 *(supra)* and Py. 3, 1 f., shows us three forms: εἰ θέμις, ἐπεύχομαι; εἰ θέμις, θέλοιμι ἄν; and εἰ χρεὼν τοῦτο εὔξασθαι ἔπος, ἤθελόν κε, corresponding to a present particular, a future less vivid, and a present unreal condition respectively.

[1] Gildersleeve, *AJP* 3 (1882), 540, states that the first clause is strictly potential and that "nothing is gained by forcing [it] into the conditional formula." This is not the place for an examination of the notion of "strict" potentiality, a time-honoured notion indeed, but one which, in my opinion and to judge from the examples given by Goodwin and others, needs a thorough restudy. At any rate, Gildersleeve's acceptance of the notion leaves unexplained the syntax of εἰ χρεών, and Gildersleeve, the "syntactitian," as he styled himself, could not unfeelingly assume an ἐστί and translate "I would want—if it is allowed" as others do. Consequently, to keep the first clause "strictly potential" to conform with the belief that Pindar makes a simple prayer for Cheiron's life, Gildersleeve is obliged to contrive an elliptical apodosis for εἰ χρεών: "The apodosis of εἰ χρεών (sc. ἐστι) is the utterance itself, and the condition is logical = οὕτως εὔχομαι, εἰ χρὴ εὔξασθαι" (*ibid.*, p. 445). All of that seems a highly unnecessary, confusing, even desperate, expedient, especially when it is obviated merely by supplying, if we must supply a verb, ἦν rather than ἐστί.

[2] Cf. Lefkowitz' translation (p. 28 *supra*). "I would want" is, I think, preferable to "Would that," for the historical development of the simple "would" is scarcely apparent in its usage and "would that" requires a modal in the noun clause; "would want" allows Pindar's construction, the object infinitive. I do not claim that the notion of a wish is entirely absent from Pindar's phrase (indeed, he seems to utilize some ambiguity), but that the sentence is formally a condition, not a simple wish.

[3] 'On the lips of all:' Sandys, Fennell, Paley, Méautis, p. 138, Duchemin, p. 169, et al.; cf. Mommsen, Puech, Wolde, et al. The historical facts and common sense ought to inform us that few, if any (not to mention all), Syracusan citizens could be represented, even in an encomiastic poem, as actually wishing for a live Cheiron to heal a sick Hieron.

[4] The first of the scholiasts' explanations, κοινὸν, ἤτοι κατακοίνως λεγόμενον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, must be right, that to say "I would that so-and-so were alive," when the need of the person's presence or help was felt, was an everyday commonplace (see the rest of the above-mentioned scholion; so Aeschin. 3, 115: Μειδίαν, ὃν ἐβουλόμην ἂν πολλῶν ἕνεκεν ζῆν). Schneidewin (Dissen²) ex-

drawing a contrast between κοινόν and ἁμετέρας: ἁμετέρας ἀπὸ γλώσσας is placed within τοῦτο and κοινόν so as to contrast the prepositional phrase with the two accusatives which enclose it.[1] In these verses, therefore, the poet has not actually wished that Cheiron were alive. He claims that he would do so if it were proper for him to utter such a commonplace. These opening verses introduce and greatly influence subsequent themes of the poem, and only such an interpretation can account adequately for the words themselves and for the poem which follows them.

The phrase ζώειν τὸν ἀποιχόμενον is also of considerable moment to the development of the poem. The juxtaposition of ζώειν and τὸν ἀποιχόμενον produces a strong contrast between the two words which are so opposed in meaning, and the contrast is further stressed because the juxtaposed words occupy a verse to themselves, isolated by the prosody from the rest of the sentence.

The first three verses, therefore, may be translated literally thus: "I would want, if it were proper for this saying, a common prayer, to be made by my tongue, Cheiron the son of Philyra to be alive, the departed." In summary, we may note that the prayer which Pindar considers is a wish, an impossible wish, that someone who has died be alive; that the one who has died is described by the euphemism, 'departed,' hence is not only dead but also to be considered from a distance. These facts, together with Pindar's reluctance to make such an impossible wish on the grounds of propriety, will assume increased importance as the poem proceeds.

In *vv.* 4 f. the Cheiron of the prayer is described, probably under the influence of hymnal style: [2] his lineage is of Zeus; his abode, on

plains *tritum usu cotidiano*; Mezger also quotes this interpretation but his gloss, "trivial," is too strong. Another interpretation, 'public, for the common good' (Farnell, Traverso), has the weight of statistics behind it, and, although contextually inferior to the above interpretation, is not impossible; the word might even be somewhat ambiguous intentionally. The best translation, of course, is simply 'common,' '*gemeinsam*,' or the like (Mommsen et al.). Schroeder *ad loc.*, a unique interpretation, seems unlikely.

[1] Gildersleeve *ad loc.*, Lefkowitz, p. 219.

[2] As in hymns, the poet gives Cheiron's parentage, and his *sedes* (habitat); νόον ἔχοντ' ἀνδρῶν φίλον is comparable to εὐμενής and its congeners; the relative, οἷος, begins to tell a specific event in his life (see Bundy I, note 27, and, for the hymnal element in Pindar's narrative of myth in general, see Drachmann, *Moderne Pindarfortolkning*, and Bundy *passim*). Even the fact that Cheiron would be called upon to perform an act similar to one he has done before is analogous to a common hymnal motif.

Mt. Pelion. His mind was kindly to men.[1] The prayer would have him return with these characteristics and "just as he was" when he reared Asklepios and taught him to be a healer of all illness.[2] The passage depicts medicine as a profession and the physician as a craftsman, for Pindar uses the word τέκτων which always has the connotation 'maker' of something.

As the first antistrophe begins, Pindar ingeniously passes from a hypothetical wish about Cheiron to the story of Coronis while showing their relationship through Asklepios:[3] the relative τόν appears in a temporal, infinitive construction (πρὶν τέλεσσαι) subordinate to the finite clause.[4] This unusual construction produces the following effect: when the audience hears *vv.* 8-11b, it must still keep in mind the passage about Cheiron and Asklepios and, indeed, the whole first strophe of the poem, for the entire passage depends syntactically upon the simple relative which refers back to the strophe. Nevertheless, the principal focus of the passage is on Coronis, because the finite verb and all else in the clause refer to her. Thus Pindar makes a coherent transition to the myth of Coronis without allowing the audience to dismiss the first strophe. The contrary-to-fact condition, Cheiron, and Asklepios are removed to the background temporarily, but the notions of the opening verses forcibly remain present as the story of Coronis becomes the major concern.

The syntactical continuity of *vv.* 1-11b is finally broken by an independent sentence, the gnome of *vv.* 11b f.[5] The gnome, although not unrelated to what precedes, for it refers to the τέχναις Ἀπόλλωνος, provides an end to the great structural period which has touched upon several mythical events. Asklepios, the famous physician hero, was reared by Cheiron; his mother, before bearing him,

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[1] Cheiron is the universal teacher of man in Pindar: Py. 4, 101 ff., Ne. 3, 41 ff. (n.b. 51 ff.), Py. 6, 19-27; cf. frag. 206 (177).

[2] Fennell I, 173, notes that νόσος ends 3 verses in the poem, 7, 46, and 66, while πάθα terminates *vv.* 42 and 97.

[3] For such complex hypotaxis in Pindar as a manifestation of the inherent relationships between the topics see Fraccaroli, pp. 122 f.

[4] The relative habitually used to introduce the myth: Des Places, *Le pronom*, pp. 48 ff.; cf. Gildersleeve *ad* Ol. 1, 25 with p. 294, et al. and see also p. 31, n. 2 *supra*. The use of the relative in transitions to, from, or within a myth is not limited to pronouns; locative and temporal adverbs (ἔνθα, etc.) are also frequent: see Radt, p. 155. For the transition to the antistrophe (Py. 3, 8) see Nierhaus, p. 37.

[5] Pindar's gnomes frequently fulfill various functions of transition: Py. 3, 54, Ol. 1, 53, 64, etc.; see further Illig, p. 62, n. 1.

was killed by the design of Apollo for some offense. Her death, however, seems not to have been violent, because she died "in her bedroom" (ἐν θαλάμῳ).[1] This long first sentence with its concluding gnome summarizes subjects later told in detail, and Illig has described its programmatic function in his description of the *Ringkomposition* of the poem.[2] To the summary Illig applies the term κεφαλαῖον. From the κεφαλαῖον of the Coronis-story, Pindar elaborates her myth until he finally returns (*vv.* 38 ff.) to the concluding term of the κεφαλαῖον, the fact that Coronis' own death anticipated the birth of her child.[3] Verses 47-53 describe Asklepios, the παντοδαπᾶν ἀλκτῆρα νούσων (*v.* 7), in detail. Still later (*v.* 63) Pindar returns to the subject of *vv.* 1 ff., Cheiron, and concludes, in *v.* 77, the topic of *v.* 1 by making a prayer, even repeating forms of ἐθέλω and εὔχομαι from the opening sentence.

The chiastic arrangement, which Illig terms 'concentric *Ringkomposition*,' informs the greater portion of the poem, and the opening verses and the κεφαλαῖον of the myths obviously bear upon the conception not only of the *Ringkomposition* but also of the entire poem. In fact, the *Ringkomposition* of the first seventy-seven verses marks them off as a carefully constructed refusal, a poetic *recusatio*. The poet considers a topic for prayer at the beginning of the poem only to dismiss it completely in favor of another prayer in *v.* 77. Verses 1-76, therefore, like the now well-known Pindaric priamels,[4] provide foil designed to highlight the final choice of poetic topic. However, in *Pythian* 3, as will become evident in the following

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[1] Wilamowitz' astonishing remarks (*Pindaros*, p. 282, n. 1) on this passage testify to the fate of literary criticism when philology becomes exclusively "empirical-historical." Attempting to prove the text corrupt, he misses completely the fact that ἐν θαλάμῳ indicates that Coronis died in her bedroom and explains εἰς 'Αΐδαο δόμον ἐν θαλάμῳ κατέβα as an "unheilbare Verderbnis" of two euphemisms for 'die:' εἰς 'Αΐδαο δόμον καταβαίνω and εἰς 'Αΐδα θάλαμον καταβαίνω. The latter might be said of Persephone, hardly of Coronis. Coronis has, of course, been put back in her bedroom by Hess (*Rhein. Mus.* 88 [1939], 286).

[2] Mezger, Gildersleeve, Fraccaroli, Wilamowitz, et al. mention that the summary of the two myths precedes them; Illig has elaborated the point and added the term κεφαλαῖον. These scholars, however, do not seem to note that *vv.* 1-11 are, in essence, a κεφαλαῖον of the whole first eleven stanzas, *vv.* 4-11 merely forming the κεφαλαῖον of the two myths.

[3] Illig, p. 49, suggests that the μέν of *v.* 8 is not answered ed until the ἀλλά of *v.* 38.

[4] Bundy I, 5 f. *et passim*; first explained by Dissen (*ad* Ol. 1, 1), elaborated by Dornseiff, pp. 97-102; also Schadewaldt, p. 267; Bowra, pp. 199-205 (with additional references, p. 199, n. 1). See p. 10, n. 3 *supra*.

discussion of *vv.* 12-77, the poet gives such elaborate grounds for rejecting his opening subject that the *recusatio* almost becomes the whole poem, the subject which formally supplants the foil (*vv.* 77-79) at first seems utterly insignificant in comparison with all the preceding verses, and the remainder of the poem is unintelligible without the *recusatio*, in which the major themes of the poem are developed. Consequently, the mythical material contained within the *Ringkomposition* must be interpreted in its formal and functional contexts, not as isolated story, and only thus can we understand the very forms which the myths themselves assume.

The myth of Coronis (*vv.* 12 ff.) has its source in the *ehoiai* of Hesiod,[1] and much has been written about the changes which Pindar makes in the Hesiodic version. Scholars universally agree that Pindar's evident changes have as their purpose the aggrandizement of Apollo, both as a god of infinite capabilities and of moral justice: [2] Pindar is supposedly writing a polemic to correct Hesiod. However, although Pindar's changes do compliment Apollo in general, more importantly they serve the poetic purpose and form of the poem. To demonstrate that Pindar altered the Hesiodic account strictly on moral or religious grounds is impossible, but to show that the changes contribute organically to the composition of a coherent poem is not, and in the following discussion I shall be concerned primarily with indicating how the myths, with the changes, so contribute.

Coronis contemned the wrath of Apollo, whose child she was carrying, by having a clandestine union with another (*vv.* 12-15). She did not wait for a traditional and legal marriage ceremony, nor for the singing and jesting of her comrades who would have gathered outside the door of a newly-married couple in the evening.[3] Pindar attributes unusual importance to the lack of song in the union of Coronis and her lover, for he devotes three full verses to describing the songs and the joys which accompany them, while summing up the whole marriage-banquet itself and the ceremony in just two

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[1] Frags. 122, 123, 125 Rzach[2] (and perhaps 219: see p. 37, n. 1 *infra*); the attribution of 124 to the Koronis-*ehoie* is now doubtful: see Oxyrh. Pap. 2509, 3). The best collection of testimonia, etc., is in Traversa, *Catalogi*, 108 ff., *q.v.* For Pindar's use of Hesiod as his source and for an attempt to reconstruct Hesiod's story see Wilamowitz, *Isyllos*, pp. 57 ff.

[2] Wilamowitz, *Isyllos*, pp. 57 ff.; Farnell, I, 97; Kolf, p. 16; Illig, pp. 51 f.; Méautis, p. 140; Duchemin, p. 111, note 2; Fehr, p. 95, p. 97; et al.

[3] Theocritus *Id.* 18, Catullus 61 and 62, Sappho 39 (30 LP), etc.

words, τράπεζαν νυμφίαν (*vv.* 16-19). Thus he establishes the absence of song as the primary motif in the disastrous nature of Coronis' new union.

The next passage begins with the short phrase ἀλλά τοι ἤρατο τῶν ἀπεόντων, "she was enamoured of the distant." The ambiguity of the phrase is ingenious: τῶν ἀπεόντων properly refers to foreigners, because Ischys, Coronis' lover, comes from Arcadia though she herself lives in Thessaly. However, this information does not appear until several verses later, and Pindar could not have expected his audience to know that Ischys is Arcadian, because in the Hesiodic account he was a native of Coronis' own land.[1] Therefore, it is impossible to distinguish at *v.* 20 whether τῶν ἀπεόντων is masculine or neuter, whether Coronis is enamoured of distant things or distant men.[2] The general statement which follows (*vv.* 21-23) might well suggest that the genitive of *v.* 20 is neuter, since the elaboration of *v.* 20 in *v.* 22 involves neuters. However, the attentive audience will notice the similarity of Coronis' action in *v.* 20 to the wish which, only moments before, was considered in *vv.* 1 ff. Coronis wished for that which is or those who are away (τῶν ἀπεόντων); Pindar would have wished for one who had "gone away" (τὸν ἀποιχόμενον). The gender of the genitive in *v.* 20 remains ambiguous.

From the specific statement of *vv.* 19 f. Pindar passes to generalization:

οἷα καὶ πολλοὶ πάθον.
ἔστι δὲ φῦλον ἐν ἀνθρώποισι ματαιότατον,
ὅστις αἰσχύνων ἐπιχώρια παπταίνει τὰ πόρσω,
μεταμώνια θηρεύων ἀκράντοις ἐλπίσιν.

Coronis' case serves as an example of misdeeds more general and serious than mere unlawful wedlock. The inclusive and indefinite word φῦλον and the neuters of *v.* 22 expand the subject to encompass many people and various types of action. The members of the φῦλον look for what is away at a distance (τὰ πόρσω), hopeless (ἀκράντοις ἐλπίσιν), and vain (μεταμώνια); in contrast, they spurn the opposite, that which is not away, that which is at hand, "at home" (ἐπιχώρια). Having thus established the paradigmatic importance of Coronis, Pindar returns to her story. Coronis belonged

[1] Wilamowitz, *Isyllos*, pp. 60 and 81.
[2] So Burton, who understands these verses well, terms τῶν ἀπεόντων "an allusive plural" (p. 82).

to the φῦλον; she went to bed with a stranger from Arcadia (*vv.* 24 ff.). The application of the general theme to the specific action of Coronis now becomes apparent, and Pindar's choice of words in *vv.* 20-26 turns out to be significant and admirable. As Burton (p. 82) notes, the revelation of the identity of Coronis' lover takes place gradually in *vv.* 13, 20, 26, and 31. However, in the entire passage the vocabulary, which proves to be determined by the general thematic purpose of the poem, is skilfully designed to apply to Ischys. The allusive phrase, τῶν ἀπεόντων, indeed refers to all the people and things which are distant, but later characterizes Ischys, because he is from Arcadia. Similarly, ἐπιχώρια (*v.* 22) is used in the general statement to mean 'at hand,' 'accessible,' but also fits the story of Ischys well, since the basic meaning of the word is 'native to the country,' which Ischys obviously was not. Ischys was from a distant land, hence one of τὰ πόρσω.

Pindar emphasizes the connection between Ischys and the neuters of *v.* 22 by enclosing within the phrase ἐλθόντος ... ἀπ' Ἀρκαδίας (*vv.* 25 f.) the sentence which explains (γάρ) the relevance of the general statement (*vv.* 21-23) to Coronis' action. The unusual separation of the verb meaning 'come' from the prepositional phrase designating whence the person has come draws attention to the fact that Ischys, a foreigner, has come from a distant land.

Commentators attribute Pindar's change in Ischys' homeland to a desire on the poet's part to make Coronis' sin greater than described in the *ehoiai* and thus to make Apollo's punishment of her more just.[1] Such a motive would suit the Pindaric exaltation of Apollo over the Hesiodic Apollo that the commentators see in the poem, and Coronis' punishment does emerge in *Pythian* 3 more conspicuously just than in what we possess of the *ehoiai*. Yet Pindar's religious devotion to Apollo cannot be the cardinal reason for his change in the myth: Pindar makes Ischys a foreigner so that the myth of Coronis provides manifest evidence of the truth of the general statement contained in *vv.* 20-23. By classifying Ischys among τὰ πόρσω, Pindar shows the interconnection of all the ideas expressed in the course of his narrative of the myth and aids considerably the development of a theme formed by the interrelation of all parts of the ode.

To explain the modifications of tradition sometimes observable in

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[1] See p. 34, n. 2 *supra*; Burton makes a similar suggestion but also sees the thematic purpose (pp. 83 f.).

Pindar's odes solely on religious grounds betrays an underestimation not only of Pindar's desire to create a coherent poem but also of his ability to do so.[1] Other minor modifications of Hesiod's myth serve Pindar's poetic purpose. The remains of the Coronis-*ehoie* indicate that, in contrast to Pindar's version, it contained a marriage banquet. Many passages in ancient literature stress the disaster and hopelessness of a 'marriage' which has not been sanctioned by the proper religious and social blessing.[2] Coronis' union performed κρύβδαν, without the banquet, the feasting, and, as becomes evident later, especially the songs, is founded upon ἀκράντοις ἐλπίσιν.

The same poetic goals probably account for the next passage (*vv.* 27-30), one of the most renowned in the entire corpus because Pindar has diverged greatly from the Hesiodic account. In the *ehoiai* a raven informed Apollo of Coronis' act; Apollo, in his wrath, transformed the raven, which had formerly been white, into a black bird.[3] Pindar's Apollo learns of Coronis' crime through his own omniscience. Nevertheless, Pindar alludes to the story of the raven,[4] for σκοπός ordinarily means 'guard,' 'lookout,' or 'spy' (the raven was apparently Apollo's 'guard-spy' in Hesiod's version) and ἀΐω usually, though not always, means 'hear;' κοινάν, 'confidant,' may mean 'informer.' [5] The audience acquainted with the *ehoiai* would

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[1] Bundy I, 9; cf. p. 40, n. 1 *infra*. Moreover, there is some reason to believe that Pindar elaborates and clarifies the Hesiodic story and its moral rather than 'revising' and 'correcting' them. The scholiast to the verses in which Pindar draws his moral (*vv.* 20-23) quotes a Hesiodic verse, νήπιος ὃς τις ἕτοιμα λιπὼν ἀνέτοιμα διώκει (frag. 219), which bears such similarity to Pindar's own sentence that Blumenthal (*Hermes* 49 [1914], 319), followed by Traversa, plausibly attributed it to the Coronis-ehoie (cf., however, Hesiod *Op.* 364-368, and see "Appendix I" *infra*).

[2] Catullus 68, 73-76, Vergil *Aen.* IV, especially 125 ff. and 160-172; etc. Cf. the disastrous 'marriage' of Helen and Paris, especially Alcaeus 74 (B 10 LP), to which *cf.* Py. 3, 89 ff. The Alcaeus fragment may even serve as a commentary on Py. 3. In Γ 48-50 the theme of an 'outlander'-marriage bringing destruction is precisely parallel to the motif in Py. 3, and the theme frequently manifests itself in lesser forms elsewhere (see p. 18 *infra*).

[3] Scholia *ad* Py. 3, 29 (52a), Apollodorus III, 10, 3; see p. 38, n. 1 *infra*.

[4] As others suggest: Burton, p. 84, Fennell, *ad loc.*; *cf.* Wilamowitz, p. 281.

[5] When σκοπός refers to a god, it is customarily accompanied by a defining genitive and, after all, still means 'look-out;' *custos* in the following passage may well translate σκοπός:

> Apollo cum Coronida Phlegyae filiam gravidam fecisset, corvum custodem ei dedit, ne quis eam violaret. cum ea Ischys Elati filius concubuit; ob id ab Iove fulmine est interfectus. Apollo Coronidem gravidam percussit et interfecit; cuius ex utero exsectum Asclepium educavit, at corvum qui custodiam praebuerat ex albo in nigrum commutavit. (Hyginus, *Fab.* CCII, Rose)

have no reason to doubt that the σκοπός is an agent of Apollo, probably the raven, until the (surprisingly) active participle, πιθών, occurs at the very end of *v.* 28. Only then could a suspicion arise that the σκοπός and κοινάν is not the raven. Not until the emphatic πάντα ἴσαντι νόῳ, apparently in apposition to κοινᾶνι εὐθυτάτῳ and postponed to the very end of the whole passage, can the audience be expected to know definitely that Apollo was his own informer. Thus by a careful choice of words and by postponing the decisive phrases until the end, Pindar has referred to the story of the raven and rejected it at the same time, without according it specific mention.

The rejection of the story of the raven, perhaps more than any other modification of the Hesiodic tale, enhances Apollo as a great divinity. Therefore the change should be attributed in part to Pindar's well-known sophisticated outlook toward the divine. However, here, too, Pindar's religious sense can hardly be the only determinant in his spurning of the story of the raven and his substitution of the god's omniscience. To expect Pindar to tell the story in *Pythian* 3 as it appeared in Hesiod is to misunderstand Pindar's use of his sources. The story of the raven was primarily an aetiological tale, 'Why the raven is black.' [1] In a short lyric poem the introduction of a complicated aetiological myth about a raven would only be an extravagant digression irrelevant to the short Coronis-myth and to Pindar's purposes in telling it.[2]

The aetiological story cleverly omitted, the narrative continues smoothly in *vv.* 31-35. When Apollo learned of Coronis' "union with an outlander" (ξεινίαν κοίταν) and of her deceit, he sent his sister "burning (with rage)" (θύοισαν) to Lakereia, where the girl lived. Fittingly, the punishment delivered by the "burning" Artemis is compared to fire:

Pindar's οὐδ' ἔλαθε σκοπόν occurs abruptly after the description of the forbidden union and finds a parallel in οὐδὲ δὴν ἦεν ἄπυστος Ζεύς (ε 127); however, no doubt because of the σκοπός in Hesiod's story of Coronis, Pindar discloses slowly what Homer stated concisely. Wilamowitz suggests that ἄϊεν implies the existence of another (p. 281, note 2), as must κοινάν, usually translated 'confidant' here. Since κοινάω in Py. 4, 115 = κοινόω not κοινωνέω, κοινάν might even mean 'informer' here, i.e., equal not so much to κοινωνός as to ὁ κοινῶν.

[1] Besides the Pindaric scholia *ad loc.* (52a) see Callimachus frag. 260 (Pfeiffer), Ovid *Metam.* II, 534 ff., and Hyginus CCII (p. 37, n. 5 *supra*).

[2] Mere mention of the raven might have produced some confusion due to the similarity of κορώνη ('crow') to Κορωνίς.

καὶ γειτόνων
πολλοὶ ἐπαῦρον, ἁμᾶ δ' ἔφθαρεν· πολλὰν δ' ὄρει πῦρ ἐξ ἑνὸς
σπέρματος ἐνθορὸν ἀΐστωσεν ὕλαν.

The imagery of these verses has long been recognized, but the relevance of the passage to the remainder of the poem has not been explained; Pindar describes death by plague, or at least uses imagery applicable to a plague.[1] *Olympian* 1, 35 and 52 have caused most critics to believe that Pindar, as a matter of religious principle, would never attribute any unjust action to the gods, surely not to Apollo. Yet here, as the scholiast notes, Apollo causes the death of many innocent people. Obviously Pindar has not suddenly reversed his former complimentary attitude toward Apollo and become 'anti-Apolline': [2] to understand the sentence is to understand its context. *Pythian* 3 is a poem intently concerned with disease, the healing of

[1] For the similarity of plague to fire (not only its contagion but also its symptoms) see Thucydides II, 49, Soph. *O.T.* 27, etc. The scholiast *ad* Py. 3, 35 f. states that Coronis died of the plague, then quotes Hesiod *Op.* 240 (πολλάκι καὶ ξύμπασα πόλις κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀπηύρα: see the whole passage; *vv.* 238-243), and almost glumly comments that even innocent people (μηδὲν αἴτιοι) die in a plague brought about by the crime of one person. The obvious similarity of Py. 3, 35 f. to *Op.* 240 needs no further comment. For δαίμων ἕτερος see my "Soph. *Ajax* 516."

Several modern commentators recognize or consider it probable that Coronis died of plague (Boeckh, p. 256, Schmidt, p. 237, Fennell *ad v.* 11, Mezger *ad loc.*, Fraccaroli, p. 384, Farnell and Schroeder *ad v.* 10), but no one seems to accord it any importance. Some doubt of the scholiast's remark may result from the mention of Coronis' death by arrows in her bedroom (*v.* 10); however, the plague is notorious for coming in the form of Apolline arrows (A 44-61 [n.b. καίοντο πυραὶ in *v.* 52, *cf.* Py. 3, 44]). Nevertheless, those who cannot reconcile *v.* 10 with a plague in *vv.* 35 ff. may compare Fraccaroli on Py. 1, 15 and 27 f. (p. 138).

[2] If, however, we are to judge the passage out of context, as Pindar's statements relating to religion and morality are usually assessed, such a conclusion is mandatory, or nonsense ensues. The tendency to go through the Pindaric corpus branding 'religious' passages or 'complimentary-to-Apollo' passages regardless of contextual considerations produces curious interpretations. Duchemin represents Coronis' punishment as just, and then writes:

> "Mais le dieu n'avait pas voulu punir en même temps un innocent. Traversant les flammes du bûcher, il revit l'enfant et le confia au Centaure Chiron" (p. 112).

Her first sentence is contradicted by Pindar himself only four verses before. As proof of Pindar's "incoherence and irrationality in theological and moral doctrine" (p. 62) Norwood writes:

> "Apollo causes the death of Coronis' innocent neighbours without evoking a censorious word; but the god suddenly becomes very tender of the guiltless when his own unborn child is threatened in the course of the same affair" (p. 56).

disease, and death: the deaths of Coronis and her innocent neighbors result from plague; the story which follows the tale of her death is concerned with the inception of the healing arts.

Fire again assumes importance at the cremation of Coronis: σέλας δ' ἀμφέδραμεν λάβρον 'Αφαίστου (*vv.* 39 f.). Apollo suddenly proclaims that he will not let his son die in the flames. With one leap [1] he reaches Lakereia and from the flaming pyre (καιομένα πυρά) snatches Asklepios from the womb of his mother's corpse (*vv.* 43 f.).[2] By saving the baby from the flames Apollo has saved his life. As in the sentence concerning plague (*vv.* 36 f.), fire is closely associated with death.

The myth of Coronis thus terminated by the subject whence it began, Asklepios' premature birth, Pindar further signals a transition by reintroducing Cheiron's foster-parentage of the child (*v.* 45, cf. *v.* 5). He then proceeds to tell the myth of the first physician. The two stories, however, are bound together by much more than the logical transition provided by Cheiron's rôle of receiving and rearing the child, and, as was noted above, among these other connectives is the topic of disease and death. Verse 46, πολυπήμονας ἀνθρώποισιν ἰᾶσθαι νόσους, which obviously harks back to Asklepios'

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[1] Almost all commentators suggest that the "one step" required by the god to make his trip is a conscious 'rectification' or 'improvement' over the Homeric god who requires four steps to reach his goal (N 20); Pindar supposedly has a higher opinion of the gods than Homer does, because his gods take fewer steps (e.g., Kolf, pp. 10 ff.). No such evidence exists, and the entire idea is based upon a compulsion to compare trivia (cf. Croiset, p. 180). Since the distance traveled by Homer's Poseidon in the famous passage (from Samothrace to Aegae) is almost three times (if we accept the Euboean Aegae) or over four times (if we accept the Achaean Aegae [Ne. 5, 37]) greater than that traveled by Pindar's Apollo (from Delphi to Lake Boebois), the statistics belie the statisticians' theory (see also Ξ 225-8). The important matter, however, is to note what each poet is doing. Homer is emphasizing the force of Poseidon's step as it shakes the earth with each stride (N 17 ff.); therefore, for his god to take several steps is not only impressive but even mandatory. Four steps of approximately equal length would take Poseidon 'island-hopping' from Samothrace to Lemnos, to modern Hagios Evstratios [ancient Neae?], to Scyros, to Euboea in a line. Pindar has no reason to depict Apollo as 'Poseidon the Earth-shaker,' but needs to get Apollo to the scene of the fire as swiftly as possible.

[2] διέφαινε: *LSJ s.v.* διαφαίνω III, 2, "parted its flame" (so the scholiast and modern commentators) is an interpretation of the word which assumes a unique meaning, for the word elsewhere denotes perviousness to light or sight. Possibly the word has its customary meaning here, Apollo passing through the flames as light or sight might pass through a diaphanous garment or crystal.

portion of the κεφαλαῖον,[1] introduces the narration of the Asklepios-myth proper. Strophe γ′ is wholly devoted to a description of the various methods by which Asklepios healed sundry ailments. The passage (*vv.* 47-53) bears interest in itself as a concise summary of the ancient healing arts,[2] but, like all else in *Pythian* 3, it is integrally related to other ideas developed in the poem. Pindar's reasons for terming Asklepios a τέκτων (*v.* 6) are clarified: by various means but especially surgery, Asklepios set the sick upright (ἔστασεν ὀρθούς). The phrase and the related ὀρθόω are medical terms meaning 'to cure,' but the medical meaning is apparently closely related to the carpenter's term meaning to erect or rebuild [3] and readily brings to mind a product as well as a service. Moreover, both terms, τέκτων and ἵστημι ὀρθόν, recur in significant contexts later in the poem. Another notable phrase is θερινῷ πυρί, which apparently refers to the extreme summer heat to which sunstroke is attributed; [4] the use of the simple word πῦρ is uncommon in such contexts, and here serves to continue to connect fire with the forces of disease and death, as in Coronis' story and in Asklepios' salvation from death.

The importance of the plague in *vv.* 35 f. now becomes apparent. There Apollo was the instigator of disease, and sent death to many innocent people without apparent justification. Yet the same god's act of saving Asklepios and entrusting him to Cheiron for training as the world's first physician provides a significant counter, for it initiated a remedy for disease. A dual function, part positive, part negative, for a god is not illogical.[5] The god empowered to produce

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[1] For νοῦσος at the end of the stanza and for the general idea cf. *vv.* 5 ff.; for ἀνθρώποισι (dative of interest, 'for mankind') cf. the variation of εὐμενής in *v.* 5.

[2] Mezger *ad v.* 52 notes that there are three specific types of ailments and three specific types of cures. We are not, however, to take a further step and assume that each class of ailments is cured by only one remedy.

[3] Several examples from both construction and medicine are given by *LSJ s.v.* ὀρθόω; the word may even be used for 'raise from the dead' (Theocritus *Id.* 1, 139) as English *resurrect*; cf. also Archilochus 56, 2 (58, 2 Diehl[3]) where ὀρθόω approaches medical terminology but also is used metaphorically as ἵστημι ὀρθόν in Py. 3, 96b. Gildersleeve notes that 'bring out' (ἔξαγεν) is still a common medical term for cures.

[4] Mezger and Gildersleeve *ad loc.* Gildersleeve suggests that πῦρ here actually may mean *fever*, which would not be unexpected (see *LSJ s.v.* πῦρ, p. 39, n. 1 *supra*, and θερμᾶν νόσων in Py. 3, 66), but, to judge from parallels, is unlikely here: cf. Horace *Ep.* 10, 15 f., *C.* III, 13, 9 f., I, 17, 17 f., 22, 17-22, etc.

[5] Similarly, Artemis, the huntress, of course, is also the protectress of animals.

a certain effect has control over it; therefore he may also cause the opposite effect. Consequently, Pindar's Apollo, both destroyer and protector, is consistent with his natural functions, but emerges as the institutor of the medical profession, a gift of considerable value to mankind. Furthermore, because an examination of the healing arts and of their possible efficacy in preventing death is implied in subsequent parts of the poem, the plague which caused the death of Coronis and her neighbors contributes to the unity of the poem, as does the imagery of the spreading fire, which almost becomes a symbol for death.

The new antistrophe opens abruptly and ominously with a short gnome: ἀλλὰ κέρδει καὶ σοφία δέδεται (*v.* 54). Even the σοφία or profession of the τέκτων, Asklepios, 'is a thrall to gain.' The gnome, as often, effects transition from one portion of the myth to another.

ἔτραπεν καὶ κεῖνον ἀγάνορι μισθῷ χρυσὸς ἐν χερσὶν φανείς
ἄνδρ' ἐκ θανάτου κομίσαι
ἤδη ἁλωκότα.

The verb τρέπω recalls *v.* 35 which concerned the downfall of Coronis. So here Asklepios was "deflected" [1] or 'induced' by gold placed in his hands to bring back a man from death, one who was "already caught" (ἤδη ἁλωκότα). Crucial to the thematic development of the poem, this passage may be compared to *vv.* 1 ff.,[2] for to wish that Cheiron, ὁ ἀποιχόμενος, be alive (ζώειν) is in some ways similar to the desire to κομίσαι ἐκ θανάτου someone who is ἤδη ἁλωκώς. The two participial phrases, ἤδη ἁλωκότα and τὸν ἀποιχόμενον, both come at the end of their respective clauses, and the former, at least, has a concessive force. Perhaps we might translate, "even though he was already captured," [3] and "—the departed—."

Yet neither Pindar nor Asklepios, both human beings, can overcome death's law. The natural order of Zeus precludes it.[4] When Asklepios tried to do so,

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[1] For the syntax, cf. Py. 9, 44.

[2] Gildersleeve (p. 268) and Schmidt (p. 233) may be making vague references to this correspondence; Lefkowitz (pp. 220 f.) does so more explicitly, but otherwise the connection seems to have gone unmarked.

[3] Plato's paraphrase of the sentence (*Resp.* 408b) strips it of the careful word order and euphemisms which were created for Py. 3, and although Pindar's sentence obviously refers to a dead man, Des Places (*Pindare et Platon*, pp. 169 f.) may be correct in assuming that Plato means merely 'dying' by θανάσιμον (despite Sophocles' use of the word for 'dead').

[4] Apollodorus III, 10, 3, Gerhardt, p. 20, Méautis, p. 143, Farnell *ad loc.*,

57 χερσὶ δ' ἄρα Κρονίων
ῥίψαις δι' ἀμφοῖν ἀμπνοὰν στέρνων κάθελεν
ὠκέως, αἴθων δὲ κεραυνὸς ἐνέσκιμψεν μόρον.

Once again fire (in the form of αἴθων κεραυνός) is associated with death. Each of the two principal mythical characters, Coronis and Asklepios, has committed an offense and been punished. With the deaths of Asklepios and of the man whom he had attempted to restore from death to life, the mythical section proper of the poem ends, and Asklepios' story provides the moral by which transition is made from the myths and the antistrophe to the non-mythical part of the poem and the epode. The connective and summarizing force of the moral is crucial:

59 χρὴ τὰ ἐοικότα πὰρ δαιμόνων μαστευέμεν θναταῖς φρασίν,
γνόντα τὸ πὰρ ποδός, οἵας εἰμὲν αἴσας.

Although the phraseology is calculated to refer closely to the immediately preceding subject, mortals' attempt to escape the law of death, this sentence contains a variation of the theme which occurs earlier (*vv.* 20-23) in the Coronis-myth: [1] τὸ πὰρ ποδός (*v.* 60) obviously corresponds to ἐπιχώρια (*v.* 22). Mortals are not to seek (μαστευέμεν, *v.* 59: cf. παπταίνει, *v.* 22) from the gods what is not ἐοικότα; the latter would apparently be τὰ πόρσω of *v.* 22, since anything not ἐοικός would contrast with τὸ πὰρ ποδός as τὰ πόρσω with ἐπιχώρια. The continuity of theme manifested by the corresponding words in these two passages, each of which sets forth the moral of its respective myth, invites the attentive audience to compare the two myths and to complement the one with the other. Both Coronis and Asklepios wished to obtain something that they could not have. Their desires were neither possible nor proper (cf. *vv.* 1 ff.). The variations in the theme of the myths, apparent in *vv.* 20-23 and *vv.* 59 f., provide a connection between that theme and the proem of the poem, for a wish that Cheiron, ὁ ἀποιχόμενος, were alive is a form of wanting τὰ πόρσω, a longing for τῶν ἀπεόντων, a desire that an ἤδη ἁλωκώς escape Hades' capture. Any doubt that the opening sentence of the poem is a contrary-to-fact condition should be abolished by the next three stanzas.

Burton, p. 82. The inability of the natural order to sustain such an act as that of Asklepios lies behind the master touch of the master poet, the ἄρα of *v.* 57: the relationship of cause and effect is more scientific than moralistic.

[1] See Burton, pp. 84 f.

Pindar begins the epode by addressing himself: [1]

61 μή, φίλα ψυχά, βίον ἀθάνατον
σπεῦδε, τὰν δ' ἔμπρακτον ἄντλει μαχανάν.

Here Pindar has ingeniously bound together many aspects of the theme which has already been observed. Asklepios had not necessarily desired to make himself immortal, but someone's wish that someone escape death occasioned the greed that induced Asklepios to misuse his art. The poet, apparently referring primarily to that action of Asklepios,[2] says, "Do not, φίλα ψυχά, seek immortality." The interchangeability of the two notions, a wish to raise another from the dead and a personal desire for immortality, does not exemplify Pindar's supposed illogical thought-association but actually reveals Pindar's consummate clearness of mind and art.[3] The relationship between the notions arises because both are impossible, because both seek to controvert the natural principle that mortals must die.[4] Furthermore, another element common to both ideas is emphatically pointed out by the story of Coronis and her wish for τῶν ἀπεόντων. Asklepios' violation of the law of mortality consisted of the restoration of one who had departed and hence was ἀπέων. Coronis had scorned τὰ ἐπιχώρια. So now in *vv.* 61 f. ἔμπρακτον corresponds to ἐπιχώρια (*v.* 22) and πὰρ ποδός (*v.* 60). βίον ἀθάνατον corresponds to τὰ πόρσω (*v.* 22). σπεῦδε corresponds to παπταίνει

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[1] The injunction, directed by the poet to himself, also has the force of a general recommendation with specific application to Hieron (Bowra, p. 130 n. 2, Méautis, p. 143) as well as to the poet: see pp. 58 f. *infra*.

[2] Burton, p. 85. The reference can hardly be to the recipient of Asklepios' dubious gift of momentary resurrection, for Pindar does not even mention his name, although various versions of the story give many variants for the name of the resurrected man (for the candidates see Roscher, *s.v.* Asklepios, col. 619, and Apollodorus, *Bibl.* III, 10, 3 with Frazer's *Loeb* edition, II, 16, n. 2). Pindar may have intended Hippolytus (see Schroeder *ad v.* 54 and his argument against the theory [Wilamowitz, *Isyllos*, pp. 60 f.] that Pindar originated the story of the bribery), but he seems to avoid purposefully all but minimal reference to the other man while concentrating on Asklepios (so Sappho 68 [55 LP], by omitting the name, condemns to perpetual obscurity someone against whom her anger or contempt is directed). We do not know who paid the bribe, but unless advance payment had been made, it cannot have been the dead man and is unimportant. Since Asklepios' story is the source of the moral which Pindar draws, the reference must be to his actions.

[3] I have in mind the theory of mere thought-association of Drachmann, Dornseiff, Schadewaldt, et al. (see "Pindaric Criticism," pp. 610 f.).

[4] For Asklepios' act see p. 42, n. 4 *supra*; the unnatural nature of immortality in *v.* 61 has been established by θναταῖς φρασίν in *v.* 59.

(*v.* 22) and μαστευέμεν (*v.* 59). Many other phrases such as ἀποιχόμενον (*v.* 3), ἤδη ἀλωκότα (*v.* 57), and ἐοικότα contribute to the composition of this theme which *vv.* 61 f. state in terms connected with immortality and death. The importance of these two verses, however, passes beyond their function of expanding and clarifying the theme set forth in the myths, because with *vv.* 61 f. Pindar, in his rôle as poet, returns to the subject of himself and his own wishes.[1] The last time that subject occurred, the poet was contemplating a wish that Cheiron transcend the laws of mortality and be alive. In *vv.* 61 f. he begins to reject that wish for another's immortality by spurning a desire for his own, again making manifest the close connection between the two desires. The dependence of the myths upon *vv.* 1 f. and, consequently, their relevance thereto are clearly demonstrated, as Pindar now returns to the possibility of Cheiron's living again, even recalling the contrary-to-fact condition of *vv.* 1 f. by another:

63 εἰ δὲ σώφρων ἄντρον ἔναι' ἔτι Χείρων, ...

Since the poet has just stated that he does not desire a βίος ἀθάνατος and by clever manipulation of vocabulary and theme has suggested that a desire for immortality is reciprocal with a desire for another to return to life from death, the contrary-to-fact condition is especially meaningful. To want Cheiron to be alive is not ἔμπρακτον, nor is Cheiron πὰρ ποδός or ἐπιχώριος. He is ἀπεών, ἤδη ἀλωκώς, or, as Pindar said before, ἀποιχόμενος. Therefore, Pindar advisedly says in *vv.* 63 ff., 'If he *were* still alive and I *had* lulled him with my song, I *would have* persuaded him to provide the good men of our day with a physician (such as Asklepios was) and I *would have* come across the sea,' etc. If Pindar *had* come bringing the double gift of χρυσέα ὑγίεια and the κῶμος for a victory in the Pythian games, he *would have* come as a light more far-shining to Hieron than a heavenly star.[2] Comparable emphasis on unreality occurs in no other Pindaric

[1] This formal fact is not altered by the subjects discussed in p. 44, n. 1 *supra* and p. 58 *infra*.

[2] Although most of the traditional praise is reserved for the encomiastic portion of the poem, the first mention of the recipient of the poem in *v.* 69 bears with it a short statement of praise (*vv.* 70 f.), kindness to citizens and to foreigners being a common universalizing doublet attributing universal kindness to the laudandus: see Bundy II, 67. Bundy lists two examples; others are Ol. 2, 6 f., Ol. 4, 17 f., Ol. 13, 2 f., Py. 5, 56 f., Is. 6, 65 f. (cf. Emped. B 112, 1 ff.). For the imagery of *v.* 75 see Lefkowitz, p. 221 and n. 100 and Ar. *Ranae* 342 (with Radermacher's commentary). The many

ode.[1] The entire passage is designed to create a specific mood and to serve as vividly contrasting foil for the antistrophe, where, as in the "capping terms" of the priamels discussed by Bundy, ἀλλά, ἐγώ, and ἐθέλω + infinitive dismiss the preceding ideas while marking the new subject as climactic.[2]

77 ἀλλ' ἐπεύξασθαι μὲν ἐγὼν ἐθέλω
Ματρί.

All the *if's* and *would have's*, the generally pensive tone of unattainability, and the long, complex contrary-to-fact constructions are suddenly, even rudely, broken and dismissed. The poet pointedly and in simple terms changes the subject: "But I, for my part,[3] want to pray to the Mother." This sentence finally completes the concentric sequence begun at *v.* 1, for Pindar now emphatically makes a wish, the action which occupied his attention as the poem began. A conscious reminiscence of *vv.* 1 f. in *v.* 77 manifests itself in the repetition of the verbs ἐθέλω and εὔχομαι.[4] In the opening passage Pindar said that he would want (ἤθελόν κε) such and such, if it were proper for him to pray (εὔξασθαι) in that way. In *v.* 77 he says that he does want (ἐθέλω) to pray (ἐπεύξασθαι) in a certain way. He has exerted considerable effort in the mythical part of the poem to

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attempts to elicit biographical facts from this passage seem failures: the arrival-motif (κατέβαν, ἔμολον, etc.) is far too versatile to imply such facts, to say nothing of its appearance here in an unreal condition. For this motif and its variations see Bundy I, 27 with n. 65 (to n. 69 add the striking Bacch. 2, 1 ff.). Further examples may show the complexity of the theme: add Ol. 14, 18, Ne. 6, 59b, Is. 5, 23; 6, 54, fr. 46, 6, 9, 45 (52f, 9, 13, 60 Snell[2]), Bacch. 12, 7. For the fundamental meaning (apparently often metaphorical) of these verbs see Radt, pp. 40 ff. (where he argues cogently that the meaning, "enter the contest," of καταβαίνω probably does not occur in Pindar).

1 Gildersleeve, *AJP* 3 (1882), 445, lists only six unreal conditions in all of the epinicians; two of these occur here. If we add *vv.* 1 ff., Py. 3 contains three of seven unreal conditions.

2 For ἀλλά see Bundy II, 36, n. 3; for the first person pronoun in transitional formulae see des Places, p. 10; for the contrast between epode and strophe see Nierhaus, p. 84; for ἐθέλω + infinitive as a statement of purpose at the start of an ode or in transition see Bundy I, 20, II, 45, and add Bacch. 5, 14 ff. (the interchangeability of such phrases with futures [Bundy, *loc. cit.*] confirms Radt's suggestion [p. 74] that they are periphrastic futures, but all such statements of purpose refer, as Bundy maintains, to the poem in which they occur).

3 A translation of μὲν ἐγών and its implications (n. 2 *supra*).

4 Mezger, p. 72, Fennell, p. 173; but the ἐπ- does not have the force attached to it by Fennell *ad v.* 77: see LSJ s.v. ἐπεύχομαι.

explain the impropriety of the prayer mentioned in *vv.* 1 ff. Now in *v.* 77, abandoning all pretense of an interest in Cheiron's being alive, he expresses a simple desire to make a simple and apparently whimsical prayer to the Great Mother.

The relevance of this prayer has been frequently but vainly sought. Most scholars, citing the scholiast, suggest that Pindar prays to the Mother that she restore Hieron to health. Such a cause in the prayer is possible, but surely obscure and unemphasized.[1] Evidence for the Mother as a healing goddess is present but not impressive, surely not conclusive.[2] Moreover, Greek prayers which ask for specific results normally request help or favor of a general nature, at least, even if the particulars are left vague. Pindar asks for nothing, apparently uninterested in the content of his prayer, and if his primary purpose in praying were to acquire good health for Hieron, he would, no doubt, make some mention of something at least vaguely related to that notion.[3]

To judge from Pindar's words, the prayer has absolutely nothing to do with Hieron; the apparent irrelevance of the Great Mother to the context is, indeed, almost shocking. Consequently, many scholars have offered patently desperate explanations which, in fact, attribute shocking irrelevance to the passage. Of these the most curious confuses the apocryphal fancies of latter-day drudges with both historical fact and literary phenomena. We are asked to believe that "Pindar's vision" of the Mother of the Gods ("which took

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[1] Only one scholium, 137a, ventures upon this interpretation (although 139b is related), and its author seems (δοκεῖ) to be guessing. He is, however, followed confidently by a host of modern scholars: *RE*, *s.v.* Kybele, (Bd. XI, 2255), Fraccaroli, p. 388, Boeckh, Mezger *ad loc.*, Méautis, p. 144, Schroeder, *Pythien*, pp. 25 f., et al. *Cf.* Wilamowitz, p. 282, Coppola, p. 101, Gildersleeve *ad loc.*

[2] For what evidence there is see *RE loc. cit.* (note 1 *supra*). The fact that the Great Mother was frequently connected with death (as an earth-goddess) and with rebirth (with strong Phrygian influence) does not necessarily relate to worship as a bringer and healer of disease. Apollo is not a chthonic deity, but is the healer *par excellence*. The scholiast *ad* Ol. 1, 26, writes: Βακχυλίδης τὸν Πέλοπα τὴν 'Ρέαν λέγει ὑγιάσαι. But 'heal' there has reference to resurrection from death, not to the curing of ailments. Py. 3 scholium 139b mentions the Mother as healer of insanity, but surely its author could not be implying that Hieron's infirmity was of that nature.

[3] The mere expression of a desire to make the prayer is the completed prayer itself, and there are no further implications of intent or futurity: see Bundy II, 45 (with note 33). If the prayer were for a specific matter, the healing of Hieron, we might at least expect (as the scholiast inserts) a εὐμενής-term.

place about 474 B.C.") explains why Pindar wrote the passage in *Pythian* 3.[1] No critic points out that Aristodemus' account of the "vision" is merely an alternative, fancifully expanded, to the above-mentioned explanation of the prayer. Aristodemus' alternative explanations of the relevance of difficult passages in Pindar ought to be notorious, and his account of the vision is plainly absurd.[2] Like the story of Pindar's being fed by bees, the so-called vision belongs to the histories of literary traditions and critical aberrations, not to the serious literary criticism of this passage.

The solution to the problem of the pertinence of the prayer emerges not from the scholia, not from the tale about Pindar's mountain vision of the Great Mother nor from wanton conjectures about Pindar's financial condition, his temple duties, or his other recent poems; [3] the solution comes from the coherence of the poem itself as a whole:

77 ἀλλ' ἐπεύξασθαι μὲν ἐγὼν ἐθέλω
Ματρί. τὰν κοῦραι παρ' ἐμὸν πρόθυρον σὺν Πανὶ μέλπονται θαμὰ
σεμνὰν θεὸν ἐννύχιαι.

For those who have followed the thematic development of the poem, the connection ought to be conspicuously evident: παρ' ἐμὸν πρό-

[1] Scholium 137b (paraphrased by Bowra, p. 50, where for "wooden image" read "stone image"). For this interpretation see Burton, p. 86, Farnell *ad loc.* The supposed dating of the so-called "vision" is that of Bowra, p. 51. See further note 3 *infra.*

[2] See Aristodemus' fanciful explanation (Ne. 7 scholium 56a) of the "παρέκβασις" to Neoptolemus, which is obviously contrived as an alternative to other explanations of a supposedly irrelevant passage. Radt (p. 85, n. 4) takes the attribution of Ne. 7, 56a away from Aristodemus, because it seems inconsistent with 150a; Fraenkel (*Hermes* 89 [1961], 388) thinks that Radt may be right, but also that Aristodemus (and Aristarchus) may have given two solutions to the problem. The Ne. 7 scholia are much confused, and the scholium wrongly ascribed to Aristodemus may be 150a, not 56a—the author of Py. 3, 137b could easily write Ne. 7, 56a, and Aristodemus usually disagrees with Aristarchus (Fraenkel, *loc. cit.*, p. 390). If 94a is indeed from Aristarchus, as many think probable, perhaps "Aristodemus" in 150a is a mistake for "Aristarchus."

[3] Wilamowitz claims that Pindar had just written, for the opening of the temple, frag. 110 (95); since that poem still "rang in his ear," he inserted a remark about it in Py. 3 ("Hieron und Pindaros," pp. 1298 f.). Elsewhere Wilamowitz connects Py. 3, 77 with a theory that Pindar had to get the money for the temple from Hieron (*Pindaros*, p. 270: *contra* Farnell, II, 136, Lefkowitz, n. 106). Such guesses seem of little use; so also Bowra's claim (p. 51) that Py. 3, 77 ff. asserts the cause of Pindar's failure to come to Syracuse: he is busy with temple duties for the Mother, probably the "institution of the rite."

θυρον is obviously a thematic variant comparable to πὰρ ποδός and ἐπιχώρια.[1]

Much has been said about Pindar's dedication and sponsorship of the cult of the Great Mother near his home, but, even if these ideas be founded on more than a scholiast's whim, the primary reason the poet chooses 'to pray to the Mother' in the poem is clearly that the Great Mother, in contrast to Cheiron, is πὰρ ποδός and not πόρσω. He rejects the prayer that the commentators think he makes in *vv.* 1 f. in favor of a simple prayer to the deity nearest to his house in order to illustrate and to act in accordance with his statements about refraining from wishes for distant, impossible things while using to the full what is possible and accessible. In order to make this thematic point, he takes advantage of a common usage of Greek prayer: frequently a man selects the god to whom he will pray simply on the grounds of propinquity: whoever is nearest.[2] Therefore, the prayer is not an irrelevant outburst of uncontrollable religious devotion, financial indebtedness, or the like, but an integral part of the theme of the poem.

Moreover, the statement about the prayer (*vv.* 77-79) completes one section of the poem and, with the elaborate *recusatio* and ring-form, provides an essential formal resolution to the subject of the proem. The poem is far from complete. Rather, as is indicated by ἐθέλω + the infinitive and the "name caps" ἐγών and Ἱέρων, the poet has just begun an *encomium* of Hieron which will contain many elements seen in the other epinicians.[3] Thus the end of the *recusatio* is identical with the beginning of the *encomium*, and the two parts

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[1] The theme of the superiority of the near or present to the far or absent assumes a variety of forms: indigenous/foreign, one's own property/others' property, inside the house/outside, present time/future time, etc. Such themes appear, no doubt, innumerable times in all literatures, but Greek literature contains a considerable number of passages wherein not only the sentiments but also the sentence structures and vocabularies bear remarkable similarities to each other. Since both the general theme and a derivative, the advisability of marrying a local person, help elucidate several portions of Py. 3, I have shown some thematic occurrences and variations in "Appendix I."

[2] So Jocasta says to Apollo (Soph. *O.T.*, 919 f.):

πρὸς σ', ὦ Λύκει' Ἄπολλον, ἄγχιστος γὰρ εἶ,
ἱκέτις ἀφῖγμαι τοῖσδε σὺν κατεύγμασιν.

"Sehr oft aber bestimmte auch die Nähe eines Heiligtums .... diese oder jene Gottheit anzurufen" (Stengel, *Kultus*, p. 79 [where he refers to L. Schmidt, *Ethik der Griechen*, II, 31 f.]).

[3] See p. 33 and p. 46 *supra* and, for the term "name cap," Bundy I, note 18.

of the poem are formally inseparable.[1] More important, however, is the thematic interdependence of the two structural portions. Although the first seventy-six verses have been formally rejected, they have also effected some highly developed themes and conclusions, which Pindar will apply in the second section to Hieron specifically and to all of mankind implicitly.

The specific applications to Hieron occur in an especial nexus of encomiastic motifs which has already been examined extensively by Bundy. The principal subjects are the nature of the human situation and the universality of death; human hopes and expectations; the superlative state within the human condition reached by the laudandus; the knowledge of these matters possessed by the laudandus; his liberality based upon such knowledge; the fame that results from such liberality if it is joined to song; and the fact that the last-mentioned phenomenon is a counter to the first.[2] However, since Bundy does not discuss *Pythian* 3 in his explication of this τόπος and since in *Pythian* 3 the motifs receive elaborate modification and expansion in order to maintain their part in the organic development of the whole poem, the remainder of the poem needs to be examined in the close manner of the preceding pages.

An appeal to the sagacity of the laudandus, the first encomiastic element,[3] appears in the form of a condition (*v.* 80). Hieron is assumed, or at least invited,[4] to understand the preponderance of bad over good in human existence (*vv.* 81 f.). In true Hellenic fashion, Pindar attributes such knowledge of the present to a knowledge of the past,[5] and προτέρων is commonly understood to refer to past poets, especially Homer, and specifically Ω 527 ff., as it no

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1 The sequence of μέν and δέ in *vv.* 77 and 80 further shows the formal link between *vv.* 77 ff. and *vv.* 80 f. Of course purely encomiastic elements occur within the first section (p. 45, n. 2 *supra*); of interest, however, is the omission of a vocative or proper name there. They are postponed until *v.* 80.

2 Bundy II, 86-91, discusses several of these topics at length and the others are implicit in his argument. A closely related arrangement of themes is discussed as the "Consolation" by Greene, *Moira*, pp. 27 (Achilleus' speech to Priam in Ω 518-51) and 232 f. (on an arrangement of fragments of Antiphon: G. Altwegg, *de libro ΠΕΡΙ ΟΜΟΝΟΙΑΣ scripto*, [Basel, 1908], pp. 20-55). Although these discussions do not touch upon all that occurs in Py. 3 and do not mention it, they provide a truly helpful commentary to the poem.

3 Cf. Bacch. 5, 3 ff., Is. 2, 12, Ne. 7, 17 (see Bundy II, 86), etc.

4 A protasis introduced by εἰ δέ and applying or applicable to the laudandus is usually assumed to be true of him (Bundy II, 54 ff.), but this occurrence differs from the examples discussed by Bundy.

5 See in general van Groningen, *In the Grip of the Past.*

doubt does. This interpretation, however, is seriously impaired when the scholiasts and modern critics presumptuously charge Pindar with an inability to read Greek.[1] οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο, to borrow a phrase from the scholiast. Scholars, past and present, not Pindar, have not only misread their Homer but also misconstrued the attitude of most Greeks toward life itself: Homer does say that Zeus has two jars of evil and one of good.[2] To recognize that the immortals give mortals two evils for each good is not, for most Greeks at least, pessimistic as modern critics so often maintain; rather it is realistic. Pindar elaborates:

82 τὰ μὲν ὦν οὐ δύνανται νήπιοι κόσμῳ φέρειν,
ἀλλ' ἀγαθοί, τὰ καλὰ τρέψαντες ἔξω.

The evils (τὰ μέν) foolish people cannot bear decorously, but the good can bear them, by turning the fair parts to the outside. The metaphor apparently refers to the practice of turning the best parts of a garment to the outside so that they alone are visible; the word νήπιοι probably harks back to the Hesiodic passage whence *vv.* 20-23 probably arose.[3] At any rate, a definitive connection between the

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[1] The scholiast *ad loc.* claims that Pindar erroneously "took" (ἐδέξατο, the term for accepting an interpretation) the Homeric passage to refer to three jars through ignorance of the uses of ἕτερος; so Farnell *ad loc.* and the majority of the interpretations of the Homeric passage. Fortunately, the lack of knowledge about ἕτερος lies with classicist grammarians, not classical poets (note 2 *infra*). Luppino's arguments that προτέρων modifies λόγων and refers to a numerical proportion of good and evil in the earlier myths of the poem is ingenious but forced; Schroeder *ad v.* 81 had given warning against such an attempt.

[2] For the proper understanding of the passage from the *Iliad* see Greene, p. 27 ("For upon the floor of Zeus stands [*sic*] two jars (πίθοι) of the evil gifts that he giveth, and another of blessings") and p. 15; Kitto, *Greeks*, p. 60. Plato (*Resp.* 379 d) obviously has learned a different textual tradition or is quoting his predecessors with even less fidelity and insight than usual, and his hexameter line has no real bearing on the interpretation of the traditional one. The scholia on Py. 3, 81 show that the number of jars in Ω 528 f. was a traditional controversy caused by the erroneous assumption of some grammarians that ἕτερος could not be used when more than two items were under consideration (see *LSJ s.v.* ἕτερος II, Hes. *Th.* 367, Bacch. 10, 42, etc.). The punctuation of Ω 529 suggested by the Pindaric scholia and, required for that interpretation, read in most Homer texts seems perverse, and the context shows that the preponderance of evil over good in human life is the point of the passage (Greene, pp. 232 f.). See also Stoessi, *Wiener Studien* 50 (1932), 171 ff. and Schroeder, *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* 21 (1922), 47 ff.

[3] P. 37, n. 1 *supra*. For the explanation of the metaphor see schol. *ad loc.*, Fraccaroli, p. 386, Gildersleeve *ad loc.*

present passage and earlier passages exists. 'We must bear the bad, making the best of whatever good we have' is a variation of the theme which occurs frequently elsewhere in the poem. Verses 61 f. suggested that we all must die, but that we can make the most ("exhaust to the fullest:" ἀντλεῖν) of what we have, as in the metaphor of *v.* 83. Even the words τὰ μέν and τὰ καλά correspond complexly but discernibly to previous expressions: τὰ καλά corresponds to ἔμπρακτον (*v.* 62) and ἐπιχώρια and πὰρ ποδός. τὰ μέν may be compared to τὰ πόρσω. These relationships, because they result not from mere paraphrases of the same idea but from a theme with manifold aspects, at first appear rather abstruse, but they are not nebulous or forced. In the poem Pindar demonstrates a real connection between the bad (τὰ μέν) and the distant (τὰ πόρσω), and to observe these unusual, complex relationships is only to observe the complexity of the poem and of the problem to which Pindar has addressed himself.[1]

The predominantly adverse nature of human life provides vivid foil for Hieron's lofty estate as Pindar effects the 'supreme compliment,' often the highlight of an encomiastic poem, a categorical statement that the laudandus is superlative:[2]

84 τὶν δὲ μοῖρ' εὐδαιμονίας ἕπεται.
λαγέταν γάρ τοι τύραννον δέρκεται,
εἴ τιν' ἀνθρώπων, ὁ μέγας Πότμος.

A lot of blessedness attends Hieron. The word μοῖρα strictly means 'portion,' frequently, as here, 'apportionment:' the sentence, there-

[1] So Burton (p. 85 *q.v.*) writes, "τὰ ἐπιχώρια becomes τὸ πὰρ ποδός," indicating one of the obvious variations of the theme.

A slightly different relationship may exist between τρέψαντες and earlier verses. Whereas τὰ μέν and τὰ καλά gain the relationships which I have indicated primarily by their aptness to the general theme observable in *vv.* 20-23, 59 f., 61 f., and 82 f., τρέψαντες verbally recalls *v.* 35 and *v.* 55 where Coronis and Asklepios, because they did not heed the lesson of the theme of *vv.* 20-23, 82 f., etc., were "turned" to the bad. In *v.* 83 we are urged to "turn" the good outside. The relationship is remote but perhaps real.

[2] Cf. the following passages where the laudandus is praised with a phrase declaring him unique or superlative among men: Bacch. 3, 63 ff., 93; 4, 15; 8, 22; fr. 20C, 21; Pindar, Ol. 1, 103 ff.; Ol. 2, 102 ff.; Py. 1, 49; Py. 2, 58 ff.; Ne. 6, 25 ff.; Eurip. 3 (Bergk [*PMG* 755]); Simon. 10 (*PMG* 506); Callimachus *Dian.* 249 f. (a laudandum rather than laudandus). εἴ τις ἀνθρώπων, or the like, is frequent in such 'supreme compliments,' as is οὔ τις (ἕτερος or the like) and an accompanying asseveration (Bundy I, 17). For εἴ τις as a virtual superlative see *LSJ s.v.* εἰ B 7, 3 e.

fore, relates closely to *v.* 81. Hieron, if any man, is viewed by "great Destiny" as a leader of his people and a *tyrannus*, thus faring far better than others in this world of two evils for each good. He has many of τὰ καλά to "turn to the outside," much good to "utilize to the fullest" (*v.* 83 and *v.* 62 respectively).

The same foil material, however, and the cautious superlative, "if any man," serve another encomiastic purpose. In order to show that the laudandus has reached the pinnacle of achievement, the encomiast must include a reminder of mankind's limitations. The reminder, which always has a somewhat sobering effect, may express the inaccessibility, even to the laudandus, of a fabulous place, for example, the land of the Hyperboreans in *Pythian* 10.[1] Or it may, as already suggested in the foil passage discussed above, designate perfect happiness as impossible for humans.[2] No man, howsoever great and blessed by his apportionment of good, goes without misfortune. The law stated in *vv.* 81 f. applies to all:

86 αἰὼν δ' ἀσφαλὴς
οὐκ ἔγεντ' οὔτ' Αἰακίδᾳ παρὰ Πηλεῖ
οὔτε παρ' ἀντιθέῳ Κάδμῳ·

Again and again in ancient literature and especially in Pindar, Peleus and Cadmus serve as paradigms of human bliss, and to their story Pindar now turns for support of his reasoning in *vv.* 81-86. Although Cadmus and Peleus were not void of calamity, nevertheless they are considered to have been the most fortunate of mortals (*vv.* 86 ff.), because they heard the Muses sing and dance in celebration of their marriages; the gods partook with the heroes of banquet and feast; Peleus and Cadmus saw the gods enthroned, and they received gifts from the gods (*vv.* 89-95). Significantly, among these events which rendered Peleus and Cadmus the most blessed of men, Pindar lists as foremost[3] the celebration in song by the chorus of Muses (μελπομενᾶν Μοισᾶν, *v.* 90).[4] Twice before, in con-

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[1] Burton, pp. 7 f., Bundy II, 43 f., *et al.* The theme may appear unmistakably even in a truncated form: μηκέτι πάπταινε πόρσιον, Ol. 1, 114.

[2] So many occurrences of the theme *nihil ab omni parte beatum:* Bacch. 5, 53 ff. (*cf.* frag. 54), Ne. 7, 55 f., Py. 5, 54.

[3] Foremost not only in position but probably also in causation: the οἵτε is probably causal (= *quippe qui*, see Denniston, *Particles*, pp. 522 f.).

[4] μέλπομαι normally means to sing (and dance in a chorus) in celebration of someone (or something); Pindar's song celebrates Hieron in the same way. μέλπομαι and related words are discussed in detail by Bielohlawek, *Wiener Studien* 44 (1925), 1-18, 125-143.

texts concerned with action conforming to τὸ πὰρ ποδός, the poet has placed singing in a prominent position. The repeated word of the present passage, μέλπομαι, recalls one of the earlier passages, *vv.* 78 f., where Pindar turned to pray to the Great Mother whom the κοῦραι celebrated with song and dance beside the poet's πρόθυρον. The other passage, *vv.* 17 ff., described the delightful singing and festivities that would have blessed Coronis' marriage had she not been enamoured of τῶν ἀπεόντων. With *vv.* 89 ff., Pindar has established song and celebration as things inseparably connected to happiness and ὄλβος, and even to propriety and the worth-while things in life: as the lack of marriage-songs performed in Coronis' honor contributed greatly to her misfortune, so the celebration of Peleus and Cadmus in song at their marriages is vital to the composition of their ὄλβος ὑπέρτατος.[1]

By the grace of Zeus, through the songs and festivities, the two heroes shed their earlier sufferings and 'set upright' their hearts:

Διὸς δὲ χάριν
ἐκ προτέρων μεταμειψάμενοι καμάτων
ἔστασαν ὀρθὰν καρδίαν.

There can be little doubt but that the curious words ἔστασαν ὀρθὰν (καρδίαν) are designed to recall ἔστασεν ὀρθούς (*v.* 53), the phrase used to typify the cures performed by Asklepios. As the suffering men were 'cured' by Asklepios, so the suffering hearts of the two heroes were 'cured' by festivities and songs in their honor. The repeated phrase here foreshadows an implicit comparison between the 'curing' capabilities of song and medicine which forms the climax of the poem.

These ideas established, Pindar returns to the unfavorable percentages of *vv.* 81 f.: neither Asklepios' physical cures nor the remedies given by divine song free human life from death; death and suffering must still affect Peleus and Cadmus. Pindar relates the death of neither hero, for there was no such literary τόπος, and, contrary to received tradition, Pindar apparently never changes or invents myths unnecessarily: instead, he draws upon the traditions about the children of the two men. The deaths and other misfortunes of Cadmus' daughters illustrate his lack of immunity to calamity. Despite the preponderance of misfortune in the lives of the daughters

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[1] *Cf.* Ne. 5, 22 ff., Duchemin, p. 45. For praise from others as a requisite of superlative ὄλβος *cf.* Is. 6, 11, Is. 5, 13-17, Py. 1, 99-100b.

of Cadmus,[1] all good was not lost (cf. *v.* 81), for Zeus, by sharing her bed, honored Semele (*vv.* 98 f.).

Pindar now relates the misfortune of Peleus' only son, Achilleus, who lost his life in battle (*vv.* 100 f.). Significantly, as the poet culminates [2] his account of the universality of misfortune, even for the most fortunate, he once more concentrates on death, which he again associates with fire:

102 ὦρσεν πυρὶ καιόμενος
ἐκ Δαναῶν γόον.

The pyre of Achilleus has a strong literary tradition [3] which Pindar adapts advantageously. πυρὶ καιόμενος is reminiscent of καιομένα πυρά (*v.* 44) in the description of the pyre whence Apollo rescued his son from death. Indeed, some form of fire has attended each of the several deaths recorded in the poem. Pindar likened the plague that killed Coronis and her neighbors to a spreading forest-fire, and attributed the deaths of Asklepios and his resurrected patient to a fiery thunderbolt sent by Zeus. "Fire" occurs in the list of the causes of ailments (*v.* 50), and fever represents deadly diseases in general (*v.* 66). Fire has, in fact, become an adjunct, if not a symbol, of death in the poem; thus the prominence of fire in Achilleus' death relates it, despite its other differences, to the other deaths previously recounted.

The frequent mentions of death and, now, of its inevitability, made vivid by the fire-imagery, have delineated a lesson. Asklepios received temporary respite from death, but he, too, eventually had to die. Similarly, Asklepios himself could prolong life, but he was unable to nullify the natural law of death: even the great art of medicine cannot create immortality, and mortals are not to desire it. Death must touch even the happiest of men. The following verses conclude some such development of ideas:

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[1] Probably in order to illustrate this preponderance, Pindar does not mention the subsequent joys of Ino as given in Ol. 2, 31 ff. (Fehr, p. 19, Gerhardt, p. 27).

[2] For the intricate chiasmus of the whole mythical exemplum see Burton p. 88.

[3] See ω 58-73. The Muses celebrate Achilles at his pyre (so also Is. 8, 56 ff.), and their song makes his death glorious (as Homer's song made his life glorious). Because of the similarities of content, it is probable that the Homeric passage is Pindar's source for both Py. 3, 101 ff. and Is. 8, 56 ff. For the importance of Achilles' pyre see *RE s.v.* Achilleus, cols. 239 f.

103 εἰ δὲ νόῳ τις ἔχει
θνατῶν ἀλαθείας ὁδόν, χρὴ πρὸς μακάρων
τυγχάνοντ' εὖ πασχέμεν.

"If any mortal has the way of truth in mind, he must fare well at the hands of the gods as he has the opportunity." [1] The sentence is allied with *vv.* 59 f. where the poet stated that one must (χρή) desire from the gods what is "fitting," while knowing τὸ πὰρ ποδός. Yet *vv.* 103-105 also recall the advice of *vv.* 82 f., 'do well with what is good,' and further associate themselves with other variations of theme, for τυγχάνοντα suggests πὰρ ποδός, which in turn suggests ἐπιχώρια, etc. Thus the *sententiae* of the poem, the myths whence the morals are drawn, the rejection of a wish for the abrogation of the law of mortality, and even the prayer to the nearby goddess all inseparably and complexly relate to one another and render any simple prose attempt to paraphrase the theme, which is not obscure, a failure.

To continue the subject of faring well or ill at the hands of the divine powers, Pindar turns to his favorite metaphor for vicissitude, the shifting winds which blow in various directions at various times (*vv.* 104 f.).[2] The winds in Pindar, however, are best understood as forming a nautical metaphor,[3] and nautical imagery may offer some help in the interpretation of the subsequent *locus conclamatus*, *vv.* 105 f. Numerous emendations for the first part of *v.* 106 exist, of which only one, Emperius' σῶς, has received common acceptance.[4] Yet the usual interpretation of the passage entails difficulties: the assumption that Pindar is referring to "unhealthy" ὄλβος and to ὕβρις is unfounded and seriously violates the context; the Solon

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[1] Despite the possibilities of others, this, the common interpretation, seems preferable. Dissen followed by Gildersleeve took εὖ with both τυγχάνοντα and πασχέμεν.

[2] Bowra, pp. 250 f., Gildersleeve *ad* Ol. 7, 95, Fennell I, 73.

[3] See the commentaries *ad* Is. 4, 5 f., Ol. 11, 1 f., Ne. 7, 17 f., etc.; cf. Gildersleeve, pp. xlii, 184.

[4] See Schroeder's apparatus. σῶς is read by Bowra, Christ, and others, Schroeder's variation of it, σάος, by Snell and Sandys. Turyn and Puech hesitatingly retain the mss. reading while commending σῶς. Wilamowitz' name beside the conjecture coupled to the Greek paraphrase in the end of Schroeder's critical note seems to have given this 19th century conjecture unusual respectability (the Greek is apparently Schroeder's; Schroeder credits Wilamowitz, *Isyllos*, p. 61, with having revived the "*diu neglecta*" [36 years, at the most] emendation, but Wilamowitz there fails to make it clear that σῶς is a conjecture and makes no reference to Emperius, whose conjecture is first recorded in Dissen[2] *ad loc.* by Schneidewin).

fragment always quoted as an explanation of the sentence has no significant relevance.[1] σῶς is possible, but I prefer the reading of Bergk[2 and 3], despite misgivings about the postponement of ἄν,[2] since it involves no actual emendation and suits the context well.[3] The imagery of winds for sailing (*vv.* 104 f.) apparently continues in *vv.* 105 f.:

> ὄλβος οὐκ ἐς μακρὸν ἀνδρῶν ἔρχεται
> ὅς πολὺς εὖ τ' ἂν ἐπιβρίσαις ἕπηται.

I translate, "The good fortune of men does not come for long, if (ὅς ἄν) it presses (ἐπιβρίσαις) from behind (ἕπηται) heavily and well (πολὺς εὖ τε)." [4] The imagery is that of a good strong wind aft. πολύς refers to the strength of it, εὖ to the direction of it. ἕπηται refers to the fact that it would follow behind a traveling ship; ἐπιβρίσαις describes it pressing hard, good for filling the sail. Unlike other explanations of the passage, such an interpretation accounts for all the words and shows the relevance of the metaphor and of the

[1] Solon (5, 9 f.) says that great ὄλβος causes ὕβρις, if it attends the stupid man; Theognis (153 f.) says it does so, if it comes to the stupid or κακός man. To expect Pindar to mean exactly what Solon and Theognis said is nonsensical, for Pindar's passage occurs in a statement about what wise men know, and it is highly unlikely that Pindar would be so illogical to his context and so insulting to his patron, who is assumed to be neither κακός nor ἄιδρις. See also p. 58, n. 2 *infra.*

[2] ἄν (κε) appears immediately after the relative in conditional relative clauses with amazing regularity, although this fact (see Wackernagel, *Kleine Schriften* I, 47 ff.) has not always been recognized. It has not, for example, deterred Hermann, who wrote a book on ἄν, from emending the unmetrical τὰ δ' αὐτὸς ἄν τις τύχῃ (Ne. 4, 91) to ἄν τις ἴδῃ, and other such emendations could be cited. I can offer only two new examples where a word (other than particles, as in Hes. *Op.* 357) interposes between the relative and the ἄν: Hes. *Op.* 208 (τῇ δ' εἶς, ᾗ σ' ἂν ἐγώ περ ἄγω), and Eurip. fr. 1029, 4 f. (ἀρετὴ δ' ὅσῳ περ μᾶλλον ἂν χρῆσθαι θέλῃς, τοσῷδε μείζων αὔξεται). Better examples than these might be desired, but if any rationale determines such interposition, it is the importance of the interposed words to the clause itself, and Py. 3, 106 seems comparable (in LSJ *s.v.* ἄν D.I. 1 add Ar. *Ra.* 259, Herod. 5, 43).

[3] Heyne first divided the letters thus (εὖ τ'), but he read οἷς for ὅς. Of Pindar's editors, Bergk was the most inclined to emend; perhaps his refraining from actual emendation here is informative. Not only would the letters have been written together in ancient texts, but even the accentuation is the same.

[4] For the τε linking the adjective and the adverb see Denniston, *Particles*, p. 497, n. 2. For 'adverbial' πολύς see Smyth, *Greek Grammar*, § 1043. ἐπιβρίθω is not common after Homer until late writers, but is a verb sometimes used to describe the pressing of winds (see *LSJ s.v.*) which seems to be the metaphor behind many of its occurrences. For πολύς applied to a strong wind *cf.* πολλὸς ἄνεμος in Hdt. 7, 188.

entire gnome. Just as a good strong wind behind cannot last for long, so human ὄλβος does not remain indefinitely.[1] Yet as the prudent sailor takes advantage of the favorable wind when it is present, so the wise man will draw advantage from his ὄλβος while he has it at his disposal. The sentence, interpreted thus, suits rather than violates the context, directly continues the wind-metaphor, and accords well with the ideas expressed in *vv.* 103b f., *v.* 83, and *v.* 62 (each of which contains the idea of utilizing opportunity). The passage has nothing to do with ὕβρις.[2]

Ignorance of a common encomiastic motif which might be called the 'first-person indefinite' [3] has resulted in frequent and gross misunderstanding of the final epode.[4] With the 'first-person indefinite,' the poet, by stating what he will do or hopes to do, suggests what intelligent people in general, often the laudandus in particular, do or ought to do.[5] The statements made in the first person, therefore, may be applied to both the poet and the laudandus, and any differences in the degree of applicability to either or to men in general

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[1] Wilamowitz, p. 284, while not mentioning nautical imagery, seems to have extended to this sentence the wind-imagery of the one preceding. The scholiast *ad loc.* compares Eur. *Or.* 340, which is followed by a simile involving a ship on a wind-swept sea; the intent of the passage differs considerably from that of Pindar, but the metaphor of wind for ὄλβος may be involved. For the necessity of utilizing a favorable wind when it comes *cf.* Soph. *Phil.* 464 f., etc.

[2] Lefkowitz (who accepts σῶς and sees medical imagery in these verses) writes, "The image of unhealthy *olbos* does not occur again in Pindar" (n. 103). While the literal statement is questionable for several reasons, her observation that Pindar is far less suspicious of great good fortune itself than are most Greeks is perceptive (see Bowra, p. 190 with n. 1, where he refers to Eitrem in *Studies Presented to D. M. Robinson*, II, 531-6, and others). Consequently, we should not wilfully read such an image into a passage such as this; we should also remember that Pindar gives us the old saw, Κόρος τίκτει ὕβριν, with an unexpected metathesis (Ol. 13, 10).

[3] This term, suggested to me by Burton's discussion (p. 88), despite its paradoxical nature, seems preferably precise when compared with Schadewaldt's "in der höflich vorsichtigen Ich-Form" (p. 333) or Bundy's paraphrase of a scholiast, "persuasive hortatory soliloquy" (II, 85).

[4] Such as Farnell II, 136 and *ad v.* 110, Boehmer, p. 31, Bowra, p. 357 with note 3.

[5] This usage was long ago explained and documented by Dissen (Dissen[2] I, xvi = Dissen[1] I, xxx [cf. p. 33, n. 4 *supra*; Dissen, however, was taken off the Pindaric reading lists by Wilamowitz: see "Pindaric Criticism," n. 73]). Cf. Burton, pp. 86, 88 f., Des Places, *Le pronom*, p. 9, Bundy II, 85, Schadewaldt, p. 333, Wilamowitz, p. 284, etc. The clearest and most copiously documented treatment of the phenomenon is to be found in Fraenkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie*[2], p. 543, n. 12, and p. 587 ([2.2—5] with cross-references).

are determined by the immediate context.[1] With these modifications of the meaning of ἐγώ in *vv.* 107-end understood, we may proceed to examine them.

Pindar opens the epode with a pledge to adapt his behavior to his circumstances:

107 σμικρὸς ἐν σμικροῖς, μέγας ἐν μεγάλοις
ἔσσομαι·

The traditional rendering, "I shall be small when my fortunes are small, great when they are great," is needed by the context and, despite the unusual use of ἐν μικροῖς and ἐν μεγάλοις, must be correct.[2] However, the poet is not so much advocating the polyp's chamelionic changeability as stating a fact, as he had appealed to reality in *vv.* 82 f., which intelligent people ought to accept: a man's greatness is, to a large extent, determined by his position and opportunities. To be small in small circumstances, great in great, moreover, continues the themes of the first part of the poem, for it consists of knowing circumstances (i.e., τὸ πὰρ ποδός) and the nature of one's lot (*v.* 60) and of acting in accordance with them (contrast *vv.* 21-23). Now, as in the first portion of the poem (*vv.* 61 f.), Pindar advises taking advantage of the possible and available, namely and literally, circumstances:

108 τὸν δ' ἀμφέποντ' αἰεὶ φρασίν
δαίμον' ἀσκήσω κατ' ἐμὰν θεραπεύων μαχανάν.

[1] So in Ne. 10, 39 ff. the statement is so specifically applicable to someone else that it cannot refer to the poet at all (note, however, that the participial protasis has not the connotation of unreality of English "if I were you" and that the condition is not grammatically unreal). In such passages as Is. 7, 40 ff. and Ne. 8, 35-39 the statements are of such general application that they may be wrenched completely from their encomiastic and poetic contexts and consequently have been canonized as intensely personal and topical proclamations of Pindar. Most occurrences of this usage, of course, fall somewhere between these extremes, e.g., many first person statements by tragic choruses which are reflections upon the action. See also p. 60, n. 3 *infra*.

[2] Gildersleeve's translation *ad loc.*; others are similar. Few critics would now maintain that the datives are masculine rather than neuter and that Pindar means that he knows the proper decorum for court society. The common interpretation demands rare meanings from ἐν σμικροῖς and ἐν μεγάλοις, for such phrases usually refer to the importance of things (*LSJ s.v.* μικρός I, 3, *s.v.* μέγας II, 4: *cf.* Xen. *Cyr.* 1, 5, 14, etc.) not to the good or bad fortune involved in them. Dissen, however, cites Eur. *El.* 407, and fortune, especially in this poem, may be considered closely allied with importance. Perhaps translations such as those of Fraccaroli and Lattimore are best, for they say no more and no less than Pindar's own words.

The repetition of the word μαχανά (cf. *v.* 62) augments the correspondence with the earlier passage. Pindar will exercise whatever fortune (that given by the gods, hence his δαίμων) is near to him (τὸν ἀμφέποντ' αἰεί which once more suggests all the variations of πὰρ ποδός), tending it [1] to the best of his own ability (κατ' ἐμὰν θεραπεύων μαχανάν). The possessive adjective, ἐμάν, receives some emphasis because of the interposition of the participle. Pindar's own μαχανά, as others have seen, is obviously poetry.[2] Insofar as the ἐγώ of the last several verses applies to the poet, I suggest that Pindar's intention is approximately this: 'In restricted circumstances, I am restricted, but in the matters for which I have abundant effectual means at hand, I shall work effectively and to the best of my ability.' The means and the 'ability' are poetry and poetic talent. Specifically, such sentiments conform with his refusal to make a vain prayer that Cheiron be alive and thus produce a physician to heal Hieron, making, albeit momentarily, an exception to the natural laws of sickness and death. That course has been rejected as being impossible (the restricted circumstances); medical healing can do little to satisfy man's urge for a prolonged existence, the concern of several themes of the poem and of the conclusion. Yet Pindar represented another kind of healing in *vv.* 89-96b: the healing of celebration and song. Beside poetry, medicine is not only μικρόν but even ἀπεόν in Hieron's case. But Pindar himself will now develop this point.

Insofar as Pindar's announced intentions of *vv.* 107-109 are recommendations to others, or even commendations, of proper conduct, they apply, of course, especially to Hieron. Hieron's general position, as *vv.* 84-86 have established, is definitely ἐν μεγάλοις, and he, too, should utilize his situation to the best of his μαχανά. With *vv.* 110 f.[3]

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[1] Lefkowitz (p. 222) thinks that medical imagery is contained in the previous sentence, attempting to relate the whole passage to Hieron through a reference to his illness. Medicine is, I think, important throughout the poem, and implicitly compared to poetry in the final epode. Yet a medical connection is not obvious in the words that Lefkowitz adduces, and the only true candidate for medical terminology, θεραπεύων, obviously has another meaning here.

[2] Burton, p. 86 *(q.v.)*; cf. Schmidt, p. 234, Lefkowitz, p. 220.

[3] For an even more abrupt shift of the applicability of ἐγώ see Theoc. *Id.* 16, 66 ff., where *vv.* 66 f., coming after a condemnation of miserliness, give, in the first person, a recommendation (primarily to Hieron II) of liberality which bears some remarkable similarities to Py. 3, 110 f. In *v.* 68 the interest shifts from Hieron II to Theocritus the poet, thus confusing commentators *ad loc.* (e.g., Gow, *Theocritus*, II).

the interest of the 'first-person indefinite' concentrates on Hieron's situation:

εἰ δέ μοι πλοῦτον θεὸς ἁβρὸν ὀρέξαι
ἐλπίδ' ἔχω κλέος εὑρέσθαι κεν ὑψηλὸν πρόσω.

The common encomiastic praise of unhoarded wealth and liberality appears here in the form of this sophisticated first-person condition. The conventional praise of liberality may take various forms, and the reference here is not simply to the expense of rearing horses nor to the hiring of poets, but to liberality and good works in general.[1] However, in all the poems wherein wealth and *euergesia* are praised, the need for song to transmit the memory of the acts is either clearly expressed or implied.[2] As the context shows here, liberality with poets is the means by which fame won in the games, by good works for the city, and in other ways is perpetuated.[3] However, because of the elaborate thematic background in which this conventional praise of liberality occurs, it acquires associations here which pass far beyond its ordinary motivational and encomiastic functions. 'The man with wealth at his disposal (cf. πὰρ ποδός) should use it (to the fullest, cf. ἄντλει) to gain future renown:' poetry does offer continued existence, a kind of immortality, even if medicine does not.

Lest the audience fail to accommodate this conventional τόπος to the themes of the first part of the poem, the connection is made virtually explicit and an ingenious contrast is suggested. In *vv.* 21-23, which, as was shown above, serve as a common thematic reference point for such passages as *vv.* 1 ff. and *vv.* 55 ff., Pindar described the foolish tribe which contemplates the distant (τὰ πόρσω) with impossible hopes (ἀκράντοις ἐλπίσιν). Significantly, now, in *v.* 111, he uses the same two words, ἐλπίς and πόρσω, in a situation where these same two concepts, in contrast to *vv.* 21-23, are compatible. The expectation of continued renown in poetry is the only

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[1] Farnell *ad loc.* emphasizes, to the depreciation of other aspects of the theme, the hiring of poets; Hampe (ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑ, pp. 52 f.), the rearing of horses. A manifold theme is in question: see Bundy II, 85-90, Von der Muehll, *Mus. Hel.* 11 (1954), 55 f., etc. For victory in the games as *euergesia* see especially Schadewaldt, p. 278 with n. 2.

[2] In forthright praises of wealth, the need for enduring praise is more likely to be implicit (cf. Bundy II, 86 f.); in reference to a victory, it is more likely to be explicit (Ol. 10, 95 ff., etc.).

[3] Cf. Theoc. *Id.* 16, especially 14-30 and 57 ff.; *Id.* 17, 106-120, etc.

"distant hope" conformable to the thematic development of the poem and consequently may violate the simple proportion 'near : good=far : bad' because it is ἔμπρακτος, therefore, while distant in one sense, πὰρ ποδός, in another. The poet grants an immortality of a sort different from that attempted by Asklepios, yet poetic immortality works.

Of that fact Pindar need not look far for an illustration: Nestor and Sarpedon (perhaps deliberately random heroic names) remain among men's speech because they were celebrated in song by the makers (τέκτονες) of words (*vv.* 112 ff.). τέκτων was the term applied to Asklepios in *v.* 6. The word, occurring in both the first and the last stanzas of the poem, subtly reveals that the beginning is related to the end and also indicates that the comparison between the two 'healing' arts, poetry and medicine, is fundamental to the whole poem.[1] Between the first and last stanzas lie the passages which form the comparison, the emphasis being on medicine in the first part of the poem and on poetry at the end.

The poem has contrasted poetry and medicine in respect to their ability to satisfy man's desire for a continued existence, the universal human yearning for immortality. Pindar now reports the findings:

114 ἁ δ' ἀρετὰ κλειναῖς ἀοιδαῖς
χρονία τελέθει·

The immortality offered by Pindar may seem inferior to the other. Continued life in song might be slight comfort for a man in ill health desiring to be restored by a physician and to be preserved alive. Yet another important difference between the two versions of immortality is decisive: that offered by Pindar is available and works effectively; the other is not possible and hence cannot be effective. τὰν δ' ἔμπρακτον ἄντλει μαχανάν, γνοὺς τὸ πὰρ ποδός, τὰ καλὰ τρέψαις ἔξω· τὸν δ' ἀμφέποντα, etc. The poem reproves the folly of that φῦλον of mortals who seek the distant and impossible while scorning that which is at hand and possible. Pindar offers Hieron an accessible, proven product, and Pindar's words and thoughts upon the matter are all the more attractive, important, and impressive because they

[1] This correspondence was noticed by Mezger, who also recognized its significance; Fennell also cites the correspondence (I, 172) and notes a disparagement of medicine in the poem (but does not discuss the comparison between medicine and poetry).

are indisputably true. Men may ponder immortality of the soul, believe in it, refuse to believe it, or doubt it. Encouraged by modern medicine, they may dream about physical immortality, although such a thing is absurd so long as men are men. But Pindar's faith in the greatness and immortalizing nature of literature derives from one of the very few demonstrable truths: through his ability to fashion great poetry for a man who provided him poetic material and opportunity (εὐμαχανία),[1] both he and Hieron, even to this distant day, remain, from a Greek viewpoint at least, immortal.[2] Yet, as Pindar says in conclusion,

παύροις δὲ πράξασθ' εὐμαρές.[3]

The much perverted term 'unity' has provided Pindaric scholarship with its most controversial problem, and in this century those who maintain that the Pindaric ode is characterized by a fundamental disparity of parts and meaning, the 'anti-unitarians,' have prevailed. Elsewhere, in a review of modern Pindaric criticism, I

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[1] The Greek poets are ever mindful of their need for a subject, just as they constantly remind us that a subject needs a song (Schadewaldt, p. 277, n. 1). Therefore, they profess extreme delight at having a wealth of worthy subject matter (εὐμηχανία) which will make their task easy (εὐμαρές, κοῦφον). A singer without a subject or a subject without a singer is in a helpless state (ἀμηχανία). See Schadewaldt, p. 281, Burton, pp. 52 f., Bundy II, 64; I add two interesting occurrences, though there are many more: *h. Ap.* 19, Bacch. 3, 67 f. (which clarifies the meaning of the much disputed Py. 2, 54 ff.). To use the theme of εὐμηχανία is, obviously, to pay a high compliment to the subject.

[2] There is no need to illustrate the *non omnis moriar* theme, the classical authors' conviction that they and their subjects overcome, to some considerable extent, their mortal natures by virtue of the perpetuation of their names, words, ideas, and works in posterity, for anyone who has read even a few ancient authors, to say nothing of Pindar, knows that such a notion is fundamental to classical literature from the *Iliad* on down (cf. Diotima's speech to Socrates in Plato *Smp.*, especially 208b-209e [with the references to Achilles, Homer, and Hesiod]). Pertinent, however, are the facts that a dead man's living reputation could actually entitle him to the epithet ἀθάνατος (Tyrtaeus 9 [Diehl^{3}], 31 f., cf. Is. 2, 28 f.) and that the poetic and hyperbolic possibilities of the theme were explored early, immortality being considered no slight love-pawn (Thgn. 237-54).

[3] There has been much scholarly dispute as to whether the final sentence refers to poets, such as Pindar, or to important men, such as Hieron (e.g., Farnell *ad loc.* chooses the former, Burton, p. 89, the latter). In view of the ambiguous nature of ἐγώ in the final epode and of the matters discussed in notes 1 f. *supra*, the sentence obviously refers to both poet and subject, for both participate and are instrumental in the process and both benefit from the kind of immortality derived from it. Therefore παύροις refers to both Hieron and Pindar (so Wilamowitz, p. 284).

have shown that, despite the validity of many of the charges which have been levelled at the 'unitarians,' the position of the 'anti-unitarians' rests on unsound arguments and palpable prejudices.[1] To say that a poem has unity is merely to claim that it makes sense as a whole; to assert that a poem lacks unity is to contend that the poem is generally incoherent, consequently, as a poem at least, unintelligible and virtually meaningless.[2] It is a serious accusation, the most damning judgment a critic can make. If, however, unity implies coherence, as it surely must, the common condemnation of Pindar as a poet has been premature. The above analysis of *Pythian* 3 has demonstrated that its parts cohere to an amazing degree, and the poem is formally and thematically, as well as historically, a unit; analyses of other poems in the other chapters yield similar results.

In *Pythian* 3, as in other Pindaric poems, a multiplicity of phenomena cause the various parts of the poem to combine to form a unit.[3] Despite its unusual structure, the poem possesses a formal unity. The poet begins his encomiastic poem by considering a particular prayer as a statement of purpose, gives elaborate arguments in the traditional Greek medium, mythology, for avoiding that prayer, makes a pointedly contrasting prayer as he begins the encomium anew, and, by traditional encomiastic means, proclaims his patron's supremacy over other men. Within this general structural plan, formal unity is further evident, resulting and inseparable from the development of ideas in the poem. The verses between the *Ringkomposition* formed by *vv.* 1 f. and *v.* 77 are formally connected not only by their inclusion within the ring but also by the chiastic order of subjects which they reveal. The poem begins with the subject of the prayer, then reviews, in the following order, b) the possibilities of Cheiron's being alive, c) Asklepios, d) his birth, e) Coronis' death, f) her story, e') her death, d') Asklepios' birth, [Cheiron and] c') Asklepios' story [and death], b') the possibilities of Cheiron's being alive, and then concludes with the decision about

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[1] See "Pindaric Criticism," especially pp. 585 f. and 600-09. The basic error usually committed by both sides in this controversy is the assumption that the desired unity is something occurring within the poem rather than the poem itself.

[2] Cf. Aldrich, *The Andromache of Euripides*, p. 7 with n. 6 (on the term 'dramatic unity').

[3] Several Pindaric scholars have recognized this multiplicity of unifying factors in theory (Croiset, Fehr, Untersteiner, van Groningen, *et al.*), but they themselves seldom observe it in practice.

the prayer. And the cohesiveness of these verses is not merely geometrical, for each topic follows logically from that last discussed, and the conclusion of the whole system is the resolution of the beginning. The inseparability of the ideas and topics thus exhibited contributes to the unity of the ode in a grander manner but much in the same way as the consecutiveness of *vv.* 1-11b where the clauses summarizing the subjects to be elaborated in the first eleven stanzas are so interrelated that they are not even grammatically separable. The second part of the poem, which is begun by the conclusion to the first, reveals a logical and orderly treatment of the several subjects basic to Greek encomia.

Formal unity, however, being merely the most outward manifestation of the general unity of an ode, cannot be sundered from other unifying factors, such as thematic coherence. Misconceptions about the nature of thematic unity have generated many curious theories in the history of Pindaric criticism, of which Dissen's theory and its congeners are the most notable. Dissen argued that unity of a Pindaric ode results from a single, paraphrasable, thought which embraces all the parts of the poem, a "Grundgedanke." Burton is probably correct when he implies that *Pythian* 3, more than any other ode, suits the *Grundgedanke* theory:

> Running through the poem and linking its parts together is a single theme which emerges to view three times, at *vv.* 20 ff., 59 ff., and 107 f. This theme is an amplification of the oracular γνῶθι σεαυτόν, and emphasizes the duty of mortal man to confine his aspirations within the limits of his mortality. It is not often in his poems that Pindar reveals so clearly a single unifying line of thought. The ode closes with an affirmation of the power of poetry to give permanence to famous deeds, a proud boast proudly stated (p. 78).

This account, despite its admirable perspicacity and its superiority to other attempts to sum up the unity of the ode,[1] is insufficient as a statement of unity. The theme stated by Burton emerges far more than three times and in seemingly endless variation. Moreover, the parts which Burton sees joined by this theme are not merely linked together by it, for they all, in fact, gain their essential significance from it and, in turn, actually participate in its further composition.

[1] Such as the inconsequential and vague *Grundgedanken* offered by Schadewaldt, p. 333 (μὴ μάτευε Ζεὺς γενέσθαι), or Barigazzi, p. 131. Yet Barigazzi's emphasis on the possible and impossible is cogent and rather wanting in Burton's statement.

For example, both ἤδη ἁλωκότα (*v.* 57) and παρ' ἐμὸν πρόθυρον (*v.* 78) reflect the theme and contribute to it, but in order to show the relationship of contrast existing between the two phrases, one could hardly state a one or two sentence theme, thought, or idea.

The ideal way to indicate the relationships between such expressions would be to recite the poem, for only thus could the many thematic components which determine the relationship be touched upon. Eventually, the complete theme of a unified poem, if it is to show its unity of expression and to reveal its import or meaning, must be the poem. Yet ideal methods, especially in classical studies, are not often feasible, practical, or even available, and the critic must rely upon an ἔμπρακτος μηχανή, prose analysis. Burton realizes that the immortalizing power of poetry is an integral part of the meaning of the poem, for he includes mention of it in his short summary. Yet in Burton's words the theme is rather independent of the power of poetry. The above analysis shows that it is not, and the formulation of any simple thought or theme to indicate the unified content and meaning of even this poem is impossible. However, again looking for ἔμπρακτα means we can note the consistency of a single plexus of ideas, which often approaches Burton's statement of the theme, in *vv.* 1-3, 19-23, 56 f., 59-62, 77-79, 81-83, and 103b-109. Nevertheless, those are only the passages in which the theme becomes most apparent. To reveal its full complexity we ought to include *vv.* 16-19, which suggest that a proper regard for traditional customs may bear upon "the duty of mortal man to confine his aspirations within the limits of his mortality." We must, at any rate, add *vv.* 110-115, which modify Burton's statement of the theme by reshaping the limits of man's mortality. Furthermore, as both these passages suggest, in the poem poetry and song are inseparably associated with man's proper aspirations, and therefore we must add such passages as *vv.* 88 ff. to the theme. There is no conceivable point at which the vital meaning will be complete until we have added all the passages of the poem. However, we can call the subject matter the 'theme' if we wish, and then we may agree with Finley, who quite properly says (p. 91), "[*Pythian* 3] has to do with the possible and the impossible." Yet that statement does not explain the meaning or even the unity of the poem, nor does it pretend to do so. It is not a *Grundgedanke* but simply the *Grund* on which the *Gedanken* of the poem are built.

Furthermore, the above analysis suggests, and other chapters

show rather clearly, that the coherence of the poem passes beyond the mere consistency of the ideas explicitly propounded, the thoughts, statements, and gnomes which scholars often translate and proffer as *Grundgedanken*. What Fraenkel has termed the "Konkrete Inhalt," what Wilamowitz gave as the "paraphrase" of the poem, these cannot indicate satisfactorily how repeated words, developed imagery, recurrent grammatical constructions and other modes of expression relate various parts of the ode to one another.[1] Yet through such means poets traditionally modify and augment the so-called literal meaning of their sentences, and these additions and modifications become real constituents of the theme and meaning. To concentrate on only one aspect of a poet's expression, as Dissen concentrated on literal content and Norwood on imagery, will surely lead to poor and incomplete understanding of a poem.[2]

Imperfect as it is, Burton's statement nevertheless mentions poetry and mortality, subjects of primary importance to the unity of the poem. All have noticed that the subject of healing arts is essential to the poem. Yet apparently no one except the frequently ignored and ridiculed Mezger (p. 72) has recognized that the contrast between the services performed by medicine and by poetry toward the goal of extending the limits of mortality is as fundamental to the poem as it proves to be.[3] Mezger advisedly holds that in the poem Pindar consciously compares the τέκτονες of the two professions in their ability to prolong a man's existence. The medical profession loses by the comparison, and to understand that fact one must understand *vv.* 1 f. and *vv.* 77 f. The contrary-to-fact condition of the proem almost reveals disdain for a wish or prayer that the trainer of physicians be alive again. Moreover, when Pindar finally does wish (in the present indicative) to make a certain prayer (*vv.* 77 ff.), he emphatically makes a prayer which perhaps has, formally at least, absolutely nothing to do with Hieron. The poet's obvious refusal to retain an interest in a Cheiron who will train a physician contrasted with his readiness to pray to the 'Great Mother' by his home seems almost rude and cold. Yet this prayer is related to the theme of seeking what is at hand and what is possible in preference

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[1] See "Pindaric Criticism," n. 90 and p. 613 with note 135. The fallacy of paraphrasable content ought to be notorious in poetic criticism by now.

[2] See "Pindaric Criticism," p. 616.

[3] Cf. also, however, Finley's perceptive remark mentioned in p. 68, n. 1 *infra*.

to doing what members of the ματαιότατον φῦλον do. Therefore the prayer is not cruel but only honest. When Pindar shows in the last part of the poem what he can offer as an alternative to the healing which Cheiron taught, then the statement of *vv.* 77 ff. becomes enchanting. Pindar's choice of prayers is not sentimental, but based on patent truth and, eventually, profound knowledge of the world in which we live. This knowledge includes the recognition of the significance and strength of poetry.

The commentators, therefore, are correct in saying that the poem must be a *consolatio* to an ailing Hieron, but the means of the *consolatio* are not those which critics traditionally see. Pindar does not console Hieron with pleasant stories about medicine (which would be almost invidious since the healing of medicine, in the context, has crucially limited capabilities) nor even with the "courage which poetry gives." [1] Going beyond such ideas, Pindar consoles Hieron with nothing less than immortality.

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[1] There is universal agreement that the poem is consolatory, but not many scholars venture to explain the nature of the consolation. Farnell, however, writes:

> "At least, the story of Asklepios is relevantly introduced; once introduced, it is told at great length as a romantic and fascinating tale, to solace the sick man" (I, 97).

Finley, although he has keen insight into the problem ("Pindar exhorts to the healing which he can give, the medicine of fame . . . ."), concludes that Pindar promises "chiefly an inner healing" (p. 92) and, somehow still under the influence of Ol. 1 and the concept of 'courage,' that "Pindar would be a healer like Asklepios or the centaur Cheiron who reared him, but his healing would be the courage which poetry gives" (p. 91).

CHAPTER THREE

OLYMPIAN 7

The Seventh Olympian, celebrating the boxing victory won by Diagoras of Rhodes in 464, begins with the renowned simile which compares the poet who bestows song upon athletic victors to a bride's father who presents the groom with a golden cup at the wedding.[1] The frequent quest for the relationship of the simile to the remainder of the poem has met with partial success, but much remains unclear. Because of the elaborate nature of the simile, those who attempt to assess its relevance ought to examine the significance of the cup in the wedding ceremony as well as any possible adumbrations, in the proem, of subsequent themes.

Pindaric criticism, however, is an extraordinary field, and before discussing the simile further, I must insist that the Greek word for *from*, ἀπό, means 'from' rather than 'in' or 'with:'

1 Φιάλαν ὡς εἴ τις ἀφνειᾶς ἀπὸ χειρὸς ἑλὼν
ἔνδον ἀμπέλου καχλάζοισαν δρόσῳ
δωρήσεται.

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[1] The poem has appealed both to unitarians and to their opponents as a model for illustrating the validity of certain critical methods. Rivier, Fernandez Llorenz, Norwood, pp. 138 ff., and, in some respects, van Groningen, *Composition*, pp. 352-358, each with his own critical theory, attempt to demonstrate that the poem has unity; Lawall's article, without a theory, succeeds far more than any of these in proving the unity of the poem, and I must make clear that much of my interpretation of the imagery is an expansion of ideas suggested by Lawall's article. The aim of Jurenka's article was to disprove all previous notions of the unity of the poem and thus to show that Pindar's odes in general lack unity. Welcker, *Rhein. Mus.* 2 (1834), 381-387, intended as a defense of Dissen and the 'unitarian' school, produced the opposite effect (see "Pindaric Criticism," note 47). The principal problem in recent criticism, the relevance of the opening simile, has, with the possible exception of Lawall's discussion, been examined on false assumptions about the nature of unity, so that Norwood's contention that the proem is irrelevant because it does not deal with roses (pp. 144, 77 f., 145) and van Groningen's writing off of the simile as mere splendor because it is unrelated to Rhodian history (*Composition*, pp. 357 f.) need little comment. Pindar's unified odes are not monotonous; see pp. 63 f. and notes *supra*. Lawall justly notes the importance of giving in the simile, but concentrates, perhaps excessively, on later acts of giving in the poem, without examining adequately the significance of the gifts in the simile.

The ἀπό, for an unobvious reason which will emerge presently, has offended critics of the poem, and verse 1 has been a much disputed crux. The emendations are several;[1] the violent mistranslations, such as Sandys' "taketh in his wealthy hand," are a multitude.[2] Another popular course has been to argue for questionable syntax and impossible word order (ἀπὸ χειρός construed with δωρήσεται rather than with ἑλών) while citing spurious parallels.[3] Although desperate means of subverting the ἀπό have been contrived,[4] one fact remains, I think, unalterable: our manuscripts read ἀφνειᾶς ἀπὸ

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[1] Bergk suggested ὑπὸ χηλοῦ for ἀπὸ χειρός, Bornemann read ἑκών for ἑλών, and Jurenka emended ἀφνειᾶς ἀπὸ χειρὸς ἑλών to ἀφνειῶν ἀπὸ χείλεος οὗ. See Jurenka, *Wien. Stud.* 15 [1893], 9.

[2] Cf. Puech, Norwood, p. 92, Farnell, *et al.* Way's "with" (cf. Traverso, Fraccaroli, Mommsen, *et al.*) is, of course, no better than "in" (cf. also Wolde, etc.). Because his commentary ignores the problem entirely, Farnell's translation is incredible.

[3] Gildersleeve:

> ἀφνειᾶς ἀπὸ χειρός. Combined with δωρήσεται. ἀπὸ has the connotation of "freely." Comp. ἀπὸ γλώσσας, Ol. 6, 13.

There is no reason why ἀπό should have that connotation here. Ol. 6, 13 is not apposite here because there is no participle such as ἑλών for ἀπὸ γλώσσας. Moreover, ἀπὸ γλώσσας εἰπεῖν is a standard Greek phrase (not always meaning 'by heart') for which see Dindorf's Stephanus' *Thesaurus Graecae Linguae s.v.* γλῶσσα, 659 and στόμα, 805, whereas ἀπὸ χειρὸς δωρεῖσθαι, in contrast with ἀπὸ χειρὸς ἑλεῖν, is not a common phrase. Seymour illustrates another popular mode of argument (cf. Rauchenstein, *Comment. part.* II, 27, Mezger, Fennell, Galiano, *et al. ad loc.*):

> ἀπὸ χειρός: construe with δωρήσεται—ἑλών: the familiar epic pleonastic use of the participle as in Hom. A 139, ἄξω ἑλών.

The 'adverbial' (so *LSJ*, a better term than 'pleonastic') use of ἑλών is apparently well attested, but it seems, to me at least, nowhere pleonastic. In each case it means "having taken" and thus 'by force,' so that ἑλών in A 139 (where, after all, it picks up the ἕλωμαι of 137), far from being pleonastic, puts great emphasis upon Agamemnon's threat of force. No example cited for ἑλών 'adverbial' includes a prepositional phrase with ἀπό or ἐκ as in Ol. 7, 1. For what it is worth, I add Fritzsche's conclusion regarding 'pleonastic ἑλών' in Pindar, since he expended considerable labor on the problem: "Dieser conspectus zeigt dasz ἑλών als überflüssiger zusatz bei Pind. nicht vorkommt" (p. 149, but his own explanation, p. 150, is even worse and need not be considered).

[4] Fraenkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie*², 490, *et al.* exercise an extreme form of the "pleonastic ἑλών" interpretation: they pretend that the word is not even there. Boeckh observed the rules of the Greek language only to charge Pindar with writing nonsense: pater puellae phialam, quam altera manu tenet, altera ipse comprehendit (ἀπὸ χειρὸς ἑλών) et sponso propinat. Fritzsche, understandably taken aback by Boeckh's interpretation, remarked, "Ein etwas umständliches gebahren, nach dessen zweck man vergeblich forscht."

χειρὸς ἑλών, which can only mean "(after) taking (it) from an ἀφνειά hand." The participle is no more pleonastic than in a relevant parallel, O 126:[1]

ἔγχος δ' ἔστησε στιβαρῆς ἀπὸ χειρὸς ἑλοῦσα.

A suggestion that στιβαρῆς ἀπὸ χειρὸς ἑλοῦσα means "taking in her powerful hand" or "[fixed] from her powerful hand (takingly)" could not even find its way into print, yet we are to believe that Pindar's structurally identical phrase means "taking in his wealthy hand" or "[gives] from a wealthy hand (takingly)." Thus the word order alone demands that ἀπὸ χειρός and ἑλών be taken together.[2] Furthermore, any interpretation other than "from the hand (of another)" destroys a clear parallelism, such as occurs elsewhere in the two parts of the sentence, existing between ἀπὸ χειρὸς ἑλών and Μοισᾶν δόσιν (*v.* 7), the phrases which in their respective clauses designate the source from which the subject receives the object that he gives to another recipient.

The solution to the problem, therefore, lies not in doing violence to the Greek, but in identifying, if possible, the possessor of the "wealthy" hand, for his obscurity is the true source of the bewildering nature of the sentence. To my knowledge, only one attempt at such identification has been made: Hartung conjectured that the father-in-law had received the cup as a gift from a wealthy friend at some time before the wedding described in the simile.[3] This interpretation would suit the literal meaning of the words, but it is not satisfactory; similes such as this customarily describe general phenomena, and Hartung's identification implies an irrelevant, specific detail.[4] Since, as we shall soon see, the cup is probably a family keepsake passed from generation to generation to symbolize the perpetuation of the family in its new members, a slight modification of Hartung's interpretation would produce considerable improvement: not a rich friend who had earlier given the cup, but the

[1] Which, of course, is much more pertinent than any of the passages mentioned in p. 70, n. 3 *supra*. Cf. Σ 445, Euripides *Ion* 1212, etc.

[2] So Fritzsche, p. 150.

[3] Hartung *ad loc.* Bowra's remark (p. 25) seems to imply a similar interpretation, but is confused or, at best, confusing. The father must already possess the cup, for it is given οἴκοθεν οἴκαδε as the κορυφὰν κτεάνων. Consequently, the cup cannot be a wedding gift or the like brought by a rich friend. Dornseiff, Pighi, and Lattimore also translate the ἀπό correctly, but none of them elaborates, and apparently Lattimore alone knows what the phrase means.

[4] "Wie wird man dem dichter im ersten verse innerhalb einer vergleichung einer so nichtssagende digression zutrauen" (Fritzsche, p. 148).

present father-in-law's own father-in-law, the earlier occasion being the wedding of the present bride's mother and father. A gift from the rich hand of the bride's maternal grandfather would not be irrelevant to the simile, for, besides the familial symbolism of the cup, wealth is a family possession in Pindar's society.[1] I think such an identification of the hand possible, but again difficulties arise. In the father-in-law's past there must have occurred a ceremony, comparable to the present wedding, at which he probably obtained the cup as a gift; but for us to take ἑλών as a reference to so remote an event, as also in Hartung's explanation, is difficult, especially in view of the Homeric parallel quoted above. And we should have to charge Pindar with taxing our imaginations rather excessively by introducing such a subtle reference in the first line of a poem.

Fortunately, there is at hand an interpretation much simpler and more probable than Hartung's or its modification mentioned above. The obscurity lies not in Pindar's poetry but in our knowledge of ancient idiom. In the present case, however, the idiom has not been entirely lost. Hartung rejected the obvious candidate for the possessor of the hand, a slave serving the banquet, because he, like all commentators and translators except Lattimore, assumed that ἀφνειᾶς implies the financial wealth of the possessor of the hand.[2] Yet ἀφνειός does not always mean 'wealthy:' sometimes it means 'abundant,'[3] and modifying χείρ, it means 'munificent.' Thus Sophocles' Electra, rather ashamed of the paucity of the gifts which she places on her father's tomb, expresses a hope to give more lavishly (ἀφνεωτέραις χερσί) in the future.[4] In Pindar's simile, then, ἀφνειὰ χείρ apparently refers to generosity in the pouring of wine, not to personal wealth, and the hand belongs, in all probability, not to a rich father-in-law nor to a rich man at all, but to a slave. The meaning of ἀφνειᾶς ἀπὸ χειρὸς ἑλών established, the simile may le-

[1] Ol. 10, 92 ff., Py. 10, 17 f., etc., Wilamowitz, p. 363. For the continuity of the family through its children see p. 74, n. 1 *infra*.

[2] Where others translate "rich" or "wealthy" Lattimore correctly, I think, translates "lavish."

[3] For 'abundant' see *LSJ s.v.* I shall illustrate 'munificent,' 'lavish' here.

[4] Sophocles *El.* 457 (note her emphasis on the meagerness of her gift in 450 f.). Although the word is normally translated "wealthier" in the Sophocles passage, Euripides uses ἄφθονος, which also means 'abundant,' similarly and thus clarifies Sophocles' meaning: ἀφθόνῳ δοῦναι χερί, "give generously" (*Medea* 612); ἀφθόνῳ μετρῶ χερί, "measure with a generous hand," 'dole out generous portions' (of fodder: *Rhesus* 772); cf. also Ol. 2, 104 and see Van Leeuwen *ad loc. Electra* 457, then, is not so much concerned with an increase in Electra's finances as with an increase in the magnitude of her giving.

gitimately be examined as splendidly composed, not tortured Greek.

The basic structure of the simile runs as follows:[1] accusative object (φιάλαν, *v.* 1, νέκταρ, *v.* 7), pronominal subject (τις, *v.* 1, ἐγώ, *v.* 7), verb (in same metrical position: δωρήσεται, *v.* 3, ἱλάσκομαι, *v.* 9), dative (γαμβρῷ, *v.* 4, ἀνδράσιν, *v.* 8). But there are further pairs in the details, such as προπίνων (*v.* 4) and πέμπων (*v.* 8), while γλυκὺν καρπὸν φρενός (*v.* 8) corresponds structurally to πάγχρυσον, κορυφὰν κτεάνων (*v.* 4) and semantically to ἀμπέλου δρόσῳ (*v.* 2). In both *simile* and main clause, the subject of the verb receives from another source the object which he, in turn, passes on to someone else, so that Μοισᾶν δόσιν (*v.* 7) and ἀφνειᾶς ἀπὸ χειρὸς ἑλών become another corresponding pair, as noted above.[2] So high, indeed, is the degree of correspondence between the terms of the simile that, as Bowra puts it, "we may press the details."[3] The cup of wine gains its importance not so much as a poetic symbol but as a symbol in the marriage ceremony itself.[4] The cup, probably a family keepsake passed from generation to generation,[5] must be, as critics commonly

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[1] There are other analyses of the simile, but that given above differs slightly from others primarily because of the different meaning attached to ἀφνειᾶς ἀπὸ χειρὸς ἑλών. The simile is, of course, one of the most admired passages in Pindar: cf. Gildersleeve *ad loc.*, Lawall, pp. 35 f. (see note 2 *infra*), Bowra, p. 25; Méautis, p. 405, Farnell I, 40, etc.

[2] Bowra, p. 25, notes this correspondence but leaves it unclear; Gildersleeve (*ad v.* 7) notices it, but, because he construes ἀπό wrongly, is understandably confused. Had Lawall noticed the correspondence, he surely would have used it to support his theory of a hierarchy (pp. 35 f.) in the giving, but if the hand does belong to a slave rather than, e.g., to a rich grandfather, slight support for the "hierarchy" results.

[3] Bowra, p. 25; cf. Norwood, p. 144, Bernard, p. 19, etc.

[4] See Bernard, p. 65. Norwood's interest in the cup (e.g., p. 145) is, therefore, misplaced. The gift of the bride's father's *phiale* completed the formal ceremony, as our pronouncement that the couple has been united in marriage: Athenaeus 13, 575-576b. Once the cup had been given, the marriage was considered legal and final (as seems clear despite what Athenaeus [from Aristotle] says about the feelings of Petta's father). Thus the cup becomes the symbol not only of the accord and obligation between the son-in-law and father-in-law (Gundert, p. 45 with note 216, Bernard, p. 19) but also of the marriage itself (note ὁμόφρονος εὐνᾶς). Detailed information on non-Attic wedding-banquets (which constituted the legal ceremonies) is scant, but see *RE s.v.* Hochzeit, 2130, and *Harper's Dictionary of Classical Literature and Antiquities, s.v.* Matrimonium.

[5] Thus Diomedes' cup (Z 220 f.), originally a gift from Bellerophon, has been passed down from Oineus through Tydeus to Diomedes as a symbol of the *xenia* existing between the descendants of Oineus and those of Bellerophon. Diomedes does not even remember his father, but knows well the symbolic significance of the family cup and the generations through which

suppose, a symbol for the perpetuity and rebirth of the family in its new generations, thus causing the emphasis on οἴκοθεν οἴκαδε (*v.* 4) and on the fact that both father-in-law and groom drink of the same wine from the same cup.[1] The attaching of such symbolic importance to the cup filled with wine is corroborated by its equivalent in the main clause, the νέκταρ, a veritable source of perpetuated life, thus a fitting metaphor for Pindar's immortalizing verse.[2] And the correspondence between Μοισᾶν δόσιν and ἀφνειᾶς ἀπὸ χειρός indicates that as a generous portion has been poured into the life-symbolizing cup which the bride's father, after partaking of it himself, gives to the groom, so Pindar has received an abundance of the life-giving *nektar* of the Muses, which he, in turn, passes on to the victors.[3] Thus a number of topics are introduced in the simile, among them generous giving, life itself, and the means by which it may be perpetuated, such as by marital union or by song.[4]

Yet in addition to the symbolic significance of the two gifts mentioned in the simile, each has an important, immediate effect, and so arises the final set of corresponding ideas of the simile, the fact that each gift makes the recipient blessed in the eyes of men.[5] The phrase which matches θῆκε ζαλωτόν (*v.* 6), "That man is blessed whom good reports surround" (*v.* 10), is suggested by the epinician poet's power to advance the reputations of his patrons. The form in which the idea is cast, the traditional gnomic beatification formula, ὄλβιος ὅς,[6] signals the end of the simile.[7] Another traditional

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it has passed. The cup in the marriage ceremony probably functions in a similar manner, being an emblem of the family itself rather than of *xenia.*

[1] Duchemin properly terms the cup "le presage heureux du renouveau d'une race" (p. 249; that remark, because of the importance of the cup in the ceremony, remains true even if her remarks about the "boisson vivifiante" or the "breuvage d'immortalité" [pp. 274 f.] are perhaps vagaries of criticism); cf. Galiano *ad v.* 4. For marriage and children perpetuating the family and thus bestowing immortality upon its members see Gundert, p. 17 with n. 48. Cf. Catullus 61, 211-216 (204-209 Mynors).

[2] The word has its full meaning here; Fraenkel translates "Nektartrunks (= Unsterblichkeit)" (*Dichtung und Philosophie*[2], p. 490). See also Bowra, pp. 25 f.

[3] The Muses are asked to give (δότε) the poet song in Hesiod *Th.* 104.

[4] See further Lawall, pp. 37 ff.

[5] Fraenkel (*Dichtung und Philosophie*[2], p. 490, n. 12) accordingly glosses θῆκε ζαλωτόν by ἐμακάρισεν and terms ὁ δ' ὄλβιος "ein μακαρισμός."

[6] Hesiod *Th.* 96, Alcman *Parth.* (PMG 1), 37, *h. Hom.* 25, 4, Pindar frag. 142 (137a), Bacch. 5, 50, etc. Cf. Py. 5, 46, Py. 10, 22 f., etc.

[7] See p. 32, note 5 *supra*. In Alcman (note 6 *supra*) the beatification is obviously terminal in function.

topos now provides preparation for the specific praise of Diagoras by rendering the themes of the simile applicable to the present situation.[1]

11 ἄλλοτε δ' ἄλλον ἐποπτεύει Χάρις ζωθάλμιος.

The name of the Grace, Thalia, probably suggests the unique, arresting word, ζωθάλμιος ('causing life to flourish' or the like), yet the compounded epithet attracts greater attention and attributes more importance to the "Blooming One" of the Graces than would the mere name. Although this emphasis on life and blooming may even seem somewhat intrusive at this point, later developments within the poem will account for Pindar's creation of the word and prove it apt. The theme of vicissitude and diversity in the sentence provides a reminder of the rare and precious nature of such important and deserved favor [2] as that received by the bridegroom and by the victors. One occurrence of such Χάρις ζωθάλμιος is connected with lyres and flutes (*v.* 12), and thus Diagoras is selected from the general and transient: The limelight must illumine now this man, now that, but as the wedding day belonged to the groom, so this is Diagoras' day.

13 καί νυν ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων σὺν Διαγόρᾳ κατέβαν τὰν ποντίαν
ὑμνέων παῖδ' Ἀφροδίτας Ἀελίοιό τε νύμφαν, Ῥόδον.

"So now I, in the presence [3] of both [*viz.* the lyre and the flute], have come, singing of Aphrodite's sea child and bride of Helios, Rhodes ...." The complement of epinician motifs, καί νυν, name cap (σὺν Διαγόρᾳ), and the theme of arrival (κατέβαν),[4] terminates the transition from the generalities of the proem to the concentrated praise of Diagoras; and it will elicit in the subsequent verses (14 ff.) the statement of the χρέος, the duty of the poet to his present sub-

[1] For the transition from the general to the specific through such phrases as ἄλλοτε ἄλλον see Bundy I, 7, where he uses the term "summary priamel."

[2] χάρις, of course, is a complex word: see further Schadewaldt, p. 227, and Bernard, p. 19 with n. 25.

[3] On the meaning of ὑπό see Else, *Wiener Studien* 52 (1959), 85-90 and n. 50. The lyre and the flute are objects with power on which the poet senses his own dependence. Cf., in general, Py. 1, 1 ff.

[4] For the whole phrase and the "virtual future" see Bundy I, 20; for νῦν or νυ(ν) used to introduce climactic specific instances see *ibid.*, 5, n. 18 (to which add Bacch. 6, 10; 9, 25; 11, 37 and cf. Hes. *Th.* 22, etc.; in Bacch. 13, 182, where we might expect such a νῦν, καὶ μάν [Denniston, *Particles*, 351 f.] occurs). For the term "name cap" see Bundy, *loc. cit.* For the motif of arrival see p. 46 *supra*.

ject.[1] Pindar's mention of Rhodes, child of Aphrodite, bride of Helios, as the poetic topic perhaps bears some relationship to the wedding in *vv.* 1 ff., but primarily serves to foreshadow the union of Helios and Rhodes in *vv.* 61-71, at which point their union has, in fact, become the foremost topic of the poem. Since some critics have concerned themselves with distinguishing the references to Rhodes the nymph from those to Rhodes the island and those to Helios the god from those to Helios the sun, a reminder of the reciprocity of these ideas is in order here.[2] Ῥόδος means the island which can, of course, be talked about as if a being, a nymph, but the meanings are not separable. The sexual union of male and female implied in *v.* 14 and expressed in *v.* 71 is merely one mode, in which the anthropomorphic vocabulary dominates, of a single union which is viewed from other points, such as those of geography and imagery, elsewhere in the poem. The figurative viewpoint gains its existence from yet another semantic fact, by now well known, about the Greek word for the island Rhodes: in the poem, Pindar uses the name only in the oblique cases, where it is phonetically identical to the Greek word for the floral rose, and he capitalizes on the ambiguity for his poetic purpose.[3] The versatility of the word ΡΟΔΟΝ in *v.* 14 assumes considerable importance later in the poem, and these later developments partially account for the prominence here of Ῥόδον as the hymnal topic by which the poet fulfills his χρέος and accomplishes his poetic goal.

The χρέος and goal are stated in the terms of the genre: Pindar sings of Ῥόδον in order that he "praise [Diagoras] recompense for boxing" (*v.* 16). Statements of purpose in the epinicians often contain, as here, a verb of singing or praising (αἰνέσω), and an internal object designating the song as an award or return for the victory or for some factor of it. The word referring to the victory is frequently in the genitive.[4] The word in the genitive and the word denoting

[1] See in general Schadewaldt, pp. 277 ff.

[2] Gildersleeve *ad v.* 18. The scholiast *ad loc.*, apparently somewhat perplexed, notes that Pindar sometimes "entwines" the references to the nymph and to the place (cf. Galiano *ad loc.*).

[3] Norwood, p. 140, Lawall, p. 33, etc. See also Norwood, p. 258, n. 6 and pp. 88 f. *infra.* Rivier curiously speaks of "une île parée de roses" (p. 80) and gives no sure indication that he understands the ambiguity of ΡΟΔΟΝ. See van Groningen, *Composition*, p. 356.

[4] For the internal object see the examples listed in Bundy I, 20, and II, 65. For the general theme, ἄποινα and its congeners, and the customary genitive, see Schadewaldt, p. 278, n. 1, an elaborate and informative catalogue which

compensation may describe return for some experience which, of itself and without the recompense, would be unpleasant or undesirable.[1] Athletic events which include a physical struggle with an opponent suggest such terms as ἄποινα μόχθων and such notions as a relief from pain, as in *Nemean* 3, 17a f.[2] Since boxing was apparently not a pleasant experience, Pindar's song is return not only for victory but also for the painful experience that Diagoras has undergone in the match, and the phrase πυγμᾶς ἄποινα contains both ideas.[3]

In the remainder of the sentence (*vv.* 17 ff.) the praise is expanded to include Diagoras' father, Damagetos, the island once more, and its inhabitants' Argive ancestry. Although Pindar has been charged with being "cool" toward Diagoras, his family, and this poem, I cannot discover on what grounds such conclusions could be drawn, and Pindar's interest in the family and in its history is carried over into the mythical portion of the poem and emphasized in the conclusion.[4] In fact, the greatness of the family and the victor's con-

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reveals the variety with which Pindar treats a conventional theme (Bacchylides seems content with ἕκατι νίκας: 6, 11; 5, 33; 10, 15).

[1] For Pindar's positive use of words that generally have a negative connotation, see Radt, p. 40; in odes for equestrian victors, the expense of keeping stables may require recompense: Py. 5, 106 (see Hampe, p. 52).

[2] ἄποινα μόχθων, Ne. 7, 16; καματωδέων πλαγᾶν ἄκος ὑγιηρόν, Ne. 3, 17a. See further Hampe, *loc. cit.* in note 1 *supra* and Schadewaldt, *loc. cit.* in p. 76, n. 4 *supra*. Pindar uses the same vocabulary to describe the hero's reward for toil (e.g., Ne. 1, 70), from which notion the vocabulary as an epinician motif perhaps derives. The vocabulary, therefore, often makes the heroic act paradigmatic of the victory, and Pindar will use it again in Ol. 7, 77.

[3] Both ideas are clearly expressed in Is. 8, 1-5: λύτρον καμάτων .... Ἰσθμιάδος τε νίκας ἄποινα.

[4] Farnell's remark (II, 50) that Pindar says less than might be expected about Diagoras' family has little support. Besides Diagoras, Pindar mentions explicitly an ancestor, Kallianax, the father, Damagetos, the Eratidae in general, and the family's descent from Zeus, Herakles, Tlepolemos, *et al.* See Welcker, *loc. cit.* p. 69, n. 1 *supra*, p. 387. Since Diagoras is already famous in his own right, there is no need for elaborate praise of relatives as sometimes occurs in odes for men or boys whose relatives are more famous than they. Moreover, Pindar cannot praise the father's athletic victories if there are none. Wilamowitz' claim (*Pindaros*, p. 362) that Pindar used reserve toward Diagoras throughout the ode seems a mere subjective opinion. The truth or falsity of his statement (*ibid.*) that Diagoras wanted Pindar to use reserve in the poem can never be known. Diagoras' victories remain because Pindar celebrated them; Diagoras' wishes and wants are irrecoverably lost. Finally, Wilamowitz' judgment (p. 361) that Pindar's art in this poem "bliebt kühl; das Herz des Dichters ist unbeteiligt" I can only regard as the result of a superficial reading of the poem.

tinuance of it are crucial in *Olympian* 7, as in most epinicians, and inseparably bound to the greatness of Rhodes itself, as the myths make clear.

In *v.* 20 Pindar makes a secondary statement of purpose,[1] saying that he will exalt [2] for Diagoras and his father their story from the beginning (ἐξ ἀρχᾶς) from Tlepolemos. He then quickly traces the ancestry back from Tlepolemos through Herakles to Zeus on the paternal side, through Astydameia to Amyntor on the maternal (*vv.* 20-24). The gnome which follows is important, but it is much misunderstood and has occasioned some scholarly dispute. Since the gnome is obviously prefatory to the material which follows it, an examination of the subsequent mythical narrative is pertinent. The poem, like many of the epinicians, is a triptych, the portion devoted to mythical events occupying a central position (in *Olympian* 7, the mathematical center) between two portions which are rather directly concerned with the program, that is, the poet's praise of the victor and closely related matters.[3] Since transition to and from the mythical narrative is made through mention of Tlepolemos, his recurrent name (*vv.* 20 and 77) embraces the myths and effects the clear demarcations of ring-form. The mythical portion reveals further structural symmetry, being itself a triptych in which the three principal myths occupy approximately a triad each.

Yet the myths have far more in common with each other than length and symmetry. Not only is each an aetiological myth about some important event in Rhodian history, but they also have a

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[1] See p. 46, n. 2 *supra*; van Groningen, *Composition*, p. 357.

[2] For ἐθελήσω see Radt, p. 74. Commentators take διορθῶσαι to mean 'correct,' 'revise' (e.g., Norwood, p. 258, n. 3: "Pindar means to 'edit' the current version"). Yet I doubt that διορθῶσαι here differs greatly in meaning from ὀρθόω elsewhere in Pindar (see Rumpel s.v.) where the principal idea is not so much that of truth (Bundy II, 65) as that of elevation (to glory—and thus celebration). ὀρθόω means 'set upright,' but dependent upon whether its object is internal or external, it means 'erect' (the construction of a monument or wall) or 'correct' (the raising of a fallen soldier or a fallen wall); see the examples in LSJ *s.v.* If λόγον in Ol. 7, 21 is external, the phrase probably refers to the restoring to prominence of a story which has fallen into disuse (as in Hermog. *Id.* 2.1: cf. Pindar Is. 4, 21-23) not to the revision of a current story. However, λόγον is probably internal ('raise [i.e., construct] a story') as ὕμνον in Ol. 3, 3b. ξυνόν both here and in the comparable (for the internal object see Bundy II, 65) Is. 1, 46 is perhaps best taken as predicate; by his proclaiming, the story which Pindar erects becomes public.

[3] The common sequence, program, myth, program, is, of course, not an epinician rule but an established habit: see Croiset, pp. 361 ff., Schadewaldt, p. 269, Bowra, p. 282.

common basic movement of plot, from an adversity to good fortune. In the first, Tlepolemos' killing of his uncle causes him to leave his country, no doubt an exile, but he is given the divine charge of the Greek colonization of Rhodes. In the second myth, the Heliadae of Rhodes fail to acquire the principal patronage of Athena (which goes to Athens), yet from her they receive supremacy in arts and crafts. In the third, Helios has been omitted from the division of the world among the gods, but he receives the estimable island of Rhodes as it emerges.

This common element of the myths has long been remarked, and a multitude of scholars has sought to formulate an explanation of the meaning of the poem by a *Grundgedanke* based upon it. Dissen, of course, was first: Pindarus, magnifico posito fundamento carminis canit *aeternum insulae fatum e decoribus et erroribus mirifice mixtum.* Twentieth century naïveté can also appall. Perry wrote, "A blessed outcome, so the poet sings, may follow, by the grace of god, even upon transgression." Other *Grundgedanken* have perhaps been superior to these, but Jurenka showed long ago that all *Grundgedanken* based upon guilt or forgetfulness fail to account for all three myths, and that they are poor explanations of unity.[1] Other commentators, such as Norwood and Gildersleeve, state their views more elaborately, claiming that from the first to the third myth the "faults" of the principal characters diminish while the blessings increase. Gildersleeve: [2]

> "In each of [the three myths] we have a good beginning followed by misfortune, and yet a good ending crowns all .... We begin with Tlepolemos and end with the emergence of Rhodes. The climax is in the rank of those who have sinned, who have forgotten, who have been absent. Note that the fault is less the higher we mount. No wonder that an explanation has been sought of the triple shadow that falls across the poem."

[1] Dissen II, 88; E. D. Perry in *Greek Literature, a series of Lectures delivered at Columbia University* (New York, 1912), p. 87. For other *Grundgedanken* see Jurenka, pp. 183 and 193.

[2] Gildersleeve, p. 184. Why he should say "good" I cannot guess. Unless "good" refers only to Tlepolemos' lineage, his story has no good beginning. The beginning of the third myth is neither 'good' nor 'bad.' Gildersleeve's notion of a good beginning is not part of the usual interpretation. Cf., e.g., Croiset: "il y a dans chacun d'eux [ces trois mythes] le recit d'une aventure qui commence mal ...." p. 345; so also Rauchenstein, *Einleitung*, pp. 98 f. Norwood: ".... gloom begins to lighten .... rich solace .... overwhelming glory," then, "descending scale of guilt and a crescendo of glory" (pp. 142 f.); cf. Schmidt, pp. 320 f.

But the ideas of degrees of fault and of blessedness become rather forced when the Greek is brought into view, and they are not effective in explaining the significance of the myths.

Jurenka, however, is hardly justified in contending that the myths have nothing in common.[1] Indisputably, in each of the three myths something has occurred which, by ordinary standards, would be considered a misfortune of some kind. The presence of these apparent misfortunes in the poem has engendered a vigorous search, at no point successful, for misfortune in Diagoras' life, on the assumption that the mishaps in the poem could only thus be explained.[2] Norwood characteristically claims that as soon as "the symbol" ("the Rose") is found, all such difficulties will disappear, but he later contradicts himself by maintaining that the answer to the "gloom" can only be found in lost biography.[3] Although he nowhere shows how "rose-symbolism" explains the gloom, he appears to have some notion of proving his earlier claim when he quotes Browning's "tree-like through pain to joy." That quotation, perhaps, indicates an understanding of the imagery not revealed elsewhere in Norwood's interpretation. In fact Gildersleeve, when he speaks of triple shadows, and most of the commentators, as they speak of gloom, darkness, shadows, and dark clouds in criticizing the poem, have understood a part of Pindar's imagery.[4] They fail, however, to comprehend its

[1] Jurenka, especially pp. 190 f., "nicht das Geringste gemeinsam" (p. 190) is far too inclusive; cf. Welcker (p. 69, note 1 *supra*), especially p. 386, van Groningen, *Composition*, p. 353.

[2] Boeckh went to great pains to present the position of the Eratidae in Rhodian politics as very precarious, and he pointed out their subsequent misfortunes (pp. 177 ff.). However, as Gildersleeve remarked, "There is danger of being a Προμηθεὺς μετὰ τὰ πράγματα" (p. 184). Cf. Farnell *ad v.* 94. Boeckh thought that the poem was directed to the Rhodians more than to the Eratidae, *e.g.*, "quasi his verbis simul admonere Rhodios poeta voluerit, ne gentem minui sinerint" (p. 177). Dissen sought the answer in the scholiast's remarks at the end of the poem that Diagoras had, perhaps, some earlier misfortune. He surmised that Diagoras had killed his opponent (p. 88). In spite of Gildersleeve's statement to the contrary (p. 184), there is no mention of the killing of an opponent nor of anyone else in the scholia. Cf. also Schmidt, pp. 322 f.

[3] Pages 138 f., and pp. 141 f. Norwood's argument that the "tree" is growing under "impossible conditions" is unconvincing.

[4] Finley: "The familiar theme of vicissitude is gloomier here" (p. 71). Gildersleeve: "triple shadow which falls across the poem" (p. 184). Norwood: "Shadows fall across the brightness" (p. 138). "Radiance is preceded by gloom" (p. 141). "Boeckh points to the emphatic and repeated mention of the cloud that comes over men's wits" (p. 142), in reference to Boeckh's "ipsa affinium dictorum (*vv.* 24, 30, 43 *sqq.*) crebra repetitio" (p. 178, al-

development in the whole poem. When we see how the "shadows" and the clouds function in the poem and how they relate to other imagery such as that of precipitation and that of the rose, we shall, I think, be less disturbed than before by the presence of the dark clouds and far less interested in discovering an arcane, figurative dark cloud in the life of Diagoras.

These considerations about the myths bear upon the prefatory gnome of *vv.* 24 ff., and to it I shall now return:

24 ἀμφὶ δ' ἀνθρώπων φρασὶν ἀμπλακίαι
ἀναρίθμητοι κρέμανται· τοῦτο δ' ἀμάχανον εὑρεῖν,
ὅ τι νῦν ἐν καὶ τελευτᾷ φέρτατον ἀνδρὶ τυχεῖν.

"Around the minds of men there hang shortcomings innumerable, and there is no way to discover what now and in the end is best to happen to a man." Most scholars brand the remark, or at least the first clause, as a thinly veiled excuse for Tlepolemos' killing of Likymnios, and, somehow taking ἀμπλακίαι to be a reference to murder, they translate it by "errors" or even "crimes." [1] They are thus enabled to regard the whole sentence as proof that Pindar is saying that in the history of Rhodes crimes and mistakes cause blessedness, a curious doctrine, to say the least. Fortunately, the Greek does not warrant such an interpretation, and the sentence clearly makes an important general statement about the human inability to foresee outcomes, as is elucidated by its second part and as is illustrated by the myths.[2] Another dispute has concerned the imagery of the gnome, but such diverse scholars as the vehemently anti-unitarian emender, Jurenka, and Lattimore, in his recent translation, have persuasively viewed the imagery as drawn from

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though Boeckh actually uses the word *nubes* only in connection with *v.* 43). Farnell: "closing words showing the shadow on human glory" (I, 40). Perry (*loc. cit.* pag. 79 *supra*), p. 87: "The whole ode glows with color; but across it there fall three shadows."

[1] Farnell: "genial apology for homicide." Dissen: "caedes praemissis et subiectis verbis ita excusatur." Fraccaroli: "Pindaro, como uomo retto, non poteva giustificare ragionemente la colpa di Tlepolemo e la attribuisce all'umana cecità." Fernandez Llorenz: "Muchos errores pueden sufrir los hombres. Uno fué la muerte de Licimnio por Tlepólemo." Boeckh: "hoc ipsum (facinus) Tlepolemi sententia excusat." Cf. Méautis, p. 407, Mezger *ad loc.*, etc.

[2] The distinction is fine, but important. See further Jurenka, pp. 185 f. Cf., in general, Ol. 12: surely Ol. 12 does not imply that Pindar approves of, condones, or even excuses, στάσις. He simply notes that sometimes misfortune unexpectedly finds its own recompense.

dark clouds and their shadows which tend to obscure and limit men's vision.[1]

The truth of the gnome will be illustrated by the story of Tlepolemos, as the phrase which introduces it, καὶ γάρ (*v.* 27), indicates. Yet the mere account of Likymnios' death at the hands of Tlepolemos (*vv.* 27-30) does not illustrate the gnome, but rather, the entire story of Tlepolemos which, while presently suspended, is not formally completed until *vv.* 77 ff. Its illustrative force is one of unforeseeable outcome, not of successful and glorified murder.

However, the short gnome which follows the account of the killing probably does explain Tlepolemos' act, and it, if one must be found, might be called an apology for murder.

αἱ δὲ φρενῶν ταραχαὶ
παρέπλαγξαν καὶ σοφόν.

"Disturbances of the mind have caused even the wise to stray wide of the mark." The sentence again refers to the inadequacy of the human mind; Tlepolemos, however, obviously did not stray indefinitely and did not depend upon his faulty mind: "He went to the god and consulted him" (*v.* 31). And the god, as we shall see, told him what would be best for him.

Verses 24-31, then, do not comprise a group of disconnected and illogical apologies and mythical details but form a clear statement about man's lack of prescience, followed by an example of a man in adversity who obtained divine aid. The gnome of *vv.* 24 f. and especially that of *vv.* 30 f. may tend to explain Tlepolemos' actions and even to allow sympathy for him, but there is no justification for thinking that Pindar's principal intention in *vv.* 24-31 was to condone murder on the grounds that man, after all, is not very bright. The source of the Tlepolemos myth recounted here was, no doubt, Homer's story of Tlepolemos (B 653-670). Although Pindar adds some details (χολωθείς, ἐλθόντ' ἐκ θαλάμων Μιδέας), he does little to clarify the obscure circumstances and motives of the killing.

[1] Lattimore's "Delusions innumerable hang their shadows" uses the imagery of clouds. Way translates: "thick clouds of delusion." Jurenka: "Der Geist des Menschen, den immer (Wolken der) Irrungen umschweben (und daher umnachten)" (p. 186). Jurenka argues convincingly that the metaphor is drawn from darkening clouds which obscure our vision and therefore make what lies ahead (ἐν τελευτᾷ) indiscernible. (Gildersleeve, followed by Sandys, thinks that the metaphor comes from nets or snares; Dissen, followed by Norwood [p. 259, note 13], thinks that the metaphor is derived from hanging fruit).

Pindar, like Homer, is less interested in the killing and in the imputation of guilt than in giving the reasons why a noble Argive should leave his native land and consequently found the Greek settlement of Rhodes.[1]

Pindar's addition concerning the consultation of Apollo is probably determined by contextual considerations which differ considerably from those of the *Iliad*. The omniscient Apollo can compensate for the human short-sightedness which has become one of Pindar's topics; furthermore, the oracular response confers upon the colonization an aspect of cosmic fulfillment which is lacking and unneeded in the Catalogue of Ships but beneficial to *Olympian* 7, wherein the destiny of Rhodes and its people is a major theme.

Pindar's handling of his Homeric source, however, becomes most revelatory of his poetic aims in *vv.* 32-34, which form a temporary resolution of Tlepolemos' story and provide the transition to the second major myth: The god told Tlepolemos to take a trip to the island "on which Zeus showered golden snow" when Athena was born. This shower of gold on Rhodes is surely suggested by B 670 (καί σφιν θεσπέσιον πλοῦτον κατέχευε Κρονίων).[2] In Homer, as in Pindar, mention of the shower follows soon after mention of the trip to the island, but Pindar has placed the shower much earlier historically, making it occur long before rather than shortly after the arrival of Tlepolemos on Rhodes. Furthermore, Pindar has amplified Homer's suggestion of precipitation and explicitly called it snow. Thus occurs the first unmistakable reference in the poem to weather, but I have already noted that the imagery of *vv.* 24 f. is almost certainly that of darkening storm-clouds or their shadows.

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[1] See Thummer, *Religiosität*, p. 74, and for the motif of the forced exile (here enabling colonization) *ibid.* with n. 3 and Ne. 5, 14 ff. with commentary. Though Pindar adds details (Theiler, p. 257) he omits several others. The hesitation of some scholars to view Homer as Pindar's source is groundless, for Pindar is not in the habit of parroting his source material point for point. There are abundant points of verbal contact in the two accounts (for B 655 f. cf. Ol. 7, 73 ff.; see also above and p. 90 *infra*). Although Pindar has probably told us all that is necessary for an understanding of the poem, the problems of the variants in the Tlepolemos-myth are considerable; for the problem of the cause of the murder see the scholia *ad loc.*; for that of Midea see Farnell *ad loc.*; for that of the genealogies see Wilamowitz, p. 366, n. 1.

[2] As is commonly assumed by most scholars (*contra* Cook, *Zeus*, III. 1, 477; cf. Bowra, p. 283). For a shower of gold at the conception of a god in Pindar see Is. 7, 5. The *rapprochement* seen by Duchemin (p. 207) in Egyptian mythology is interesting and should be noted, although such things are impossible to evaluate and must remain, at this time, curious *rapprochements*.

From this point on imagery drawn from weather and related phenomena increases in frequency and importance. Of especial significance is the apparently repeated reference, in *v.* 50, to the golden precipitation of *vv.* 33 f. Yet in *v.* 50 the precipitation is rain, not snow, so that Pindar may have intended two separate instances of precipitation on the island, one at Athena's birth and another very shortly thereafter.[1] Fortunately, to determine whether Pindar implies two showers or one is not only impossible but also irrelevant, for the important fact is that he has seized upon a suggestion in the Homeric account, multiplied it, and given it variety, first as snow, then as rain, in order to contribute to a pattern of imagery, developed in detail in the second and third myths, which bears greatly upon the meaning of *Olympian* 7.

The dexterous use of another relative clause (ἁνίκα) completes the transition begun by the relative (ἔνθα) to the second myth and to a time far removed from that of Tlepolemos. From the response of Apollo we are brought to witness the birth of Athena and the ensuing events, never quite sure where the response of the god ends and the poet's narrative of the second myth begins.[2] However, by *v.* 38, the golden snow-shower and the events of *vv.* 33 ff. are obviously not oracular digressions: the birth of Athena is of importance itself, literally, in fact, an event of earth-shaking proportions.[3] The instructions of "the son of Hyperion" to his sons

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[1] Scholars, probably rightly, have apparently not concerned themselves with this problem. The second myth appears to be built upon a *Ringkomposition*, the mention of the precipitation (*v.* 34) bringing about explanatory background material (*vv.* 35-49) which leads back to a restatement of the precipitation (*vv.* 49 f.). Whatever Pindar's intention was (provided that he even intended either interpretation), he effects two references, widely separated in the narrative, to precipitation, and thus accomplishes his poetic goals.

[2] Jurenka confidently places the end of the oracle after *v.* 38 (p. 182, note 3). Seymour (*ad v.* 35) apparently places the end of the oracle after *v.* 34. Actually, there is no clearly marked break, but Apollo's oracular response becomes Pindar's myth imperceptibly. Precisely the same phenomenon occurs in Ne. 5, 25 ff. where it is impossible to distinguish where the song of the Muses ends and the poet's narrative resumes. For ἔνθα and ἁνίκα in transitions see p. 32, note 4 *supra*.

[3] Perhaps the presence of the Earth and Sky is a part of the imagery drawn from nature and weather. Their participation in the imagery, however, is not emphasized and perhaps they are mentioned only because of their connection with the birth of Athena. See Farnell *ad vv.* 35-38. The trembling of earth and sky indicates the cosmic importance of the event as well as the magnitude of the war cry: cf. Hes. *Th.* 678 ff., 836-843, and Υ 56 ff. (when Achilleus has entered the battle).

that they be first to found Athena an altar and sacrifice (*vv.* 39-43) imply the tradition that the Athenians and the Rhodians vied for her patronage.[1] Although the variously interpreted gnome which follows (*vv.* 43 f.) remains rather obscure,[2] the second aphorism (*vv.* 45 ff.) contains some elements with which we are rapidly becoming familiar in the poem: forgetfulness is represented as a dark cloud which causes the correct road to be obliterated from one's intelligence (φρένες). The sentence recalls two earlier aphorisms which also were concerned with the inadequacy of the mind (φρένες); namely, *vv.* 30 f., where the notion 'astray' (παρ-) also occurs, and *vv.* 24 f. which have the imagery of the obscuring cloud in common with *vv.* 45 ff. The γάρ of *v.* 48 indicates that the subsequent story exemplifies such a mishap. Therefore the failure of the Heliadae to use fire in their sacrifice (*vv.* 48 f.) continues the theme of the inability of the human mind (φρένες) to meet all circumstances.

Nevertheless, the dark cloud of *v.* 45 is replaced by a yellow cloud, and Zeus rains much gold on the island (*vv.* 49 f.). As Zeus rained gold, Athena gave the Rhodians supremacy in arts and crafts. The combination of wealth and skill enabled them to gain great fame for the works which they produced. The second part of the mythical narrative reaches a climax with the description of the similarity of the statues to living beings and with mention of the fame which the islanders derived from their art (*vv.* 50-52).

Of especial importance in the second myth is the remarkable and elaborate development of images and expressions relating to weather. The close propinquity of the two clouds (*vv.* 45 and 49) seems to indicate that they are part of a single figurative storm, that is, that the obscuring (and, therefore, surely dark and stormy) cloud is a meteorological antecedent of the golden cloud and of the shower

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[1] So πρῶτοι would indicate. See further on the competition for Athena's patronage and Pindar's use of it Jurenka, pp. 187-190, where he examines the other sources for the myth. Cf. Farnell I, 39.

[2] The problems of *vv.* 43 f. are great. Farnell *ad loc.* (naïvely) calls the verses the only real difficulty in the ode. The critical history of the problem is to be found in several places, *e.g.*, Fernandez Llorenz, p. 370, note 21, and Farnell *ad loc.* Ribezzo (*RIGI* 9 [1925], 92) made a bold and ingenious attempt to extract something really meaningful from the verses in contrast to the gibberish of the traditional interpretations. I cannot refrain from believing that Ribezzo was on the right road (until it was "pulled aside from his mind"): it is difficult not to think of Prometheus' connection with fire, when the story turns on the failure of the Heliadae to bring fire for the sacrifice with them. Cf. Duchemin, p. 105, note 1, and Méautis, p. 408.

which rained down upon the island. Therefore, once again (cf. *vv.* 24 f. and *vv.* 33 f.) in the sequence of the narrative, clouds are followed by precipitation, as is natural, and the imagery drawn from natural phenomena and weather has begun to take coherent and discernible form. In fact, such imagery has even begun to take precedence over the mere plot, for no other satisfactory explanation of the amplification and modification of B 670 is apparent. The importance which the imagery has assumed in the course of the second myth perhaps explains why there is no finely contrived transition from the second myth such as the ἔνθα and ἁνίκα complex which introduced it.[1] After a terminal gnomic comment, a famous yet universally misunderstood passage,[2] that learned and conscious

[1] Wilamowitz, p. 368, notes the unusual lack of transition between the two myths.

[2] Pindaric scholars, because of their proclivity to term as much as possible in Pindar as 'rectification of tradition,' have stumbled on some unusual word order here and rendered *v.* 53 nonsensical. There is a virtually universal (Fehr, p. 130, is unconvincing) belief that *v.* 53 contains a reference to the wizardry of the early inhabitants of Rhodes, the Telchines, and that Pindar either equates the Heliadae with the Telchines and here denies the charge of wizardry against them or distinguishes, as honest artists, the Heliadae from the magicians, the Telchines. See, e.g., Thummer, *Religiosität*, p. 74, n. 4. I submit that there is no reference at all to Telchines or magic, which reference would be as irrelevant to the context as it is obscure in the text ("unexpected" in Bowra, p. 339, is, of course, a euphemism for 'impertinent'). δαέντι refers to the artist, not to the judge; ἄδολος here has its meaning 'pure,' 'unmixed,' 'unrefined,' 'natural' (*LSJ s.v.* II). The topics are not magic and honesty, but—as so often in Pindar—learned knowledge (δάω/διδάσκω) and genuine, natural, unrefined wisdom (σοφία ἄδολος: in Ol. 2, 94/5 the μαθόντες are denied the appellation σοφός). The syntax is as follows: if any word is to be regarded as a protasis, it is δαέντι, not ἄδολος; μείζων is predicate; ἄδολος is attributive (clarifying the meaning of σοφία). Translate: "If a man has learned knowledge, his native wisdom becomes greater, also." For the dative meaning 'in the case of' and for the force of the καί (which is ignored in the usual interpretation) cf. Soph. *O.T.* 44 f. where there is also the similarity that one kind of knowledge (acquaintance with the past) increases another kind (that of the future). Conscious art increases inborn wisdom, that is to say, in the context, that the τέχνη given by Athena to the Heliadae augmented their native talent (cf. *v.* 71), which is as obviously true as it is pertinent. For δαείς referring to one who has learned the crafts of Athena see Solon 1 (13), 50. That Pindar should give credit to the conscious learning of a craft, despite his general doctrine of the supremacy of talent over learning, should disturb only those who are offended when he praises a trainer and perhaps those who have not noticed that shortly after a famous deprecation of learned knowledge (διδακτά, Ne. 3, 39 f.) Apollo teaches (δίδαξε, Ne. 3, 53) Asklepios the craft of medicine. While Pindar might have looked with contempt at those who had learned knowledge only, I do not think he was unrealistic, and, the world has assumed, he had his own *Lehrzeit in Athen.*

art (the τέχνη given the Rhodians by Athena) augments native wisdom (*v.* 53), Pindar suddenly begins the third part of the narrative with "Ancient tradition has it that . . . ." (*vv.* 54 f.). The ordinary means of transition, the relative, might now have severed the imagery drawn from natural phenomena in the second myth from the third myth, which also contains imagery of nature; that is, the effect of the clouds and rains might appear terminated if formal transition had been used to indicate the change in time required by the new story. As we shall see, the continuity of the imagery of the second myth with that of the third myth is of paramount importance.

The scholiast informs us that Pindar had no previous literary authority for the story of the partition of the lands and the awarding of the still submerged island of Rhodes to Helios. That remark has led commentators to suppose that Pindar received knowledge of the tale from Rhodian storytellers of local folklore,[1] which hypothesis has caused a dispute about whether or not Pindar ever visited Rhodes. Although the tale may have existed in some form elsewhere, the evidence suggests a strong possibility that the story was designed to fit the requirements of this particular poem. Even if Pindar did not invent the story, it has been incorporated so well into the poem that one might wonder whether the hypothetical Rhodian storyteller would have recognized it.[2]

The story relates that when Zeus and the gods were apportioning the earth among themselves, Rhodes (the form used, of course, also means 'rose' in Greek) was not visible but lay buried (κεκρύφθαι) in the depths (*vv.* 55 ff.). Furthermore, Helios, the sun, was not present at the apportioning of land, and no lot was drawn for him *in absentia* (*vv.* 58 ff.).[3] These circumstances constitute the 'mishap'

[1] So the scholiast *et al. ad v.* 54. Farnell *ad loc.* questions the scholiast, at least in respect to the division of the earth among the gods, but agrees completely with him in I, 40. Despite the frequent decisions of scholars as to whether or not Pindar visited Rhodes, we have absolutely no way of knowing (see p. 46, *supra*). See also note 2 *infra*.

[2] Fehr, not without cause, believes that the second myth is mostly, the third myth, entirely, Pindar's invention (pp. 132 f.).

[3] Most commentators, perhaps rightly, do not concern themselves with the question of the reason for Helios' absence. However, it has usually been assumed that Helios was on his course over the earth (Seymour *ad v.* 58, Thummer, *Religiosität*, p. 75). Welcker (*Rh. M.* 2 [1834], 381) says that the gods forgot him; cf. Méautis, p. 409; Perry (*loc. cit.* p. 79, n. 1 *supra*) simply says, "Helios failed to come to the allotment" (p. 88). However, Norwood says, speaking figuratively I suspect, "the Sun-God himself goes through his

of the third part of the mythical narrative. Confirmation of the implication that something has happened wrongly comes from the metrical and terminal positions of ἁγνὸν θεόν (*v.* 60), which put special emphasis on the incongruity of such a god's being left without a portion of land.[1] Yet the situation is redeemed, and a favorable conclusion results.

When the Sun appears (ending his absence not only from the lot-drawing but also from the imagery of the myths [2]), he does not allow Zeus to have a redrawing of the lots; he informs Zeus that he has seen a land "growing" (αὐξομέναν) beneath the surface of the sea.[3] The necessary arrangements for the awarding of the island to the Sun are made, and the island named 'Rose' "sprouts up" (βλάστε) as a plant from below (*vv.* 61-69). Here all the weather-imagery becomes clear and reaches a climax. What else could happen to a 'growing Rose' which has received two showers from above, first of snow, then of rain, when the Sun finally appears and is united with the 'Rose'? Naturally it sprouts.

Under close examination, the sequence of the imagery reveals a coherent, allegorical description of the growth of a plant under the conditions of nature: darkening clouds (*vv.* 24 f.), snow (*vv.* 33 f.), dark cloud (*v.* 45), yellow rain-cloud and rain (*vv.* 49 f.), absence of sun (*v.* 58), presence of sun (*v.* 61), growth of 'Rose' beneath the surface (*v.* 62), union of plant with sun (*vv.* 67 f.), and sudden sprouting up of plant (*v.* 69).[4]

Such a use of imagery is bold, indeed, especially since it operates virtually independently of the historical sequence of the events which provide a vehicle for its expression.[5] But timidity is perhaps

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hour of eclipse" (p. 143). Lawall, taking Norwood literally, suggests that Pindar has an actual eclipse in mind (p. 38). Such an interpretation is improbable, but not impossible: we know Pindar's interest in the solar eclipse (frag. 51 [Paean 9 = 52K Snell[2]]). Furthermore, the darkness of an eclipse would correspond well with the darkness caused by clouds in a similar position in each of the other two myths of the poem.

[1] See Gildersleeve *ad loc.*

[2] There is the reference to Helios in *v.* 39, of course, but perhaps it is significant that the actual name Ἅλιος is not used.

[3] Note the peculiar aptness of everything in the narrative; only Helios πανόπτης, ὁ πάντα ὁρῶν, would have noticed anything growing beneath the sea unknown to the rest of the gods and men (cf. Ξ 344 f.).

[4] Lawall mentions most of this imagery drawn from weather (especially p. 40 and p. 44) and suggests its relationship to the rose; he does not, however, note the rôle played by the sequence itself.

[5] Aside from Lawall's suggestion (p. 40), the only place known to me in

the only charge from which Pindar has always been, and surely will remain, free. The pattern of the allegory is too elaborate in its undertaking and too efficient in its execution to be fortuitous. Moreover, there is external evidence that the Greeks did associate the name of the island with that of the flower and that Pindar did take more than passing interest in the tradition of a rain of wealth on Rhodes.[1] Pindar has transformed these two elements, a phonetic ambiguity and a slight literary precedent, into a vivid and extensive poetic allegory which would have to be regarded as rather flamboyant if it were contrived merely for its own sake. Yet this ingenious account of the union of Helios/sun with Rhodes/rose conforms well with the announced subject in *vv.* 13 f., "singing the sea-child of Aphrodite, bride of Helios, ΡΟΔΟΝ," and we are not yet justified in passing off the development of imagery in the myths as clever, but wanton wordplay.

One type of union, then, between Helios and Rhodes has brought about a 'birth,' that of the island itself, but the transitional devices, the relative ἔνθα and the temporal ποτε (*v.* 71), allow that union to recede into the background, and another kind of union between the same pair occurs, the physical union of male and female, a topic of interest earlier in the poem. Not only was Rhodes called the "bride of Helios" but also the beginning of the poem was concerned with brides, bridegrooms, their families, and their marriage. The principal interest in the marriage here (*v.* 71) centers upon the issue of the marriage and the second generation from it, and with the transition of *v.* 71 the focus of the poem has shifted from the development of the island itself to the development of its men. Accordingly, Pindar

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which a clear recognition of this allegorical union of the Sun and the island/rose is indicated is in Myer's poem on Rhodes suggested by Ol. 7. The poem can be found in Randolph, *Fifty Years of English Song,* N.Y., 1888, III, p. 255. The following portion (and a little more) is printed by Robinson, p. 8:

"Therewith he [the sun] shot an arrowy ray
down through the blue Aegean deep;
thrilled by that magic dart of day
the hidden isle shook off her sleep.
She moved, she rose, and with the morn
she touched the air and Rhodes was born."

Those verses reveal a precise knowledge of what is happening in Pindar's poem (note ὀξειᾶν .... ἀκτίνων in *v.* 70).

[1] Norwood reproduces a photograph of a Rhodian coin with a rose on one side and Helios on the other (Plate 1, 4, see Norwood, p. 140). In frag. 128 (119) the "cloud of wealth" (surely suggested by the shower of wealth or gold) follows Theron's ancestors from Rhodes to Sicily.

mentions the founders of the three eponymous city states, who, like the gods in the third myth, partitioned the land among themselves (*vv.* 73-76). Since these are contemporary cities, Pindar indicates that the primeval time of the myths is rapidly becoming remote, as the events become increasingly recent and three generations quickly pass by.

A locative adverb (τόθι) again provides transition (*v.* 77), and suddenly we are back in the present. The paradigmatic significance of Tlepolemos' story is finally completed, as we are told that he receives "sweet recompense for his grievous misfortune" (λύτρον συμφορᾶς οἰκτρᾶς γλυκύ, *v.* 77).[1] Most commentators refer συμφορᾶς to the murder of *v.* 29, but the word probably refers specifically to Tlepolemos' exile and generally to the whole of his misfortune.[2] That Tlepolemos had experienced suffering is already stated in B 667 (ἄλγεα πάσχων), of which Pindar's phrase seems to be a reminiscence. However, Pindar mentions Tlepolemos' suffering in a formula usually applied to the victor in the epinicians, so that λύτρον συμφορᾶς, a striking parallel to πυγμᾶς ἄποινα (*v.* 16), makes the situations of Tlepolemos and of Diagoras readily comparable.[3] The parallelism, in fact, of these phrases alone should be sufficient to dispel scholarly suspicions that the pattern of success preceded by "gloom" in the myths betokens some grave mistake or misfortune in Diagoras' past. Even if the pattern of the myths is suggested by Diagoras' situation, a rather rash assumption, these phrases indicate that recompense is due someone who has undergone a trying experience. In Tlepolemos' case, the recompense takes the form of games performed in his honor in return for his misfortune; for Diagoras, recompense comes in the form of an epinician song as reward for the grueling boxing match he has won. That similarity is sufficient; there need be no further implications, for the "gloom" associated with the clouds in the myths functions as an integral part of the weather-imagery, and as clouds precede vigorous growth, so the boxing has anticipated the victory and song.

The mention of recompense and of the athletic games in honor of

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[1] Note the chiasmus which provides two effective juxtapositions, first of λύτρον and συμφορᾶς, then of οἰκτρᾶς and γλυκύ.

[2] E.g. Gildersleeve, Mezger *ad loc.* However, others have less narrow conceptions of it: Seymour *ad loc.*: "The death of Licymnius and its consequences." Boeckh *ad loc.*: "caedes Licymnii et exilium." See on this problem Jurenka, p. 186.

[3] Gildersleeve glosses λύτρον by ἄποινα: see pp. 76 f. with notes *supra*.

Tlepolemos makes possible the transition, effected by the relative τῶν (*v.* 80), back to Pindar's originally stated purpose, providing requital for Diagoras' boxing. A long catalogue of Diagoras' athletic victories follows. It has become traditional in Pindaric criticism to regard catalogues of victories as boring and extraneous, to write them off as second-rate poetry, and to excuse Pindar for composing them by theorizing that the hireling poet could not oppose the dictates of conceited patrons.[1] Perhaps too many of the students of classical civilization have accepted merely a portion of the Greek ideal, mental excellence, while rejecting its complement, physical excellence, as unworthy of serious admiration. Frankly, I am not bored by the catalogue of victories but awed.

The places where Diagoras has been victorious span the populous part of the mainland of Greece from east to west, north to south, and he is a περιοδονίκης.[2] He has multiple victories in at least two of the great games of Greece, and as many as six victories in some of the important but lesser games. When we consider the distance which Diagoras traveled from Rhodes to enter these numerous

[1] Norwood, pp. 19 f., Wilamowitz, pp. 360, 454, n. 2, etc.

[2] A map showing the locations of Diagoras' victories is impressive, all the more so when we realize that in many of these games he had multiple victories:

1. Olympia
2. Arcadia
3. Argos
4. Nemea
5. Pellene
6. Corinth
7. Aegina
8. Megara
9. Boeotia
10. Thebes
11. Athens
12. Rhodes
13. Delphi

Note the distance which Diagoras had to travel to each of these events compared with the distance that his opponents had to travel. This must have required much δαπάνη, all in the name of physical excellence and κλέος, which gives some indication of the importance that the Greeks attached to victory at the games. The victory at Delphi is referred to in *v.* 17 and, consequently, with the present Olympian victory, omitted from the formal catalogue. A περιοδονίκης is an athlete who has been victorious in each of the four major games.

games on the mainland, when we remember that, once there, he met Panhellenic competition, and when we recognize how frequently he was successful, some appreciation of Diagoras' accomplishments must affect us. After all, besides the Pythian games (*v.* 17), he won at Olympia, twice at Rhodes, four times at the Isthmian games, twice at the Nemean, at Athens (Panathenaic games), in the Argive games, the Arcadian and the Theban, in Boeotia (perhaps several different places), in Pellene in Achaea, six times at Aegina, and six times in Megara (*vv.* 80-87). Surely that is an awe-inspiring record. When writing for the great tyrants Pindar can swear, in a single unrestrained statement, that his man is supreme.[1] When a man has gained his fame and importance chiefly through athletic deeds, his accomplishments readily provide the testimony. Thus to versify Diagoras' record, roughly equivalent to the categorical statement which the tyrants receive, is about the highest praise Pindar can bestow upon him. And since Diagoras' greatness is in deeds, not concepts or circumstances, the catalogue of victories, I think, assumes true beauty and importance, if it is noted as each victory is mentioned, that Pindar is telling of a real victory won by a historical individual at a particular time and place, a victory which interested thousands of people at the time. Each of these victories, perhaps dependent upon a singular muscular action, a feint to the right rather than the left, or an extraordinary amount of effort, has been immortalized so that what was the victory of the day is now a victory for indefinite time. And while the Olympic victory in boxing in 1904 A.D. has, I assume, already lost virtually all of the cosmic significance it may have had, the Olympic victor of 464 B.C. entered the venerable realm of proverb.[2]

[1] For the 'superlative' compliment see p. 52, n. 2 *supra*. Most of the passages in question, and surely the most impressive, come from the odes for the tyrants. I do not mean to imply that Diagoras and his family were not influential citizens in Rhodes. Yet Diagoras' Mediterranean fame was athletic; Hieron's was not. The great catalogue of victories occurs in the place (near the close of the ode) where the 'superlative' compliments often occur in the odes for the tyrants; that fact provides additional evidence for the importance and highly complimentary function of the catalogue of victories.

[2] The Olympic victory in boxing in 1904 fell to one Samuel Berger (USA), about whom I, at least, know nothing, except that his win was revealed to me only by a search of the Olympic records. Diagoras, of course, later became a paradigm for earthly happiness, and, perhaps through Cicero (who quotes a Spartan, "morere, Diagora, non enim in caelum ascensurus es" [*Tusc.* 1, 46, 111: cf. Py. 10, 22-29, Is. 7, 44a and see pp. 50 and 53 *supra*]) as much as through Pindar, retains a portion of his proverbial significance even today.

Nor do I suspect Pindar of mumbling about egotistical patrons as he composed the catalogue. In Pindar's time athletic ability and success did not symbolize opposition to the arts, such as poetry, or to any other admirable occupation.[1] The catalogue provides abundant εὐμηχανία and challenges poetic ability, and Pindar has varied the concept of winning and arranged the various victories and their places of origin so that the catalogue is not repetitious, fits the meter, moves at a steady pace, and does justice to a record which may hold charm for many besides the victor.

Furthermore, from the catalogue of victories the prayer which begins the conclusion of the poem (*vv.* 87 ff.) receives its structural and logical dependence, for the victories constitute the good fortune which suggests and customarily precedes such important prayers for the future in the epinician.[2] Most often the prayers ask that the present good fortune continue undisturbed, but here, probably because the prayer occurs in the conclusion to the poem, it is first adapted to formulae normally associated with the formal closing of hymns.[3] Pindar invokes Zeus and, in accordance with hymnal style, mentions an appropriately Rhodian *sedes*, Mt. Atabyrios, and asks that the god honor the song as well as Diagoras, and that he grant Diagoras the "pleasure of veneration" among his fellow citizens and others.[4]

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[1] Xenophanes 2 (Diehl³) is the exception which proves the rule.

[2] See Bundy II, 72, 77-79, 82 f. and cf. Ol. 1, 103-end; 2, 11-17; 4, 11b-14/15; 5, 16b-23; 6, 93-end (where one prayer follows praise of Hieron's fortunes, another those of Agesias); 8, 15-29, 83-end; 13, 21b-27, Py. 5, 109-end, etc.; Bacch. 5, 31-36; 195-end, etc. The logic is probably the same (but reversed) as that which governs the common prayer-motif in which the need for present help causes the maker of the prayer to remind the god of his past performance of a similar service, and thus to bind him to do so again (*e.g.*, Π 236 ff.). Here, the past good fortune brings about the request for its continuance on much the same grounds. This entire notion can be indicated by a single word, *e.g.*, the ἔτι in Ol. 2, 16. See also note 3 *infra*.

[3] The request that the good fortune be continued undisturbed even has its own vocabulary, as these remarkably similar variants show: εὖ ἔρδων δὲ μὴ κάμοι θεός (Bacch. 5, 36), ὁ δ' ἐπαντέλλων χρόνος τοῦτο πράσσων μὴ κάμοι (Ol. 8, 28 f.), μή μοι μέγας ἕρπων κάμοι ἐξοπίσω χρόνος ἔμπεδος (frag. 42, 21 f. [Paean 2 = 52b, 26 f. Snell²]), ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς εὔφρων ποτὶ χρόνος ἕρποι (Ne. 7, 67 f.), μὴ θραύσοι χρόνος ὄλβον ἐφέρπων (Ol. 6, 97), ὁ δ' ἀθανάτων μὴ θρασσέτω φθόνος (Is. 7, 39); cf. Py. 1, 56 f., Ol. 1, 106 ff., etc. With τίμα μὲν ὕμνου τεθμὸν 'Ολυμπιονίκαν cf. ἐμὴν τιμήσατ' ἀοιδήν (*h. Hom.* 25, 6; also 6, 24; 24, 5). With Pindar's imperative, δίδοι, cf. the closing formulae of the following Homeric hymns: 6, 8, 10, 11, 20, and 25. See also, in general, Bundy II, 78 f.

[4] Lattimore's translation of the untranslatable αἰδοίαν χάριν (cf. Ol. 13, 110; Solon 1, 6). For the doublet ἀστοί and ξένοι see page 45, note 2, *supra*.

Yet those requests, essentially terminal in nature, do not complete the poem, for Pindar appends a justification for the requests and, in doing so, puts the finishing touches upon a complicated poem. Diagoras deserves such gifts,

> ἐπεὶ ὕβριος ἐχθρὰν ὁδὸν εὐθυπορεῖ, σάφα
> δαεὶς ἅ τε οἱ πατέρων ὀρθαὶ φρένες ἐξ ἀγαθῶν
> ἔχραον.

Some elements in that statement render untenable the notion that the mishaps in the myths of the poem are precise reflections of misdeeds or misfortunes in Diagoras' life. Diagoras walks straight down the road which is the enemy of ὕβρις. Surely, then, he not only is innocent of any gross transgression but also has not had the right road (ὀρθὰ ὁδός) obscured from his mind (φρένες) as was the plight of the men described in *vv.* 45 ff. Rather, his upright mind (ὀρθαὶ φρένες) has learned clearly the oracular precepts of his fathers.[1] Therefore, he has met no cloud of forgetfulness such as prevented the Heliadae from successfully completing their father's instructions. And the ὀρθαὶ φρένες which he has inherited certainly must be free of the disturbances (ταραχαί, *v.* 30) which cause some men to stray. Thus the vocabulary, imagery, and ideas of the sentence seem purposely drawn to recall earlier portions of the poem and to fit Diagoras favorably into its themes.[2] Not least among these themes have been the family and its continuity, of interest in *vv.* 71-76 and 17-24, and especially in the opening simile about the cup which symbolizes the perpetuation of the family.

In the concluding prayer, the hope for continued good fortune now assumes the form of a desire for the continuance of Diagoras' family:

Boeckh, Méautis (p. 411), Thummer, *Religiosität*, p. 76, Dissen *ad loc.*, and many others think that these and the following verses imply a precarious political position for the Eratidae and their subsequent downfall, but, in view of the formulaic and formalistic nature of the passage, such an interpretation seems not only unnecessary but even unwarranted, as it gratuitously charges the poet with obscure impertinence and, I should think, with bad taste.

[1] The syntax and exegesis of this sentence are much disputed. Depending upon the meaning attached to the obscure verb, scholars regard the φρένες as belonging to Diagoras or to his ancestors. Either interpretation, it seems to me, is equally tenuous in the Greek, and the difference does not affect the rather obvious essential meaning of the sentence.

[2] Lawall, pp. 42 f.; with *v.* 91 cf. *v.* 53 (p. 86, n. 5 *supra*).

92 μὴ κρύπτε κοινὸν
σπέρμ' ἀπὸ Καλλιάνακτος.

In the context of the elaborate floral imagery developed by the myths, the word which connotes familial lineage, σπέρμα, "seed," acquires the full force of its literal meaning, which would otherwise be unemphasized. Through the word Pindar attaches the imagery used in describing the growth of the island to the growth of Diagoras and his family.[1] And, in the terms of the imagery, the injunction, μὴ κρύπτε σπέρμα, does not mean merely, "Do not obscure their race," as it is commonly translated.[2] The Homeric *Hymn to Demeter* sheds some light upon Pindar's meaning. As Demeter sits pining for the departed Persephone, she causes a "bad year on earth."

306 οὐδέ τι γαῖα
σπέρμ' ἀνίει· κρύπτεν γὰρ ἐυστέφανος Δημήτηρ.

Later, Hermes reports to Hades that Demeter plans to destroy mankind (by famine), σπέρμ' ὑπὸ γῆς κρύπτουσα (353). These are the terms in which Pindar speaks. Of course the seed may be covered over to assure its germination, and thus the seed of the island/rose had been buried (κεκρύφθαι, *v.* 57) before it sprouted.[3] But seed kept buried—and Pindar's present imperative, μὴ κρύπτε, apparently has the full force of its progressive aspect—perishes. This is the perishing from which Zeus is asked to forbear, and in order to make his point and connect floral and familial growth unobtrusively, Pindar has

[1] Norwood (p. 144), searching for "slighter allusions" to the "rose language," hits upon σπέρμα φλογός (*v.* 48) but neglects the σπέρμα of the Eratidae. Lawall thinks both pertinent to the "idea of growth." I should expect that the σπέρμα φλογός has nothing to do with the birth of the 'rose' (cf. Py. 3, 36 f.). The σπέρμ' ἀπὸ Καλλιάνακτος, however, does make a pertinent contribution to the imagery of growth: so far as I can discover, Pindar was not interested in comparing the spreading of fire to the growth of plants; he was interested in comparing the growth of people and families to that of plants (page 96 *infra*). Lawall also notes "plant diction" in the opening simile (p. 40).

[2] Cf. the translations of Dornseiff, Puech, *et al.* The intention of Lattimore's interesting translation, "founder," is rather unclear. The common translation, "bury," is acceptable in the context (but see also Thummer, *Religiosität*, p. 76, n. 2). The progressive aspect of the imperative augments the notion of "keep covered" suggested by *LSJ* (*s.v.* κρύπτω *ad fin.*) as a distinction between κρύπτω, καλύπτω, and κεύθω. κοινόν here surely must refer to the seed common to the Eratidae (Seymour, Fraccaroli *ad loc.*) not, as the scholiast and the majority of commentators believe, to the fact that Diagoras is well known or that the public possesses him 'commonly.'

[3] Cf. Hesiod *Op.* 471.

drawn upon a variety of factors: namely, the epinician wish for the future, the ambiguity of the word σπέρμα, the tradition that Zeus extinguishes a race by burying them (as seen in the Five Generations of Men in Hesiod *Op.* 138), and the notion of destroying seed by keeping it buried (as in the *Hymn to Demeter*). By this connection of imagery Pindar makes clear his interest, in the myths and in the poem, not merely in floral growth but in the growth of life in the broad sense. The comparison between the growth of plants and the growth of men or families is popular with Pindar. Of several outstanding examples [1] the most concise is in *Isthmian* 4 where Pindar speaks of the past greatness of Melissos' family, then mentions its recent misfortune of losing many men in battle. He discusses next Melissos' Isthmian victory which restores the family to a position of prosperity, and then uses the following simile to describe those events:

18 νῦν δ' αὖ μετὰ χειμέριον ποικίλων μηνῶν ζόφον
χθὼν ὥτε φοινικέοισιν ἄνθησεν ῥόδοις
δαιμόνων βουλαῖς.

That sentence, in fact, contains a condensed version of the very cycle of growth depicted in the narrative of the myths in *Olympian* 7, even down to the details of the darkness caused by the clouds (ζόφον), the snow (χειμέριον), and the birth of the rose by the design of the gods. Thus, Pindar uses the word σπέρμα in reference to Diagoras' family because he frequently visualizes the growing process of life as one for both men and plants and, we may assume, for all of nature.

The next sentence corroborates the suggestion that Pindar has linked the man and the island/rose through imagery, for he now again capitalizes upon the literal meaning of a word to continue the figurative connection:

93 Ἐρατιδᾶν τοι σὺν χαρίτεσσιν ἔχει
θαλίας καὶ πόλις·

The word θαλίαι here obviously has its usual meaning "festivals," but the word, derived from θάλλω, literally denotes floral growth,

[1] Ne. 11, 37-42, Ne. 6, 8-11, Ne. 8, 40-42. Scholars frequently intimate that Diagoras' family has just passed through what could be termed a 'fallow period.' The third example above, although lying outside the comparison between floral and familial growth, shows how Pindar could visualize human greatness shooting up as a plant.

such as shoots and sprigs.[1] And the collocation of χάριτες and θαλίαι, perhaps again suggested by the name of the Grace, Thalia, indicates that the χάριτες Ἐρατιδᾶν are substantially the victory of Diagoras and the resulting, current song; for these were the subjects which first brought about the unusual phrase in *v.* 11, Χάρις ζωθάλμιος, the meaning of which has by now been elaborately clarified. We have seen the poetic sprouting of the island in the development of the myths which form one of the most admired geographical tributes in all of literature.[2] This famous tribute can be traced directly to the fact that an Eratidas, Diagoras, had won an occasion of χάρις. Pindar's statement of *vv.* 93 f. is, therefore, true as a description of our poem as well as a fact about the Eratidae, their city,[3] and the unity of nature. The flourishing of the city in the form of festivals and fame is inseparably bound to the flourishing of its men, and Diagoras has given Rhodes new growth.

Having affirmed the good fortune of Diagoras and of Rhodes, Pindar concludes with a gnome suggesting vicissitude:

94 ἐν δὲ μιᾷ μοίρᾳ χρόνου
ἄλλοτ' ἀλλοῖαι διαιθύσσοισιν αὖραι.

"In one apportionment of time there blows now one kind of wind, now another." The implications of the sentence have been much disputed, but some of the difficulties arise from misunderstandings about the phrase ἐν μιᾷ μοίρᾳ χρόνου. The Greek words cannot, especially in view of the ἄλλοτ' ἀλλοῖαι formula, mean "in a moment"

[1] Perhaps the use of the word was restricted in general to the meaning given in *LSJ s.v.* I, but the interchangeability of θαλία and θαλλία in mss. (*LSJ s.v.* θαλλία) simply proves what we would expect anyway, that the Greeks were not ignorant of the connection of θαλίαι to θάλλω, that while the word connoted 'festivities,' it still denoted 'flourishings,' as thus the Greeks viewed what we call 'festivity.' The significance of the image in Pindar's sentence could hardly be lost on an audience which knew Hesiod's τοῖσι τέθηλε πόλις, λαοὶ δ' ἀνθεῦσιν ἐν αὐτῇ (*Op.* 227, cf. Pindar, Ne. 10, 42).

[2] There is clear testimony of the high esteem, flourishing (to retain the image), that the island has enjoyed because of the popularity of the poem: Gorgon's frequently quoted statement (Drachmann I, 195) that the Rhodians later dedicated the poem, written in gold letters, to Athena in her temple at Lindos; statements such as Norwood's "Was ever island so marvellously praised, even when Shakespeare wrote ...." (p. 143); interpretations such as that of van Groningen (*Composition*, pp. 352-358); the general popularity of the Rhodian stories in modern Pindaric criticism, etc.

[3] Pindar (and apparently the Greeks in general, in this case) makes little or no distinction between the πόλις and the νᾶσος: see *v.* 34 (and note that Diagoras is Ῥόδιος not Ἰαλύσιος).

or "suddenly."[1] They must mean "in a single apportionment of time" (whether large or small). If the shifting winds are to any extent, as they surely must be, a metaphor for human vicissitude, the apportionment primarily concerned is a part or the whole of a human life, which, of course, was also designated as a μοῖρα.[2] By insisting that change will occur within any man's life, Pindar provides the formal reminder, traditional after mention of the signal good fortune of the victor or laudandus, that no man receives total and permanent bliss. The reminder is essentially foil designed to emphasize the current good fortune, and sometimes, as here, it is used as a fitting, if somewhat solemn, ending to an ode.[3]

The ending of *Olympian* 7, however, has appeared to many critics not merely solemn but downright ominous and morbid. I need not examine here the misguided theories that Pindar hints at specific, subsequent, political misfortunes,[4] but the ideas of Finley and of Lawall deserve some scrutiny. Perhaps partly because they fail to recognize the formal function of the wind imagery, Finley and Lawall find the last sentence disturbing. Finley even says that the poem "hardly escapes a wearisome awareness of mere process, and the winds at the end blow chillingly out of an indefinite future" and elsewhere maintains that "the theme of the poem is precisely this lack of assurance in the world."[5] Lawall, however, sees the concluding imagery in the context of the whole and, quite properly, I think, in view of the crucial nature of weather-imagery elsewhere in the poem, connects the winds with the natural imagery of the

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[1] Although many, perhaps the majority, of the commentators take it to mean that: Méautis, p. 411, Fraccaroli, p. 263, Wilamowitz, *Pindaros*, p. 365, and many others. They usually give the emphasis thus to the suddenness of the mutability of human fortune rather than to the diversity that is to be found in human life.

[2] Despite Fennell's remark *ad loc.* that the phrase does not have that meaning here. Of course its meaning is not restricted to that, but it must contain that meaning in order to perform its formal function. For χρόνου cf. Bowra, *Pindar*, p. 251, n. 1.

[3] See Farnell *ad loc.*, Wilamowitz, p. 365; cf. Welcker (page 69, note 1 *supra*), 387, Perrotta, *Pindaro*, *ad loc.*; for the prayer, in general, as the ending of an ode see Bundy II, 77. For the general topic of the "reminder" and its special significance in encomia and *consolationes* see Chap. II, p. 53 *supra* with notes 1 f. thereto.

[4] See pp. 80 and 94 *supra*. Most of these notions, resulting from ignorance of the genre, attribute not only a lack of tact to our poet but also an incredible oracular power.

[5] Finley, pp. 73 and 70. To judge from the myths, one might well maintain that the poem, while excluding foreknowledge, insists on assurance.

myths: "It is the winds which control the skies and bring now clouds and storms, now sunlight and brightness."[1] But Lawall regards the imagery of the shifting clouds as quite "ominous," a complementary contrast to that of the rose, and something of a check upon an optimistic viewpoint of life suggested by the movement of the three myths and their climax in the birth of the rose. Yet to see the winds as only ominous and as the result of Pindar's pessimistic side is to misread much of the poem. The winds do indeed "bring now clouds and storms," but we have already observed, in the poem, some of these clouds. They brought rain. Without rain, nothing grows.[2] The shifting winds are necessary, too; that is nature's way. Thus not only does the final image of the winds modify the previous imagery but also the previous imagery renders the vicissitude image actually less pessimistic than its formal function indicates. In this poem, obviously, shifting winds need not be a bad omen; they can, and do, bring good as well as bad. It is impossible to discover what is best, now and in the end, to happen to a man.[3]

As they emerge under analysis, the "dark shadows" which scholars have seen cast over the poem do not make it a dismal poem at all. The shadows cast by the clouds are preliminary to some fortunate and important events, just as the dark rain-clouds may give the earth a gloomy aspect, yet they bring the vital rains which enable plants such as roses to come to life and grow. This paradox of success and prosperity (the usual connotation of floral growth-imagery) emerging from apparent adversity (the usual connotation of storm-imagery) accounts for Pindar's statements about man's inability to assign an ultimate value to events.[4] Yet his denial of human prescience is designed primarily as a means not to disparage man, but to magnify nature. We may not find its manifestations wholly predictable, but the divine system has its own set of checks and balances and of especial interest in this poem—compensations.

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[1] Lawall, p. 44.

[2] For the importance of rain in Greek literature see Méautis, pp. 111 f. (where he cites Ar. *Nubes* 1117 ff.).

[3] Gildersleeve emphasizes both the favorable and the unfavorable changes in the winds (p. 184); cf. Fennell, p. 73.

[4] Imagery of floral growth and imagery of clouds and storms make up a surprising percentage of the synonyms for "prosperity" and "adversity" respectively; for the same in English see *Roget's Thesaurus s.vv.* 'Prosperity' and 'Adversity.'

All sunshine and ease is not nature's formula for a thriving rose—nor a thriving man. And what Finley terms a "wearisome awareness of mere process" is perhaps closer to a fascinating conception of life itself, for the process is its very growth.[1] The peculiar form of the myths, which has seemed so baffling to critics, becomes immediately intelligible in the terms of a divinely executed process, one and the same for all life, human as well as floral, of growing and prospering. The events of the myths reflect the process; the imagery of nature describes it.

Pindar does not blatantly state that Diagoras is merely an example of the mysteries of nature,[2] for he is drawing similarities, not equations. But he does place Diagoras and his family squarely within the system of nature. The development and growth of the island parallels the thriving of its inhabitants. That Diagoras had experienced misfortune, in the terms of the imagery, that he had undergone a storm, is probably certain enough. No one, so far as Pindar and other Greeks are concerned, has escaped that general rule. For that very reason, I doubt that any specific event in Diagoras' past (or future) suggested the element of misfortune which recurs in the myths.[3] Yet even if there was such an occasion, Pindar has rendered its details totally irrelevant by avoiding mention of it and by granting it, in the poem, only a general importance in so far as it reflects a general rule of prosperity preceded by adversity. Yet the epinician is an occasional poem, and the occasion of the boxing match, I have suggested above, provides an adequate parallel, for Diagoras, to the rain-storms in the imagery and to Tlepolemos' plight, and the parallelism is strengthened by the similarities of *vv.* 16 and 77.

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[1] Rivier, who has treated only the aspect of the regress of time in the three myths, is nevertheless moved to write concerning our poem:

> [Les images de la VIIe Olympique] nous découvrent dans le temps en allé le principe d'une jeunesse point fugace; et, du même élan communiqué à notre conscience, nous font toucher, comme un secret d'éternité celé au coeur de nos vies éphémères, un peu de la substance de ce que nous sommes (p. 80).

[2] I have in mind the simple relationship, something like that of microcosm to macrocosm, presented in, e.g., Aeschylus frag. 44 (Mette 125) where the impregnation of the female by the male sperm is presented as the same as the original ἱερὸς γάμος, the impregnation of Earth by Sky's rain. The resulting human child parallels the resulting floral growth.

[3] Pindar is not loath to give specific information about misfortune in the victor's life or family, if the details are required to make his point (Ol. 12, 17 f.; Is. 4, 16 ff., etc.; cf. even Ne. 11, 22 f.).

Moreover, just as Pindar seldom describes details of the contest itself, his emphasis is not on the stormy, painful part of Diagoras' life. The epinician concentrates upon other portions of the process of growth; the epinician concerns θαλίαι. The admiration, festivities, and honor resulting from the victory (closely associated with χάριτες) are essentially like blossoms or shoots in Diagoras' life and that of his city (cf. *vv.* 93 f.). And obviously foremost among these invigorating factors is the epinician song itself.

The importance of the song accounts for Pindar's close connection with Χάρις ζωθάλμιος (*v.* 11) and for her appearance in conjunction with the musical instruments. Χάρις ζωθάλμιος is present with that glorious moment when a man's life blossoms out into great prosperity.[1] The epinician is the formal presentation and, therefore, consummation of such an event. Moreover, by perpetuating these moments of favor (χάρις) the poet himself becomes ζωθάλμιος in that through him the thriving of Diagoras and the Eratidae finds expression, becomes immortalized, and is repeatedly re-created. Only in such terms can the implications of the opening simile be fully realized. Further, as Plato later discussed in such detail, in Greek thought people and their lives may be perpetuated several ways.[2] Common enough is the quickening and perpetuation of a thriving family in the new generations, and that life is symbolized by the cup of wine in the first part of the simile. Poets, Plato notes, produce offspring and life of another sort. Pindar's νέκταρ (a life-renewing substance), his poetry, gives continued life and growth to Diagoras and his family. Yet the poet also, like the father in the simile, lives on in his "children" (ἔκγονα, as Plato calls the poems). Through a variety, then, of expressions and ideas associated with the natural increase of living things, Pindar indicates a variety of complex relationships between such things as his own function as poet, Diagoras' glorious victory, his family, his city, its history, and prosperity itself.

Yet the unity of the poem derives from factors much more complicated than Pindar's interest in the unity of life and in the phenomena of growth and regeneration. Of the various factors which contribute

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[1] ζωθάλμιος probably bears some relationship to the formula ζῇ καὶ θάλλει (Euripides *I.A.* 1225, frag. 898, 13, Sophocles *Tr.* 234 f.; cf. *El.* 951 f., etc.), in which the latter element designates prosperity added to mere physical life (see Sophocles *Ph.* 418 ff.—'not only live but also prosper greatly').

[2] *Smp.* 207-209e. See p. 74, n. 1 and p. 63, n. 2 *supra*.

to the unity of the ode, some are especially noteworthy. As the description of the growing process of the island/rose develops in the narration of the myths, there occurs a reverse chronological sequence in Rhodian history: the story of Tlepolemos takes us far back into the past, the story of the sacrifice at Athena's birth takes us back even farther, the story of the allotment of lands returns us almost to the beginning of Zeus's rule. This reverse chronological sequence or regress in time has long been observed by scholars, but an outstanding description of its development and possible effect upon the audience has been given by Rivier, whose account should be consulted for full understanding of the aesthetical potential of the regress in time.[1]

However, a consideration of the regress in time is informative for the general subject of unity. Unity is exclusively attributable to no single symbol, idea, or series or events. Several unifying factors are used and developed concurrently in the same verses. Thus the regress in historical time (the colonization, the birth of Athena, the emergence of the island) accompanies the imagery which represents the development of the island as a plant (precipitation, union with sun, sprouting of rose/Rhodes). Therefore, although the showers of golden "snow" and "rain" fall upon an island which has been, historically, above the sea for some time, they contribute to a progressive sequence of imagery which leads to the very rising of the island/rose from below the surface. Conversely, when the Heliadae perform a sacrifice on Rhodes, the island off the coast of Asia, Rhodes the 'rose' has not yet appeared in the imagery concerned with weather and the phenomena of growth. Although commentators are wont to attribute Pindar's anomalies, real or imagined, to his supposed irrationality,[2] these particular incongruities surely result from quite clear thinking about two different modes of sequential unity in the myths, one of imagery, another of

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[1] Rivier, pp. 77-80. Rivier describes this section well, and he tries, not without some success, to describe and recreate its effect upon Pindar's audience.

[2] Farnell: "Pindar in his pleasant wayward fashion reverses the time-order of the events in his mythic world, and thus avoids the stiffness of chronological consecutiveness" (I, 38). Fernandez Llorenz, in explaining Croiset's *idée lyrique* says, "no como las ideas de un razonamiento" (p. 366) then repeats that phrase (p. 368, attributing it there to Girard's *Études sur la poésie grecque*, which has not been available to me) as specially applicable to Ol. 7.

historical chronology. The two sequences operate independently of each other, but the unity of the poem profits from both.[1]

A symmetrical organization also tends to unify the poem. The center of the ode contains the myth, roughly a triad long, about the Heliadae's sacrifice to the new goddess. Before and after that myth are the stories of Tlepolemos and of the apportionment of Rhodes to Helios, respectively, each encompassing approximately a triad. Both of these myths refer to the obtaining of the island as especial land. The first myth records the first Greek possession of the island; the last records the origin of the divine possession of it. Before and after the narrative of the myths are programmatic sections concerned with Diagoras, his family, and his athletic accomplishments. The recording of the Olympian and Pythian victories (*vv.* 15 ff.) is complemented by the victory catalogue, and mention of the "Olympionician" song in the last antistrophe of the poem balances, to some extent, Pindar's discussion of his song in the first antistrophe. The similarity between the beginning of the ode and the end is not pointed, but these sections do have, perhaps coincidentally, important common elements such as the interest in family glory and continuity.[2]

The most obvious element of the symmetry is the recurrent name, Tlepolemos, which appears when one triad has been completed and again when one triad of the poem remains (*vv.* 20 and 77). The recurrence of the name here has been shown to mark the presence of the structural and stylistic phenomenon, *Ringkomposition.*[3] *Ring-*

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[1] "Linear unity" (Bundy) and the search for the "*Gedankengang*" (Dornseiff, Schmidt, and others) are patently unable to cope with such concurrent developments.

[2] See also Mezger, p. 445. Lawall, p. 42, notes that Pindar asks that Zeus give (δίδοι) χάρις in the final section, possibly another link to the proem, but probably not so pertinent as other repetitions of vocabulary in the programmatic section (such as those of θαλ- and χάρις forms, etc.).

[3] Illig, pp. 58-59. Cf. Finley, p. 71, and Fehr, pp. 131 f. It should also be noted that the term *Ringkomposition* is sometimes used to describe a structure which might properly be termed 'chiastic,' *e.g.*, by Schadewaldt, p. 308, note 1. Untersteiner (*Formazione*, p. 66) also uses the term ("composizione ad anello") for chiasmus, but he seems to realize that a more precise term is needed. Illig (pp. 61 f.) notes the difference and speaks of 'concentric' *Ringkomposition.*

Pindar modifies considerably the direct technique of epic *Ringkomposition* (e.g., in Ol. 1, the idea which opens the mythical section [*v.* 23] is repeated without substantial change [*v.* 93], but it is applied to a different person) so that the occurrences in Pindar are somewhat removed from the precise examples which Van Otterlo chooses for illustration (pp. 3 ff.). However, it

komposition usually includes a regress in time. Having made a statement, the poet decides to give his audience some background material and, therefore, traces a sequence of events in reverse chronological order.[1] When he has elaborated the background sufficiently, he returns to his original topic by its restatement. In *Olympian* 7, however, the regression into the past, the stories of the sacrifice and of the allotment, can hardly be regarded as the natural consequence of mention of Tlepolemos. Although Tlepolemos' story is resolved after the third myth, the logical relationship between the first and second myths is slight; between the second and the third, it is virtually absent.[2] Yet despite the absence of logically interdependent events, the myths bear considerable relevance to one another in respect to imagery and theme. The inclusion of the myths within the ring and their presentation in the traditional manner and sequence of *Ringkomposition* accent their affinity in theme and image; a lack of structural cohesion might obscure the development of the rose-allegory or even make it impossible. Thus the *Ringkomposition* with its temporal regression, like the general symmetry of the ode, helps to unify the poem by providing a formal integrity which clarifies and enhances other unifying relationships.

The general triptych structure does not vitiate the unity of the poem. In addition to the common points already mentioned, there are other important connections between the central, mythical section and the programmatic portions which precede and follow it. These connections arise both formally and thematically from Pindar's presentation of Diagoras' relationship to Tlepolemos. The first occurrence of Tlepolemos' name, the beginning of the ring, depends upon national and familial ties between him and Diagoras; Pindar has made careful preparation for introducing Tlepolemos' story by praising Diagoras' family and their Argive ancestry in the preceding programmatic section. Thus while the material within the ring is extensive and, from a strictly programmatic viewpoint, extended,

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seems that in Ol. 7 we have approximately what he describes as the "rekapitulierend-anaphorische Verbindung." συμφορᾶς is partly recapitulatory, Τλαπολέμῳ is anaphoric, and λύτρον provides the new information. In Ol. 7 the 'ring' is also "einrahmend" since it contains the narrative of the myths.

[1] For Pindar see Fehr, p. 159, Illig, pp. 56 ff.

[2] Finley, p. 71, seems to regard the regress as logical, but it seems to me loosely logical at best; it is, however, cunningly contrived. In Sandys' introductory note, which briefly lists the mythical events in progressive chronological order, they appear amazingly unrelated.

it is not formally irrelevant. Similarly, in making transition from the ring, Pindar subtly utilizes the dedication to Tlepolemos of the Rhodian games, in which Diagoras has been successful, to fuse the mythical portion to the return to the program. The end of the Tlepolemos story becomes, in fact, with a mere relative pronoun (*v.* 80), the first entry in the long catalogue of victories. And again the relationship is no mere rhetorical device, for Diagoras and Tlepolemos, both of whom are associated with the games and receive their awards and glories from them, have their parallelism in the poem.

The 'unity' of the ode, then, depends on many contributing factors, some easy to discern and to describe, others more difficult; but if the term merely implies that the poem makes sense as a whole, *Olympian* 7 meets its test. It is a poem concerned with nature and its unity, a thriving island, and a flourishing inhabitant of it, the proof of whose flourishing is contained in his Olympic victory, and in the fact that Pindar wrote this poem for him.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION

In the preceding pages three of Pindar's odes have been surveyed by a close examination of their texts; each poem proves to be a unified, meaningful work of literary art. This result questions the validity of the critical methods used by many influential scholars, who have found the Pindaric ode, as literature, incoherent, unimportant, or both. Equally apparent, however, is the woeful inadequacy of another common critical method, which seeks to grasp the meaning and art of the ode in some monotone, such as a homogeneous and all-embracing thought, symbol, or latent topical reference. The complex nature of Pindar's poetry and of our possession of it, so many centuries later, demands a complex kind of criticism; we may not safely abandon or emphasize to the detriment of others any of the various concerns of past and present scholars, such as textual criticism, the study of the poet's imagery, or of his thoughts about what is important in life.

However, the reconstruction of the private and historical circumstances of each ode, the division of criticism usually assigned precedence over all others, appears to be overvalued. The above studies fail to confirm the assumption that Pindar often makes irrelevant personal and topical allusions, or that many passages, unintelligible in their poetic contexts, are explicable only in a private, vanished world of ephemeral personalities and events.[1] Surely the events in the lives of Pindar and of his acquaintances influenced what he wrote; Hieron's ill health is as crucial to *Pythian* 3 as the victories are to the other two poems. Yet in the poems studied here, private situations and events, with the obvious, important exception of those somehow relevant to the encomiastic poem, have apparently been stripped of their private reference, presented as exoteric generalities, and subordinated to the literary aims of the poem. It

[1] See pp. 14 f., 18 f., 47 ff., 80, 100 (with notes). Similarly, the usual assertions that Pindar makes pointed but irrelevant changes, out of personal bias, in traditional stories repeatedly proved unsound: pp. 36-39 (with notes) p. 40, n. 1, p. 78, n. 2, p. 86, n. 2. For a general state.ment on this problem see p. 25, note 1.

would indeed be of great interest to discover the historical and private circumstances of each poem. But the evidence suggests that, for comprehension of the poems, such information is seldom necessary as a critical tool, usually impossible and probably superfluous as a critical goal.

Yet if a study of these three poems tends to depreciate the theory that the understanding of Pindar's poems lies in recognition of obscure private and political facts,[1] it tends to confirm Bundy's already cogent arguments that without an understanding of relevant traditional themes and conventional rhetoric, the critic may greatly misunderstand the poem. Obviously, we must learn the language: But, because of our cultural distance from fifth century Greece, we must also become literate in it. I think it obvious that no poet, despite attempts, works wholly outside of a tradition; all classical poets work consciously within one, and Greek poets, it seems, actively strove to make tradition the immediately obvious principle of whatever they should say, thus effecting, I have suggested, great economy of expression.[2] Pindar, as Bundy has already shown, gives extraordinary heed to traditional and conventional themes, and their influence appears throughout his work. Yet to determine the importance of tradition and convention in Pindar does not, in itself, provide an adequate understanding of his poems; it merely places the critical study of his poetry on a much wider and sounder foundation than it has had in the past.

Nor should a recognition of the extent of tradition in Pindar conjure up a vision of a poet ticking off one conventional theme after another with great ease but slight profundity or originality;

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[1] On the contrary, it becomes apparent that most of the received information, whether well-founded or not, about the life of Pindar (and the same is true for most ancient authors) depends directly upon the interpretation of specific passages in his work, not upon external information available to ancient scholars but lost for us: see p. 48 with notes 1 ff., Fraenkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie*², p. 485, n. 2, and note the manner of the *Vita Ambrosiana* (Drachmann I, 1 ff.) and of Oxyrh. Pap. 2438.

[2] Pp. 23 f.; cf. Fraenkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie*², p. 487. The reliance upon palpable tradition is, of course, constant throughout ancient literature, from the Homeric formulae, through the repeatedly recurring traditional myths of tragedy, the traditional themes and translated phraseology of Horace, even to the prose satires of Lucian, who, despite his temporal and geographical provenience, seems to know only one way of speaking about the world, namely, in the terms and *topoi* traditional to Greek literature, replete with Olympian gods and Homeric quotations.

on the contrary, it produces concrete evidence that Pindar was exceptionally original. When we pass beyond the point of establishing the conventionality of a passage to inquire into why Pindar should use such a tradition or convention and what he does with it, his genius and his poetic meaning begin to emerge. In *Pythian* 11 he augments the conventional *topos* praising the simple, undistinguished life to allow the distinguishing conventional praise of athletic victory, and these are united against and with a background composed of the horrendous mythical tradition of the infamous house of Agamemnon.[1] The result is perfect, and it seems highly unlikely that any poet before or after Pindar ever did the same thing with the same three traditional materials.

Similarly, in *Pythian* 3 a number of tangible traditional and conventional elements coalesce into one, among them a host of encomiastic conventions,[2] the poetic *topoi* of the near and the far,[3] of the 'pessimistic' *consolatio*,[4] and of the immortalizing power of poetry,[5] and even such a subject as the traditional founding of medicine which, except for the originality with which Pindar combines all the other items, would be regarded as rather remote from them. He gives the traditional story of Coronis a novel element in order to amplify and clarify his use of the theme of the near and the far,[6] while he omits the story of the raven, which could contribute nothing relevant to his aims.[7] The poem I think unique—and did the *consolatio* ever consort with such company and success? [8] In *Olympian* 7 conventional epinician themes, such as those of recompense for victory[9] and of prayer for continued fortune,[10] find original application through an unprecedented allegory. The allegory uses an expansion of a mythical tradition, the shower of wealth on Rhodes,[11] combined with a phonetic ambiguity which no doubt was

[1] Pp. 19-22.
[2] P. 50.
[3] P. 49, n. 1, Appendix I.
[4] P. 24, n. 1, pp. 50 ff.
[5] Pp. 61 ff.
[6] Pp. 35 f.
[7] Pp. 73 f.
[8] I am not implying that Pindar's use of the *consolatio* is superior to its occurrence in the *Iliad*, which, in my opinion, is incomparable; yet both poems use the *consolatio* in their own separate contexts within their own dissimilar scopes with equal success.
[9] Pp. 76 f.
[10] P. 93 with notes.
[11] Pp. 83 f.

recognized both before and after the poem, but probably never so cannily exploited.[1] Pindar's originality is even demonstrated in his use of minute conventional devices.[2]

It seems evident, therefore, that Pindar subordinates the bases of his poetry, tradition and convention, to his own original poetic aims, techniques, and creations. The peculiar nature of the original poetic development within each poem determines how much of its meaning depends upon the traditions and conventions which it contains. In *Pythian* 11, the traditional *topos* and themes related to it bear a major burden in expressing the general poetic meaning; *Pythian* 3 also depends, to a considerable extent, upon the audience's familiarity with the conventions of which Pindar avails himself, but whereas the mere recognition of the conventional in *Pythian* 11 renders much of the poem lucid, it provides little more than a start for the comprehension of *Pythian* 3. In the case of *Olympian* 7, which in form, aim, and frequency of epinician motifs is clearly the most conventional of the three poems,[3] a prior knowledge of the conventional motifs is scarcely needed to understand the poem.

To observe the varied degree and manner with which Pindar makes tradition and convention serve his poetic imagination is crucial, for there, in the study of things resulting from Pindar's own poetic imagination, Pindaric criticism seems to find a wealth of instructive material and thus its own proper place. If the above chapters suggest any special critical method—it could hardly be termed a theory—it is simply that any adequate understanding of the meaning of a Pindaric poem must result from careful and unprejudiced consideration of Pindar's words in the order and context in which he wrote them.[4] That much ought to go without saying,[5] and beyond that all special theories of Pindaric composition, whether they emphasize structure, imagery, thought, or anything else, become pertinent or impertinent, depending upon the nature of the particular poetic developments of the ode in question. Pindar,

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[1] P. 76, n. 3.

[2] P. 76, n. 4.

[3] Pp. 75-78, 91-98.

[4] Of the passages examined above, Py. 3, 77 f. (pp. 48 f.) probably offers the clearest illustration of this point.

[5] But, of course, it must be said; see "Pindaric Criticism," notes 103 f., 160. So also van Groningen studies the portions of Ol. 7 in the order middle, end, beginning, and those of Py. 11, middle, beginning, end (*Composition*, pp. 352-362); cf. Wilamowitz, *Pindaros*, *passim*.

as might be expected, seems to possess more variety than his critics, and he expresses his poetic ideas through a variety of means, most of which, at one time or another, have been singled out as the dominating element of his poetry.

The significance of recurrent imagery, like that of tradition, varies greatly from ode to ode. In *Olympian* 7 imagery drawn from natural growth and weather provides an important allegorical description, which embraces the three myths, of the growth of a plant;[1] similar imagery is used elsewhere to show the relationships between the mythical portion and the remainder of the poem.[2] In *Pythian* 3 the imagery of fire appears several times in connection with death,[3] but it apparently bears, for the meaning of the poem, no rôle at all comparable to that of the crucial natural imagery of *Olympian* 7. In many other odes the importance of recurring images would fall between these two situations. For example, the unmistakably recurrent imagery of eating in *Olympian* 1 is of considerable moment to the poem,[4] but it forms no allegory and is more ancillary to other features than is the imagery of *Olympian* 7. In *Pythian* 11 there seems to be no use of imagery comparable to any of these.[5]

In the matter of recurrent statements or a single, homogeneous theme, the poems again provide considerable variety. In *Pythian* 3 a single idea, founded upon the traditional *topos* of the near and the far but not dependent upon knowledge of it, occurs with amazing frequency and numerous variations as the poem unfolds, so that a failure to follow the development of this idea would result in ignorance of the poem's import and even of the relationship between its first and second structural parts.[6] Thus the poem, which by its complexity opposes the very nature of the *Grundgedanke*-theory, reveals rather palpably that consistent thought and thematic exposition can be paramount to the meaning of an ode. In explicit expression, however, nothing really comparable occurs in *Olympian* 7, and the recurrent fact of success following adversity, which has

[1] Pp. 88 f.

[2] Pp. 75, 95-100.

[3] P. 55.

[4] See p. 112, n. 1 *infra.*

[5] I.e., although Norwood seems to have observed (partially and imperfectly) a portion of a real sequence of imagery (which had long been recognized) of Ol. 7, his "Bee-symbol" (pp. 124 f.) for Py. 11 seems pure fancy, and hardly worthy of even the reluctant approval accorded it by van Groningen (*Composition*, p. 363).

[6] Pp. 65 ff.

been thought comparable, becomes, in the totality of the poem, a minor factor totally misleading if isolated from its context or paraphrased.[1] *Pythian* 11, I suppose, because its major themes are largely directed at a traditional *topos* which finds frequent expression elsewhere but explicit treatment in *Pythian* 11 only at a few points, lies somewhere between the other two. Recurrences of words and phrases, like those of statements and images, also vary in importance. For example, the recurrent collocation of ἐλπίς and πρόσω in *Pythian* 3 makes a decisive point; [2] some recurrences in *Olympian* 7 are probably similar in nature but not equal in force.[3] I see nothing comparable in *Pythian* 11, but in *Olympian* 2 recurrent phrases and even single words are probably of greater significance than in any of the poems studied above.[4]

Structurally, all three poems exhibit dependence upon a characteristic symmetrical ring-form; in *Pythian* 3, the symmetry is confined to the myths,[5] but in *Olympian* 7 and *Pythian* 11 a general symmetry, which is perhaps stronger in the former, embraces the whole poem.[6] Yet none of these compares with the structural symmetry of *Olympian* 1, a truly remarkable phenomenon. Its rigidity is probably unmatched in ancient literature, and perhaps more conspicuously constructed with design than the allegorical growth of the roseplant in *Olympian* 7 or the detailed thematic development of *Pythian* 3.[7]

Because of the various and interrelated rôles played by these means of poetic expression within each ode, imagery, structure, thought, and tradition ought not to be regarded as separable elements of Pindaric composition; the unity of a poem does not result from these factors themselves but from their interaction. Sometimes what is expressed at one point by an encomiastic convention is developed

[1] Pp. 78 ff., 99 f.

[2] Pp. 61 f.

[3] Pp. 90, 94, 97.

[4] The recurrences of words and phraseology in Ol. 2 are too numerous and complex to be described fully here (cf. van Leeuwen, p. 290); I merely list a few significant examples: *vv.* 21-24 and 39-41, 17-19 and 106-108, καμόντες οἱ πολλά (*v.* 9) and ἔπαθον αἱ μεγάλα (*v.* 25), χάρματα in *vv.* 21 and 109, πλοῦτος, χάρις, and ἀρεταί in *vv.* 11 f. and 55-58/9, τις ... φράσαις (*vv.* 65 f.) and τίς ἂν φράσαι (*v.* 110). When these and other recurring ideas are viewed in the context of the thematic development of the poem, their kinships become of great importance.

[5] Pp. 64 f.

[6] Pp. 3-6, 103.

[7] See Appendix II.

later by a mythical event, and still later in the same poem by a metaphor.[1] Consequently, the critic must usually observe a unique poetic process whereby the first words of an ode lead to those at the end and thus cause a perfected, coherent poetic statement. One must consider how theme may relate to structure, how image may modify tradition, how a phrase near the end of a poem, perhaps in an epinician motif, may recall and clarify an earlier image or phrase; or whether the myth provides a particular theme with a positive paradigm, foil, a combination of both, or neither.[2] In other words, the whole poem must be read with a view toward its organic development. Pindar's ability to make that development lucid, even in the most complicated poems, can hardly be regarded as slight, and depends, in the main, upon cross-references from one part of the poem to another sometimes so numerous and complex that almost every sentence seems to have an observable, even if indirect and difficult to describe, relationship to every other sentence.[3]

Thus the poet traditionally charged more than any other classical author with incoherence and poverty of thought proves capable of being one of the most coherent and, I think, penetrating. His subject, human accomplishment, is catholic and momentous; and his

[1] E.g., the subject of dining is introduced in Ol. 1 by an encomiastic reference to Hieron's liberal *xenia* and patronage of the arts (*v.* 17). In the myth of the banquet on Mt. Sipylus the poet refuses to charge the gods with improper eating (γαστρίμαργος, *v.* 52, means, of course, "glutton," not "cannibal," as it is usually translated and interpreted); Tantalus' sin is presented first by an image of gluttony (καταπέψαι, κόρῳ, *vv.* 55 f.) and then described as the stealing of the gods' food for giving to his own dinner companions (*vv.* 60-63). In the myth of Pelops' heroism the antithesis of the heroic act (Burton, p. 163) is illustrated by another image related to eating (that of cooking or digesting old age: *v.* 83; see Dissen, Fennell *ad loc.*, and cf. the interest in eating in T 155 f. *et passim*). The imagery of the lyre in Py. 1 probably may be regarded as having a similar important but dependent function.

[2] In Py. 11 the myth provides foil, in Py. 6, a positive paradigm. In Ol. 1 the portion dealing with Tantalus gives contrast, the second myth of Pelops, a positive paradigm. The myths of Py. 3 approach foil; those of Ol. 7 approach a positive paradigm, but to regard them as such would be misleading.

[3] P. 66. I know of only one classical poem which coheres more intensely and more elaborately than Py. 3 (although Ol. 1 and Ol. 2 are at least comparable); Aeschylus' *Oresteia*, with its complex interweaving of image-patterns (Furies, trampling, nets, lions, lights, etc.), themes, and events, must be one of the most compact, intensely and lucidly interconnected works ever written. It is, therefore, all the more remarkable for its bulk, and its complex but lucid nature probably accounts both for the facility with which it is rather unanimously understood by a variety of readers and for the exceptional esteem in which it is held.

ideas are compellingly presented. His evidence is concrete, his expression, concise; his technique, by any ordinary standard, can be faultless, and these three poems, at least, are well-wrought literary units. Pindar's importance, to judge from the evidence, lies first and foremost in the exceptionally high quality of his poetry. It does not lie in his value as a historical source for the admittedly eventful times and people that he knew. The important facts known about the Aleuadae come from Herodotus and later authors and scholiasts, not from *Pythian* 10. There may be some important, unique historical information in the Sicilian and Cyrenean poems, but even in those odes the infrequent historical references primarily serve to confirm information preserved in fuller and more detailed accounts elsewhere. And these references pale in importance beside the literary merits of these same poems. From most of Pindar's poems, written for men who were not of extreme national political note, we learn little that has historical importance; on the few occasions in which there is mention of a historical event, we often cannot agree on its identification, to say nothing of its significance.[1] In fact, we usually search history to explain Pindar, not vice versa.

Nor does Pindar's major significance lie in his Dorian-aristocratic background nor in his much discussed rôle as spokesman for an old, dying, Dorian, settled way of life against the ascendancy of a brash, speculative, Attic-Ionian way of life. He probably did prefer the Dorian constitution to Athenian democracy,[2] but, for that matter, so did a large portion of educated Athenians. The infrequent attempts to adduce proof of the frequent assertion that the poetry and thought of the Dorian Pindar differs significantly, in national characteristics, from those of Athenians and Ionians are usually flimsy and often patently and inexcusably contrary to the evidence.[3] The significant differences between Pindar and Bacchylides are poetical, not sociological,[4] and there is nothing in the remnant of

[1] See, e.g., Farnell II, 371.

[2] I.e., Py. 1, 61-65, e.g., is perhaps not a mere detached encomiastic statement.

[3] See, e.g., "Pindaric Criticism," note 107; also p. 114, n. 2 *infra*.

[4] E.g., p. 76, n. 4. See in general Gildersleeve, *AJP* 18 [1897], 492 f. (= *Brief Mention*, p. 46). One might argue, with some credibility, that Pindar, apparently belonging to an aristocracy, believes more in the concept of "blood" (Gildersleeve, p. 349 *et passim*) than does Bacchylides (in the comparative paucity of Bacchylides' work, Bacch. 1, 140-151 might suffice to show the difference not overwhelming). Yet the question here is not so much a Pindaric belief in blood (a modern term and even concept) as a

the epinician written by that reputed model of Attic-Ionian theological iconoclasm, Euripides, for that most famous of individualistic Athenians, Alcibiades, to suggest a contrast with what we find in Pindar.[1] The Theban poet may have been familiar with certain pre-Socratic philosophies or "exotic religions" before anyone in Athens.[2]

And as scholars have exaggerated, far beyond the evidence, Pindar's Dorian provincialism,[3] they have somewhat misconstrued his place in Greek literature. He is, after all, the major bridge, for us at least, between the archaic epic, iambic, and elegiac traditions and Attic tragedy. He, along with Bacchylides, must bear the burden of representing for us that long and important age of Greek lyric poetry. It is, therefore, of Hellenic and general significance that Pindar uses Homeric formulae,[4] founds his myths on Homer or Hesiod,[5] uses ethical *topoi* found in Archilochus and Theognis, but also in Sophocles and Euripides,[6] and that often the best parallels for Pindaric idiom are to be found in the Attic tragedians.[7]

We are, I think, rather fortunate that the man who has been selected to represent for us such a transition seems to have been well-read, a careful, master craftsman, and possessed of poetic genius. And to enter occasionally the workings of such a mind from

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Greek belief in something like genes (τὸ συγγενές), which is not at all confined to Dorian aristocrats. Homer *(passim)* and Sophocles (e.g., *Ph.* 874 f., 902-905, cf. 88 f., 558, etc.) contain frequent statements of the same belief.

[1] Euripides fr. 3 (*PMG* 755); see p. 52, n. 2.

[2] Because of the strange and factually erroneous pronouncements commonly made about Pindar and about the problem of the relationship of *Olympian* 2 and the pertinent fragments to the mystery religions (see "Pindaric Criticism," notes 111, 137 [where for "Ol. 2, 79 ff." read "Ol. 2, 69 ff."], 173), it is not a pseudo-problem (van Leeuwen, p. 292). When all the denying is done, the clear fact remains that Pindar is our first expository source for reincarnation (which, after all, is a more accurate term than metempsychosis) and related matters, that Empedocles is next, and that their ideas are sufficiently similar to one another to have come from a common body of source material.

[3] See "Pindaric Criticism," p. 614.

[4] A small list is given by Bowra (pp. 215 ff.) whose source (H. Schultz, *De elocutionis Pindaricae colore epico*) I have not seen.

[5] Bowra's observation (pp. 283 f.) about Pindar's rather surprisingly limited use of Homer as a source for myth is sound but unnecessarily overstated (see pp. 82 f. [with notes], 90, 50 f. [with notes], 55, n. 3); for Hesiod, see p. 34. The myth of Py. 11 may well come mostly from Stesichorus (p. 2, n. 3), but we cannot be certain.

[6] Chap. I, *passim*; cf. Appendix I.

[7] See, e.g., p. 72.

such an important literary period brings us far closer to some relevant knowledge of that much sought object, Pindar's personality, than do claims made without or against substantial proof that he had not the time to write *Olympian* 10 before sailing for Syracuse in a certain period of a certain year, that he detested the Attic-Ionian way of life, that he did not believe in the immortality of the soul, that he was uninterested in the search for daily bread, or that he detested Xenophon of Corinth. Closer even than does the substantiated observation that he believed in and admired *areté*. Few Greeks could be denied that attribute; what is important is that Pindar seems to have belonged to that group of a few Greeks and a few others who convey their ideas about the topic more cogently and attractively than most, and thus have become poets of their times and ours.

APPENDIX I

THE THEME OF THE NEAR AND THE FAR [1]

	regard [2]	*near/present/possible* [3]	*regard* [4]	*far/absent/future/ impossible* [5]
Hesiod				
fr. 219	λιπών	ἕτοιμα	διώκει	ἀνέτοιμα
Op. 365 ff.[6]	(βέλτερον)	οἴκοι	(βλαβερόν)	τὸ θύρηφιν
	(ἑλέσθαι)	παρεόντος	χρῄζειν	ἀπεόντος
Theognis				
1151	μεθεὶς	τὸν παρεόντα φίλον	ἐρεύνα	ἄλλον
Pindar [7]				
Py. 3, 20			ἤρατο	τῶν ἀπεόντων
22 f.	αἰσχύνων	ἐπιχώρια [8]	παπταίνει	τὰ πόρσω
			θηρεύων [9]	μεταμώνια
59 f.	(μαστευέμεν)	τὰ ἐοικότα [10]		
	(γνόντα)	τὸ πὰρ ποδός		
61 f.[11]	(ἄντλει)	τὰν ἔμπρακτον μαχανάν	σπεῦδε	βίον ἀθάνατον
108 f.	(ἀσκήσω)	τὸν ἀμφέποντ' αἰεὶ δαίμονα [12]		
111			<ἐλπίδα	εὑρέσθαι πρόσω> [13]
Py. 10, 62 f.[14]	([ὁρούῃ])	φροντίδα τὰν πὰρ ποδός	προνοῆσαι	τὰ εἰς ἐνιαυτόν
Py. 11, 51 [15]	(μαιόμενος)	δυνατά		
Ne. 3, 29 f.	(μάτευε)	οἴκοθεν	ἔρωτες	ἀλλοτρίων
Is. 7, 40-44a	(διώκων)	ὅ τι τερπνὸν ἐφάμερον	παπταίνει	τὰ μακρά
Is. 8, 13 f.	(σκοπεῖν)	τὸ πρὸ ποδὸς χρῆμα		
fr. 44, 27 ff.[16]	(στέρξαι)	τὸ οἴκοθεν	[ἔρως]	ἑκὰς ἐόντων
Bacchylides				
1, 167	(ζώειν)	ἀπ' οἰκείων		
1, 174 ff.	οὐδὲν γλυκύ	τὸ πάντων εὐμαρεῖν	δίζηνται κιχεῖν	τὰ φεύγοντα
Aeschylus				
Pers. 825 f.	ὑπερφρονήσας	τὸν παρόντα δαίμονα	ἐρασθεὶς	ἄλλων
Sophocles				
Ant. 90			ἐρᾷς	ἀμηχάνων
92			θηρᾶν	τἀμήχανα
El. 392	οὐ μνείαν ἔχεις	τοῦ παρόντος βίου		
O.T. 130 f.[17]	(σκοπεῖν)	τὸ πρὸς ποσί	(μεθέντας)	τἀφανῆ
Euripides				
Ba. 398 f.	οὐχὶ φέροι ἄν	τὰ παρόντα	διώκων	μεγάλα
Hipp. 184 f.	οὐδέ σε ἀρέσκει	τὸ παρόν	φίλτερον ἡγῇ	τὸ ἀπόν
Rh. 482	μεθεὶς	τἀγγύθεν	σκόπει	τὰ πόρρω
fr. 1076, 2 f.	ἀμπλακεῖν	τοῦ παρόντος	ἔρως	τῶν ἀμηχάνων
1077	οὐχὶ σῴζοντες	τὰς παρούσας τύχας	ἐρῶντες	μειζόνων

THE THEME OF THE NEAR AND THE FAR[1]

(continued)

	regard [2]	*near/present/possible* [3]	*regard* [4]	*far/absent/future/ impossible* [5]
Herodotus I, 33	μετείς	τὰ παρεόντα ἀγαθά	ἐκέλευε ὁρᾶν	τελευτὴν παντός
Thucydides [18]				
V, 87	ἄλλο τι ἢ βουλεύσοντες	ἐκ τῶν παρόντων καὶ ὧν ὁρᾶτε	ὑπονοίας	τῶν μελλόντων
89	(διαπράσσεσθαι)	τὰ δυνατά		
113		τῶν δρωμένων	σαφέστερα κρίνετε ὡς γιγνόμενα θεᾶσθε	τά μέλλοντα τὰ ἀφανῆ
VI, 9, 3	(σῴζειν)	τὰ ὑπάρχοντα		
	κινδυνεύειν	τοῖς ἑτοίμοις	περὶ	τῶν ἀφανῶν καὶ μελλόντων
10, 5	πρὶν βεβαιωσώμεθα	ἣν ἔχομεν	ὀρέγεσθαι	ἀρχῆς ἄλλης
13, 1			δυσέρωτας	τῶν ἀπόντων
24, 3			πόθῳ	τῆς ἀπούσης ὄψεως
Lysias				
12, 45 [19]	(ἐπιθυμοῦντας ἀπαλλαγῆναι)	τῶν παρόντων κακῶν	(οὐκ ἐνθυμήσεσθαι)	περὶ τῶν μελλόντων
Aesopica[20]				
18 (I)	παρείς	τὸ ἐν χερσὶ κέρδος	ἐλπίδα	ἄδηλον
(II)	παρείς	τὸ ἐν χερσὶ κέρδος	διώκειν	ἄδηλα
(III)	παρείς	τὸ ἐν χερσὶ κέρδος	ἐλπίζειν	τὸ προσδοκώμενον
(I, cf. II)	(αἱρετώτερον)	τὸ παρὸν κέρδος		τοῦ προσδοκωμένου
(III)	ἀφείς	τὰ ἐν χερσί	δι' ἐλπίδα	μείζονος
Plato [21]				
Tht. 173e	ἀτιμάσασα	ταῦτα [sc. τὰ ἐν πόλει]	πέτεται ἀστρονομοῦσα	"τᾶς τε γᾶς ὑπένερθε" "οὐρανοῦ θ' ὕπερ"
174a	οὐδὲν αὑτὴν συγκαθιεῖσα	εἰς τῶν ἐγγύς		
	λανθάνοι αὐτόν	τὰ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ καὶ παρὰ πόδας	προθυμοῖτο εἰδέναι	τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ
174c	(διαλέγεσθαι)	περὶ τῶν παρὰ πόδας καὶ τῶν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς		
175b	ἀγνοῶν	τὰ ἐν ποσί [22]		
Theocritus				
Id. 10, 8			ποθέσαι	τῶν ἀπεόντων τινά
9			πόθος	τῶν ἔκτοθεν
11, 75 [23]	(ἄμελγε)	τὰν παρεοῖσαν	διώκεις	τὸν φεύγοντα
Lucretius [24]				
III, 957	temnis	praesentia	aves	quod abest

NOTES TO APPENDIX I

[1] For the basic form of this catalogue and for almost all of the examples from tragedy I am greatly indebted to Erling Holtsmark, "Some aspects of style and theme in the *Persae*" (unpublished 1963 University of California, Berkeley, dissertation), p. 152; also to Prof. J. R. Wilson for informing me of Prof. Holtsmark's catalogue and for sending me a copy of the relevant page. I owe the excellent examples from Aesop and from Lucretius to my colleague, Prof. A. W. Bennett. The list is not intended as exhaustive or even necessarily as representative, but rather to show the similarities of thematic expression through Greek literature, to show the extraordinary rôle played by Pindar in the continuity of that tradition, and to help elucidate the vocabulary-variants of the theme as it develops in Py. 3. The theme, of course, has many forms (see p. 49, note 1 *supra*) and strong relationships to other themes with which it may reveal crossing over (e.g., Py. 11, 51 is used primarily as an integral part of the *topos* of the simple life [p. 14 *supra*]). Discussion of related themes is impossible here, but since the theme of disastrous union with an outsider (see p. 37, note 2 *supra*) is pertinent to Py. 3, I might note that it may appear with the same implications in truncated form (ἐπακτὸν ἄνδρα, Sophocles *Aias* 1296) and that Vergil reverses it for Lavinia, who must marry not a native but a foreigner (*Aen.* 7, 96 ff., etc.).

[2] Words indicating disregard, rather than regard, will prevail (except in Pindar) in this column, and I have consequently placed verbs expressing positive regard in parentheses. Of the four, this column reveals the least consistency of vocabulary (except for the words of positive regard which also appear in column 3), but there occur several compounds of ἵημι and many words meaning 'contemn.'

[3] By far the most frequent word in this column is παρόν (13 times); variants of πὰρ ποδός occur seven times, forms derived from οἶκος, four times, and ἐγγύς, ἕτοιμος, and δυνατά (cf. τὰν ἔμπρακτον μαχανάν, Py. 3, 62) occur in more than one author. The remaining terms are synonyms of these or express comparable notions (with Thucydides' forms of ὁράω cf. Plato's τῶν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς).

[4] Here nouns and verbs derived from ἐρα- prevail (seven times or eight with the conjecture in Pindar fr. 44; cf. χρῄζειν in Hesiod, φίλτερον ἡγῇ in Euripides); words derived from ἐλπίς have four occurrences, but three of these are variants in the Aesop fable (cf., however, the unlisted ἀκράντοις ἐλπίσιν, Py. 3, 23); διώκω (which also occurs in the first column as positive regard) occurs in three different authors; words from both ποθ- and θηρ- occur in more than one author; with σκοπέω (once in column 3, twice in column 1) cf. παπταίνω (twice in Pindar). The remaining terms express an idea comparable to one or more of these (see also Bundy II, n. 120).

[5] Here a number of stock terms are manifest, but as παρόν prevails in column 1, ἀπόν is most frequent in column 3 (six times). The participle of μέλλω occurs four times (but three of these are in Thucydides; yet cf. τὰ εἰς ἐνιαυτόν in Pindar); ἄλλος (cf. ἀλλοτρίων in Pindar) is used by three authors, ἀφανής, three times in two authors (cf. ἄδηλον in Aesop), as is πόρσω (cf. ἑκάς and μακρός in Pindar and the expressions in Plato). Three authors use degrees of μέγας; with the tragedians' use of ἀμήχανος cf. δυνατά and μεταμώνια in column 1.

[6] βέλτερον and βλαβερόν, of course, are not words indicating regard, but Hesiod's forthright expression is often refreshing, and could not be omitted here.

[7] I have included several phrases from Py. 3 whose affinity to the general *topos* is apparent only in the context of that poem in order to show how they do, in fact, conform to the *topos*. Of especial interest in the Pindaric examples is the frequency of terms which denote positive regard for the near/present/possible-term and thus result in phrases which approve proper action rather than censure folly. Many of these phrases occur in general commendations stated in the first person (p. 12 *supra*).

[8] It seems certain that this word ("native," often applied to people), which suits the theme well but is otherwise absent from this list, occurs here because of its lack of applicability to Ischys (p. 36 *supra*).

[9] Cf. Sophocles *Ant.* 92 *(infra)*.

[10] τὰ ἐοικότα conforms to the theme only because Pindar makes it so, but the relationship of μαστευέμεν to other verbs of the catalogue is obvious, as is, in the context, that of τὰ ἐοικότα to the stock term τὸ πὰρ ποδός.

[11] With τὰν ἔμπρακτον μαχανάν cf. ἀμήχανα in Sophocles and Euripides. βίον ἀθάνατον enters this list only by virtue of its being, in the context, a specification of τὰ ἀμήχανα and because of the relationship of σπεῦδε to the other terms of its column.

[12] Cf. Aeschylus *Pers.* 825 *(infra)*.

[13] Pindar's way of developing a unique theme within received conventions is probably nowhere more apparent than here, where the terminology used in the phrase places it in columns 3 and 4, but its contextual function makes it conform to the notion of positive regard for the near and possible (pp. 61 f. *supra*).

[14] The exegesis and even the syntax of this sentence are much disputed, but its affinity to the theme of the near and the far is clear (see, e.g., Burton, p. 12). ὁρούῃ, which takes up the ἔρωτες of *v.* 60 (see "Pindaric Criticism," n. 125) and prefaces terms of the *topos*, is comparable to many of the terms denoting regard.

[15] I include this phrase (see note 1 *supra*) because of its similarity to Thucydides V, 89 *(infra)* and its relationship to the other terms referring to possibility in columns 2 and 4.

[16] Fr. 44 (= Paean 4) is of especial interest for this *topos*, as the greater part of its extant portion seems to be built around the theme of the superiority of the near and native to the distant and foreign, and of that theme *vv.* 27 ff. (32-35 Snell^2) contain a patent example of which the intent, despite the mutilated text, can be clearly discerned. Wilamowitz' reconstruction (*Pindaros*, p. 473) gives the proper sense, but Housman's reconstruction of *v.* 29 (34 Snell^2) is far superior (see Snell's apparatus *ad loc.*). The word designating the regard for the distant things is lost, but the conjectures of Housman and Wilamowitz (ἔρως and ἔρον), respectively, conform to the vocabulary displayed in the column to which the missing word belongs. For ματαίων, *v.* 29 (35), cf. ματαιότατον φῦλον, Py. 3, 21 (in precisely the same context).

[17] This example varies from the usual form, for the recommendation of the traditional theme, attention to present concerns and disregard for the obscure, is offered as an excuse for inattention to a matter which was of secondary importance at an earlier time. The same form and contextual function, along with the same metathesis of the terms for regard and disregard, occur in the Lysias example *infra*.

[18] Thucydides, not unlike Pindar as a master of the literary art, most ingeniously has the Athenians contemptuously apply the *topos* to the Melians in Bk. 5; then he makes Nicias use the same theme to rebuke the Athenians themselves in the debate about the expedition against the distant land, Sicily. Thucydides himself then applies a few of the thematic terms to the Athenians, as he describes their preparation for the expedition; finally, when recounting the subsequent Athenian difficulties, he presents the same theme in concrete terms (7, 28, 3), calling the fact that the Athenians should besiege Sicily, while they themselves were being besieged at home, παράλογον. Complete disaster (πανωλεθρία) results for the Athenians, yet ταῦτα μὲν τὰ περὶ Σικελίαν γενόμενα (7, 87, 6). See in general Kitto, *Poiesis* pp. 326 ff. Thus Thucydides' use of the *topos* emerges magnificently, and the Athenians' use of the *topos* during the Melian debate proves an irony not unworthy of Sophocles.

[19] See note 17 *supra*.

[20] Because of the differences in terminology, I include all three versions (Aesopica 18 Hausrath, 28 Halm).

[21] It is rather fascinating to observe that Plato, as is his wont, perverts the traditional Greek theme, or at least speaks directly contrary to the values of the traditional themes of his Greek antecedents; also that in recommending scorn for τὰ παρὰ πόδας (as the whole passage in the *Theaetetus* commends the star-gazing philosopher who has no knowledge of the things around him) and attention to distant, abstruse things, Plato quotes (column 4) phrases from Pindar; in view of the above catalogue Plato's choice of authors here seems ironic and perhaps even somewhat incongruous.

[22] The first participial clause of the sentence seems rather obscure and, because of the balance between τὰ μέν and τὰ δέ, perhaps has a meaning other than that given in *LSJ s.v.* ὑπερήφανος.

[23] Here the theme is partially appropriated to the theme of unrequited love and combined with it; cf. such related themes as φεύγει φιλέοντα καὶ οὐ φιλέοντα διώκει (*Id.* 6, 17).

[24] There are, of course, many examples from Latin literature; I include the above passage as being exemplary, since each word could be a translation of the most common equivalent Greek term of the *topos*.

APPENDIX II

THE STRUCTURE OF *OLYMPIAN* I (*ad* p. 111)

Others have pointed out the structural symmetry of *Olympian* 1,[1] but its rigidity, even in proportions and transitions, is more unusual and noteworthy than is commonly recognized. The following topics occur in order: superlatives, praise of Hieron, his Olympic victory, a myth about Pelops, a myth about Tantalus, another Pelops-myth, Olympic victory, praise of Hieron, and superlatives. Yet even the transitions between these concentrically balanced topics are symmetrical. The first and last transitions probably both contain the metaphor of missiles for poetry (*vv.* 8 and 112).[2] The transitions between the sections containing general praise of Hieron and those concerned with Olympic victory both mention the actual performance of the song with reference to one of the national distinctions used to describe music and dance (*vv.* 17 and 102). The transitions to and from the mythical section concern the shining of κλέος from Olympia, and they are so similar to each other as to suggest a kind of ring-form (*vv.* 23 and 93 f.). The transitions, within the myth, to and from the story of Tantalus reveal no similarities of content or vocabulary, but have the same function as transitional gnomes.

Furthermore, surprising symmetrical detail arises in the length of each section relative to the length of the section to which it corresponds topically, for the members of the balancing pairs are of virtually the same length. In the following schema capital letters

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[1] Mezger, p. 95, Duchemin, p. 159, Fraccaroli, p. 125. Mezger's *schema* differs numerically from that given below, but the major difference arises from his neglecting to distinguish structurally the three stories contained in the mythical portion of the poem.

[2] The imagery of ὕμνος ἀμφιβάλλεται has been disputed, but Gildersleeve argues cogently that the phrase contains the common (to Gildersleeve's list, p. 391 *s.v.* missiles, add Is. 2,3 and Is. 5, 51 f.) Pindaric metaphor of missiles for poetry (see his note *ad loc.* with reference to such parallels as Euripides *H.F.* 422); for this image in transitional motifs see Gundert, n. 254. The notion that Ol. 1, *v.* 8 implies poetic βέλη, missiles, goes back to Tafel (1824) according to Rauchenstein (*Comment. part.* II, 5, *q.v.* for other interpretations of the imagery), who unnecessarily terms Tafel's explanation "nimis audax."

represent the principal divisions of the poem according to subject matter, lower-case letters, the transitional terms between them. The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of verses contained within each part:

A a B b C c D d E d′ D′ c′ C′ b′ B′ a′ A′
(7) (10) (8) (31) (12) (31) (8) (10) (7)

Or, to elaborate the matter as to subject and verse: [1]

7	A	(*vv.* 1-7): superlatives (general)
	a	(*v.* 8): ὕμνος ἀμφιβάλλεται
10	B	(*vv.* 8-17): general praise of Hieron
	b	(*v.* 17): Δωρίαν φόρμιγγα
8	C	(*vv.* 18-24b): (Hieron's) Olympic victory
	c	(*vv.* 23-24b): λάμπει δέ οἱ κλέος
31	D	(*vv.* 25-53b): first Pelops-myth
	d	(*vv.* 53-53b): transitional gnome
12	E	(*vv.* 54-64): story of Tantalus
	d′	(*v.* 64): transitional gnome
31	D′	(*vv.* 65-94): second Pelops-myth
	c′	(*vv.* 93-95): τὸ δὲ κλέος δέδορκε
8	C′	(*vv.* 94[?]-103): Olympic victory (general)
	b′	(*v.* 102): Αἰοληΐδι μολπᾷ
10	B′	(*vv.* 103-111b): general praise of Hieron
	a′	(*vv.* 111b f.): Μοῖσα τρέφει βέλος
7	A′	(*vv.* 111b-116): superlatives (specific)

[1] To reduce the structure of a poem to a diagram always gives rise to oversimplification and invites censure, yet it sometimes provides a desirable clarity. The form of the diagram here is, of course, modeled after the kind of diagram, termed *Einschachtelung* or 'Chinese box,' now often used to illustrate this kind of symmetrical structure (whether real or imagined). Such diagrams in C. H. Whitman, *Homer and the Homeric tradition*, Chap. XI *passim* and especially the elaborate *schema* at the back and in J. L. Myres, *Herodotus, the father of history, passim*, have been met with some astonishment, perhaps because the magnitude of those authors' works allows considerable latitude and subjectivity in the determination of structurally crucial subject matter. The result has been that such scholars as Whitman and Myres have often sought an overly precise symmetry, and their exaggerations have unnecessarily detracted, in the minds of some critics, from their sound observation and presentation of palpable and important symmetry. Similar diagrams of short works must conform rather strictly to all the subject matter, and therefore can sometimes be persuasively precise; see, e.g., F. O. Copley on Ps.-Theocritus *Id.* 23, *TAPA* 71 (1940), 56. In Catullan studies, where such diagrams have long been common (cf. R. Ellis, *Catulli*

These precise numerical correspondences are slightly arbitrary, since the problems of the placement of transitional passages, of the termination of topical sections within the verse, and of prosodic judgments exclude a mathematical accuracy in such matters.[1] But the mere mechanics and numerical equivalences are of little or no importance. Pertinent is the fact that the parts of the poem unmistakably balance each other in a symmetrical manner in respect to both bulk and subject matter. The manifold effects of such balance are not merely those of aesthetically pleasing symmetry. Although many of the contributions of the structure to the poem's meaning emerge only under elaborate thematic analysis, some may be mentioned here. The emphasis on superlativity at both the beginning and the end of the poem accents the importance, to the poem and throughout it, of the very idea of superlativity as presented in such themes as those of the heroic act, of the Olympian games, and of Hieron's position in the world. The balanced expressions about the shining of κλέος, the one pertaining to Hieron, the other, to Pelops, tend to clarify the paradigmatic relationship of Pelops' Olympic success to Hieron's victory. The organizational connection of the sections on Olympic victory, the first being specific, the second, general, emphasizes the applicability of the generalities to Hieron. The structural isolation of the Tantalus-myth and its removal from all contexts directly associated with Hieron elucidate its function as foil for the subjects with which the poem is elsewhere concerned, especially, for example, Hieron's way of life. Thus the intricate symmetrical structure appears so exact as to be obviously intentional and so effective as to be clearly purposeful.

*Veronensis liber*², pp. 271 ff. and especially p. 275), the most famous is that of Frank Skutsch, *Rhein. Mus.* 47 (1892), 140, which has been reproduced by Kroll in his Teubner edition of Catullus (ed. 4, p. 219) and by D. Thomson, *Class. Journ.* 57 (1961-2), 50. For Catullus 68 cf. also J. Wohlberg, *Class. Philol.* 50 (1955), 44, and for Catullus 64, D. Thomson, *loc. cit.* and R. A. Swanson, *Odi et amo: the complete poetry of Catullus*, p. X. The structural diagrams of Pindar's odes in Mezger, *passim*, are comparable, but they probably hark back to those in Dissen's chapter *de dispositione partium* (Dissen² I, L-LXII), knowledge of which I rather doubt most modern composers of such diagrams possess.

[1] I.e., perhaps D′ contains 32 verses, rather than 31, B′, 11 verses instead of 10; I have rounded off fractions of verses; Turyn's verse-divisions may not be flawless, etc.: but the fact of the symmetrical organization does not stand or fall upon these attractive, but arbitrarily perfect, proportions. And it should be noted that, with a single, minor exception (the placement of the short transitional sentence of *vv.* 100 ff.), the obvious rhetorical divisions support rather than oppose these exact proportions.

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EXPLANATORY NOTE CONCERNING CITATIONS

The abbreviations Ol., Py., Ne., and Is. indicate the *Olympian*, *Pythian*, *Nemean*, and *Isthmian Odes*, respectively. All citations of Pindar refer to Turyn's edition (for departures from Turyn's text see page 2, n. 4 and p. 57 *supra*); of Bacchylides, to Snell's edition. Citations of Pindaric fragments follow the Turyn numbering, but the Snell^{3} numbers (which are, so far as possible, the same as in Schroeder [after Bergk]) are given in parentheses. The books of the *Iliad* and of the *Odyssey* are designated by capital and lower case Greek letters respectively. Otherwise citations of ancient authors are either given in full or abbreviated according to *LSJ* (= Liddell-Scott-Jones, *Greek-English Lexicon*). Departures, when significant, from the use of editions upon which *LSJ* is based are indicated, but most frequently the numbers of both the old edition and of that which generally supplants it (e.g., LP [Lobel and Page, *Poetarum Lesbiorum fragmenta*] and *PMG* [Page, *Poetae melici Graeci*]) are given. Citations of modern criticism refer to the following bibliography; when the author's name alone is cited, reference is made to the first entry under that name (except where the context clearly indicates a text, commentary, or translation among the several works of the author).

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